org.geonetwork-opensource CVEs

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Overview 1 match · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5

1match 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%

Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 1 100.0% No exploit published 0 0.0%

Critical 0 0.0% High 1 100.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%

blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 1 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%

Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 1 100.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%

split by StatusSeverityProtectionExploit maturity peak 1 / month

Sep 261 Mitigation candidate1 High1 not blocked1 Working exploit published1

Sep 26

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CVE	Severity	Published▾	Status	Exploitation	Description
CVE-2026-55864	High	2026-09-15	Mitigation candidate	Working exploit published	GeoNetwork is a catalog application to manage spatially referenced resources. Prior to 4.2.17 and 4.4.12, POST /api/tools/ogc/sld accepted a caller-supplied WMS server URL and performed a server-side HTTP GET without destination validation. An anonymous attacker could make the GeoNetwork server send requests to internal hosts that are not publicly reachable. When the outbound response was XML, the endpoint could store and return the fetched body, making the request forgery non-blind and enabling internal data disclosure, authorization bypass, and network reconnaissance. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.17 and 4.4.12.

CVE

Severity

Published▾

Status

Exploitation

Description

CVE-2026-55864

High

2026-09-15

Mitigation candidate

Working exploit published

GeoNetwork is a catalog application to manage spatially referenced resources. Prior to 4.2.17 and 4.4.12, POST /api/tools/ogc/sld accepted a caller-supplied WMS server URL and performed a server-side HTTP GET without destination validation. An anonymous attacker could make the GeoNetwork server send requests to internal hosts that are not publicly reachable. When the outbound response was XML, the endpoint could store and return the fetched body, making the request forgery non-blind and enabling internal data disclosure, authorization bypass, and network reconnaissance. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.17 and 4.4.12.