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allure-commandline CVEs

1 CVE, 1 protected by Waratek

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Vendor io.qameta.allure✕Product allure-commandline✕
Overview 1 match · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
1match 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 1 100.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 0 0.0% Medium 1 100.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 1 100.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 0 0.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 1 100.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
split by peak 1 / month
Protected by Waratek: 1 Medium: 1 blocked by ARMR today: 1 Proof of concept only: 1
Sep 26
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-55846 Medium 2026-09-14 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only Allure 2 is the version 2.x branch of Allure Report, a multi-language test reporting tool. Prior to 2.39.0, the HTTP server started by allure serve and allure open uses URI.getPath() in Commands.setUpServer() in allure-commandline/src/main/java/io/qameta/allure/Commands.java and passes the percent-decoded request path to reportDirectory.resolve() without normalizing the result or confirming that it remains inside that directory. An unauthenticated client that can reach the server can submit parent-directory segments, including percent-encoded segments, and cause serveFile() to return any regular file readable by the Allure process. The server binds to localhost by default, but the --host option can expose it to other systems, and local users, adjacent containers, or browser-origin attacks may reach a local listener. This can disclose credentials, configuration, source code, build secrets, and other CI/CD data. This issue is fixed in version 2.39.0.