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Published to 2022-08-31✕Vendor org.springframework.security✕Has a public PoC✕
Overview 3 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches 1protected33.3% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 1 33.3% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 2 66.7% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 1 33.3% High 0 0.0% Medium 2 66.7% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 1 33.3% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 2 66.7% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 1 33.3% Proof of concept only 2 66.7% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
split by peak 1 / year
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2022-22978 Critical 2022-05-19 Mitigation candidate Proof of concept only In spring security versions prior to 5.4.11+, 5.5.7+ , 5.6.4+ and older unsupported versions, RegexRequestMatcher can easily be misconfigured to be bypassed on some servlet containers. Applications using RegexRequestMatcher with `.` in the regular expression are possibly vulnerable to an authorization bypass.
CVE-2011-2732 Medium 2012-12-05 Mitigation candidate Working exploit published CRLF injection vulnerability in the logout functionality in VMware SpringSource Spring Security before 2.0.7 and 3.0.x before 3.0.6 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and conduct HTTP response splitting attacks via the spring-security-redirect parameter.
CVE-2011-2894 Medium 2011-10-04 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only Spring Framework 3.0.0 through 3.0.5, Spring Security 3.0.0 through 3.0.5 and 2.0.0 through 2.0.6, and possibly other versions deserialize objects from untrusted sources, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended security restrictions and execute untrusted code by (1) serializing a java.lang.Proxy instance and using InvocationHandler, or (2) accessing internal AOP interfaces, as demonstrated using deserialization of a DefaultListableBeanFactory instance to execute arbitrary commands via the java.lang.Runtime class.