Overview 3 matches · 2 protected · 1 exploited · 1 CISA KEV
Protected by Waratek
3
100.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
2
66.7%
partly blocked
1
33.3%
not blocked
0
0.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
1
33.3%
Working exploit published
2
66.7%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 1 / quarter
Q2 171
Protected by Waratek1
Critical1
blocked by ARMR today1
Working exploit published1
Q3 170
Q4 171
Protected by Waratek1
High1
partly blocked1
Exploited1
Q1 180
Q2 180
Q3 180
Q4 180
Q1 190
Q2 190
Q3 190
Q4 190
Q1 200
Q2 201
Protected by Waratek1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
Working exploit published1
Q2 17Q4 17Q2 18Q4 18Q2 19Q4 19Q2 20
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2020-9484 | High | 2020-05-20 | Protected by Waratek | Working exploit published | When using Apache Tomcat versions 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34, 8.5.0 to 8.5.54 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.103 if a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on the server; and b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a FileStore; and c) the PersistenceManager is configured with sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the attacker provided object to be deserialized; and d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage location used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over; then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able to trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for the attack to succeed. |
| CVE-2017-12617 | High | 2017-10-04 | Protected by Waratek | Exploited | When running Apache Tomcat versions 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.0, 8.5.0 to 8.5.22, 8.0.0.RC1 to 8.0.46 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.81 with HTTP PUTs enabled (e.g. via setting the readonly initialisation parameter of the Default servlet to false) it was possible to upload a JSP file to the server via a specially crafted request. This JSP could then be requested and any code it contained would be executed by the server. |
| CVE-2017-5645 | Critical | 2017-04-17 | Protected by Waratek | Working exploit published | In Apache Log4j 2.x before 2.8.2, when using the TCP socket server or UDP socket server to receive serialized log events from another application, a specially crafted binary payload can be sent that, when deserialized, can execute arbitrary code. |