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Vendor com.alibaba✕Has a public PoC✕
Overview 3 matches · 1 protected · 1 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches 1protected33.3% 1exploited33.3% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 1 33.3% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 2 66.7% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 3 100.0% High 0 0.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 1 33.3% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 2 66.7% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 1 33.3% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 2 66.7% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-16723 Critical 2026-07-23 Protected by Waratek Exploited A remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in fastjson 1.2.68 through 1.2.83. This vulnerability is exploitable under fastjson's stock default configuration — no AutoType enablement required, no classpath gadget required.
CVE-2022-25845 Critical 2022-06-10 Mitigation candidate Proof of concept only The package com.alibaba:fastjson before 1.2.83 are vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data by bypassing the default autoType shutdown restrictions, which is possible under certain conditions. Exploiting this vulnerability allows attacking remote servers. Workaround: If upgrading is not possible, you can enable [safeMode](https://github.com/alibaba/fastjson/wiki/fastjson_safemode).
CVE-2021-25641 Critical 2021-06-01 Mitigation candidate Proof of concept only Each Apache Dubbo server will set a serialization id to tell the clients which serialization protocol it is working on. But for Dubbo versions before 2.7.8 or 2.6.9, an attacker can choose which serialization id the Provider will use by tampering with the byte preamble flags, aka, not following the server's instruction. This means that if a weak deserializer such as the Kryo and FST are somehow in code scope (e.g. if Kryo is somehow a part of a dependency), a remote unauthenticated attacker can tell the Provider to use the weak deserializer, and then proceed to exploit it.