Overview 5 matches · 1 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 2 exploited · 1 CISA KEV · 1 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
1
20.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
4
80.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
5
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
2
40.0%
Working exploit published
2
40.0%
Proof of concept only
1
20.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 2 / year
20201
Not applicable1
Medium1
not blocked1
Working exploit published1
20210
20220
20231
Mitigation candidate1
High1
not blocked1
Exploited1
20241
Not applicable1
Critical1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
20250
20262
Not applicable2
Critical1
High1
not blocked2
Exploited1
Working exploit published1
2020202120222023202420252026
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-85595 | Critical | 2026-09-04 | Not applicable | Working exploit published | Traefik versions before v2.11.55 and versions v3.0.0 through v3.7.10 contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in the digestAuth middleware where unknown usernames receive an empty secret instead of rejection. Attackers can compute a valid digest response using the empty secret and arbitrary credentials to bypass authentication on any digestAuth-protected route without a valid username or password. |
| CVE-2026-65600 | High | 2026-07-22 | Not applicable | Exploited | Traefik versions <= v2.11.51, >= v3.6.0 <= v3.6.22, and >= v3.7.0 <= v3.7.6 contain an authentication bypass via path traversal in the ReplacePathRegex middleware. When ReplacePathRegex is configured with a regex that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory path separator (e.g. regex "^/api(.*)", replacement "/$1"), the middleware forwards the replaced path to the backend without validating that it matches its normalized form. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a crafted request (e.g. GET /api../admin) that produces an un-normalized path such as /../admin, which a backend that normalizes paths resolves to a protected route, bypassing authentication middleware. Fixed in v2.11.52, v3.6.23, and v3.7.7. |
| CVE-2024-45410 | Critical | 2024-09-19 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | Traefik is a golang, Cloud Native Application Proxy. When a HTTP request is processed by Traefik, certain HTTP headers such as X-Forwarded-Host or X-Forwarded-Port are added by Traefik before the request is routed to the application. For a HTTP client, it should not be possible to remove or modify these headers. Since the application trusts the value of these headers, security implications might arise, if they can be modified. For HTTP/1.1, however, it was found that some of theses custom headers can indeed be removed and in certain cases manipulated. The attack relies on the HTTP/1.1 behavior, that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. This issue has been addressed in release versions 2.11.9 and 3.1.3. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. |
| CVE-2023-44487 | High | 2023-10-10 | Mitigation candidate | Exploited | The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023. |
| CVE-2020-15129 | Medium | 2020-07-30 | Not applicable | Working exploit published | In Traefik before versions 1.7.26, 2.2.8, and 2.3.0-rc3, there exists a potential open redirect vulnerability in Traefik's handling of the "X-Forwarded-Prefix" header. The Traefik API dashboard component doesn't validate that the value of the header "X-Forwarded-Prefix" is a site relative path and will redirect to any header provided URI. Successful exploitation of an open redirect can be used to entice victims to disclose sensitive information. Active Exploitation of this issue is unlikely as it would require active header injection, however the Traefik team addressed this issue nonetheless to prevent abuse in e.g. cache poisoning scenarios. |