Overview 2 matches · 0 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches
0in Waratek scope0.0%
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
2
100.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
2
100.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 1 / month
Nov 21Jan 22Mar 22May 22Jul 22Sep 22Nov 22Jan 23Mar 23
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-20052 | Medium | 2023-03-01 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | On Feb 15, 2023, the following vulnerability in the ClamAV scanning library was disclosed: A vulnerability in the DMG file parser of ClamAV versions 1.0.0 and earlier, 0.105.1 and earlier, and 0.103.7 and earlier could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to access sensitive information on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to enabling XML entity substitution that may result in XML external entity injection. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted DMG file to be scanned by ClamAV on an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to leak bytes from any file that may be read by the ClamAV scanning process. |
| CVE-2002-20001 | High | 2021-11-11 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | The Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocol allows remote attackers (from the client side) to send arbitrary numbers that are actually not public keys, and trigger expensive server-side DHE modular-exponentiation calculations, aka a D(HE)at or D(HE)ater attack. The client needs very little CPU resources and network bandwidth. The attack may be more disruptive in cases where a client can require a server to select its largest supported key size. The basic attack scenario is that the client must claim that it can only communicate with DHE, and the server must be configured to allow DHE. |