Overview 4 matches · 3 in Waratek scope · 1 protected · 3 exploited · 1 CISA KEV · 2 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
1
25.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
2
50.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
1
25.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
1
25.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
75.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
3
75.0%
Working exploit published
1
25.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 2 / quarter
Q3 182
Mitigation candidate1
Not applicable1
Medium2
not blocked2
Exploited1
Working exploit published1
Q4 180
Q1 190
Q2 190
Q3 190
Q4 190
Q1 200
Q2 201
Mitigation candidate1
Critical1
not blocked1
Exploited1
Q3 200
Q4 200
Q1 210
Q2 210
Q3 210
Q4 210
Q1 220
Q2 220
Q3 221
Protected by Waratek1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
Exploited1
Q3 18Q1 19Q3 19Q1 20Q3 20Q1 21Q3 21Q1 22Q3 22
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2022-33891 | High | 2022-07-18 | Protected by Waratek | Exploited | The Apache Spark UI offers the possibility to enable ACLs via the configuration option spark.acls.enable. With an authentication filter, this checks whether a user has access permissions to view or modify the application. If ACLs are enabled, a code path in HttpSecurityFilter can allow someone to perform impersonation by providing an arbitrary user name. A malicious user might then be able to reach a permission check function that will ultimately build a Unix shell command based on their input, and execute it. This will result in arbitrary shell command execution as the user Spark is currently running as. This affects Apache Spark versions 3.0.3 and earlier, versions 3.1.1 to 3.1.2, and versions 3.2.0 to 3.2.1. |
| CVE-2020-9480 | Critical | 2020-06-23 | Mitigation candidate | Exploited | In Apache Spark 2.4.5 and earlier, a standalone resource manager's master may be configured to require authentication (spark.authenticate) via a shared secret. When enabled, however, a specially-crafted RPC to the master can succeed in starting an application's resources on the Spark cluster, even without the shared key. This can be leveraged to execute shell commands on the host machine. This does not affect Spark clusters using other resource managers (YARN, Mesos, etc). |
| CVE-2018-11770 | Medium | 2018-08-13 | Mitigation candidate | Exploited | From version 1.3.0 onward, Apache Spark's standalone master exposes a REST API for job submission, in addition to the submission mechanism used by spark-submit. In standalone, the config property 'spark.authenticate.secret' establishes a shared secret for authenticating requests to submit jobs via spark-submit. However, the REST API does not use this or any other authentication mechanism, and this is not adequately documented. In this case, a user would be able to run a driver program without authenticating, but not launch executors, using the REST API. This REST API is also used by Mesos, when set up to run in cluster mode (i.e., when also running MesosClusterDispatcher), for job submission. Future versions of Spark will improve documentation on these points, and prohibit setting 'spark.authenticate.secret' when running the REST APIs, to make this clear. Future versions will also disable the REST API by default in the standalone master by changing the default value of 'spark.master.rest.enabled' to 'false'. |
| CVE-2018-8024 | Medium | 2018-07-12 | Not applicable | Working exploit published | In Apache Spark 2.1.0 to 2.1.2, 2.2.0 to 2.2.1, and 2.3.0, it's possible for a malicious user to construct a URL pointing to a Spark cluster's UI's job and stage info pages, and if a user can be tricked into accessing the URL, can be used to cause script to execute and expose information from the user's view of the Spark UI. While some browsers like recent versions of Chrome and Safari are able to block this type of attack, current versions of Firefox (and possibly others) do not. |