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Overview 5 matches · 1 exploited · 1 CISA KEV · 3 public PoC · 3 EPSS ≥ 0.5
5matches 1exploited20.0% 1CISA KEV20.0% 3public PoC60.0% 3EPSS ≥ 0.560.0%
Protected by Waratek 5 100.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 5 100.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 5 100.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 0 0.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 1 20.0% Working exploit published 2 40.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 2 40.0%
split by peak 2 / year
Protected by Waratek: 5 High: 5 blocked by ARMR today: 5 No public exploit: 2Working exploit published: 2Exploited: 1
20151 Protected by Waratek1 High1 blocked by ARMR today1 No public exploit1 20160 20170 20180 20190 20201 Protected by Waratek1 High1 blocked by ARMR today1 Working exploit published1 20210 20220 20231 Protected by Waratek1 High1 blocked by ARMR today1 Working exploit published1 20240 20250 20262 Protected by Waratek2 High2 blocked by ARMR today2 Exploited1 No public exploit1
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-43866 High 2026-07-06 Protected by Waratek No public exploit Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component. JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms - and the equivalent JmsBinding in camel-sjms - deserializes the payload of an incoming JMS ObjectMessage via jakarta.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() whenever the mapJmsMessage option is enabled (the default) and Camel acts as a JMS consumer. The CVE-2026-40860 hardening added a post-deserialization class check that rejects classes outside the default allow-list java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*. However org.apache.camel.support.DefaultExchangeHolder itself lives in the allow-listed org.apache.camel.** namespace, so an ObjectMessage whose top-level object is a DefaultExchangeHolder passes the check. The receiving side then calls DefaultExchangeHolder.unmarshal() on it without requiring the transferExchange option to be enabled - an asymmetric trust boundary, since the sending side gates ObjectMessage and transferExchange handling but the receiving side did not - writing every non-null field of the holder into the Exchange: the message body, the IN and OUT headers, the exchange properties, the variables, the exchange id and the exception. An attacker who can publish an ObjectMessage to a queue or topic consumed by an affected Camel application can therefore inject arbitrary Exchange state using only universally-trusted java.lang and java.util types, with no deserialization gadget chain required, to manipulate routing and headers, exchange properties and error handling. The same handling applies to camel-sjms and camel-sjms2, and to the JMS-family components built on JmsComponent and JmsBinding: camel-amqp, camel-activemq and camel-activemq6. This is a bypass of the CVE-2026-40860 fix rather than a flaw in it. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 3.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0; Apache Camel: from 3.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, JMS ObjectMessage handling is disabled by default in camel-jms, camel-sjms and the JMS-family components (a new objectMessageEnabled option defaults to false at the component and endpoint level), so an incoming ObjectMessage - including a DefaultExchangeHolder payload - is no longer deserialized unless the option is explicitly enabled; only set objectMessageEnabled=true when the consumed JMS destination is fed exclusively by trusted producers. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, restrict publish access to the queues and topics consumed by Camel to trusted producers via JMS broker authorization, and do not expose JMS consumers that map ObjectMessage bodies to untrusted networks; a JMS-provider deserialization allow-list does not mitigate this specific bypass because the crafted payload uses only universally-trusted classes.
CVE-2026-34197 High 2026-04-07 Protected by Waratek Exploited Improper Input Validation, Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ Broker, Apache ActiveMQ. Apache ActiveMQ Classic exposes the Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge at /api/jolokia/ on the web console. The default Jolokia access policy permits exec operations on all ActiveMQ MBeans (org.apache.activemq:*), including BrokerService.addNetworkConnector(String) and BrokerService.addConnector(String). An authenticated attacker can invoke these operations with a crafted discovery URI that triggers the VM transport's brokerConfig parameter to load a remote Spring XML application context using ResourceXmlApplicationContext. Because Spring's ResourceXmlApplicationContext instantiates all singleton beans before the BrokerService validates the configuration, arbitrary code execution occurs on the broker's JVM through bean factory methods such as Runtime.exec(). This issue affects Apache ActiveMQ Broker: before 5.19.4, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.3; Apache ActiveMQ All: before 5.19.4, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.3; Apache ActiveMQ: before 5.19.4, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.3. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 5.19.4 or 6.2.3, which fixes the issue
CVE-2022-41678 High 2023-11-28 Protected by Waratek Working exploit published Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger arbitrary code execution.  In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty allows org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to create JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest. Into deeper calling stacks, org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest can be invoked through refection. This could lead to RCE through via various mbeans. One example is unrestricted deserialization in jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version above 11. 1 Call newRecording. 2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data hides in it. 3 Call startRecording. 4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will be written to a .jsp file. The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia. A more restrictive Jolokia configuration has been defined in default ActiveMQ distribution. We encourage users to upgrade to ActiveMQ distributions version including updated Jolokia configuration: 5.16.6, 5.17.4, 5.18.0, 6.0.0.
CVE-2020-26217 High 2020-11-16 Protected by Waratek Working exploit published XStream before version 1.4.14 is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution.The vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to run arbitrary shell commands only by manipulating the processed input stream. Only users who rely on blocklists are affected. Anyone using XStream's Security Framework allowlist is not affected. The linked advisory provides code workarounds for users who cannot upgrade. The issue is fixed in version 1.4.14.
CVE-2014-3576 High 2015-08-14 Protected by Waratek No public exploit The processControlCommand function in broker/TransportConnection.java in Apache ActiveMQ before 5.11.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (shutdown) via a shutdown command.