Overview 234,730 matches · 9,380 in Waratek scope · 751 protected · 3,230 exploited · 789 CISA KEV · 4,490 public PoC · 1,105 EPSS ≥ 0.5
234,730matches
9,380in Waratek scope4.0%
751protected0.3%
3,230exploited1.4%
789CISA KEV0.3%
4,490public PoC1.9%
1,105EPSS ≥ 0.50.5%
Protected by Waratek
757
0.3%
Rule in development
4
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
129
0.1%
No exploit published
8,490
3.6%
Outside Waratek scope
791
0.3%
Not applicable
216,368
92.2%
Withdrawn CVE
8,191
3.5%
Critical
27,128
11.6%
High
89,241
38.0%
Medium
94,956
40.5%
Low
10,935
4.7%
None
79
0.0%
Unknown
12,391
5.3%
split by
peak 37,712 / quarter
Q3 222,323
Protected by Waratek16
Mitigation candidate2
No exploit published85
Outside Waratek scope29
Not applicable2,065
Withdrawn CVE126
Critical350
High1,006
Medium811
Low30
Unknown126
blocked by ARMR today16
not blocked2,307
Exploited28
Working exploit published29
Proof of concept only320
Forecast only10
No public exploit1,936
Q4 226,798
Protected by Waratek52
Mitigation candidate3
No exploit published196
Outside Waratek scope52
Not applicable5,925
Withdrawn CVE570
Critical1,069
High2,502
Medium2,571
Low84
Unknown572
blocked by ARMR today52
not blocked6,746
Exploited102
Working exploit published100
Proof of concept only1,519
Forecast only21
No public exploit5,056
Q1 237,822
Protected by Waratek41
Mitigation candidate2
No exploit published165
Outside Waratek scope58
Not applicable6,709
Withdrawn CVE847
Critical1,323
High2,795
Medium2,797
Low60
Unknown847
blocked by ARMR today41
not blocked7,781
Exploited141
Working exploit published134
Proof of concept only1,603
Forecast only39
No public exploit5,905
Q2 237,502
Protected by Waratek42
Mitigation candidate16
No exploit published296
Outside Waratek scope46
Not applicable6,732
Withdrawn CVE370
Critical1,129
High2,804
Medium3,111
Low88
Unknown370
blocked by ARMR today42
not blocked7,459
not established1
Exploited144
Working exploit published192
Proof of concept only1,451
Forecast only28
No public exploit5,687
Q3 237,709
Protected by Waratek39
Mitigation candidate8
No exploit published187
Outside Waratek scope48
Not applicable6,648
Withdrawn CVE779
Critical1,211
High2,780
Medium2,833
Low106
Unknown779
blocked by ARMR today39
not blocked7,670
Exploited150
Working exploit published149
Proof of concept only1,606
Forecast only15
No public exploit5,789
Q4 237,916
Protected by Waratek39
Mitigation candidate14
No exploit published234
Outside Waratek scope53
Not applicable7,439
Withdrawn CVE137
Critical1,368
High3,258
Medium3,083
Low69
Unknown138
blocked by ARMR today39
not blocked7,876
not established1
Exploited135
Working exploit published82
Proof of concept only930
Forecast only28
No public exploit6,741
Q1 248,905
Protected by Waratek35
Mitigation candidate13
No exploit published202
Outside Waratek scope49
Not applicable8,382
Withdrawn CVE224
Critical1,418
High3,330
Medium3,792
Low138
Unknown227
blocked by ARMR today35
not blocked8,870
Exploited181
Working exploit published100
Proof of concept only1,924
Forecast only15
No public exploit6,685
Q2 2412,011
Protected by Waratek21
Mitigation candidate4
No exploit published165
Outside Waratek scope41
Not applicable11,467
Withdrawn CVE313
Critical1,220
High4,552
Medium5,688
Low236
Unknown315
blocked by ARMR today21
not blocked11,990
Exploited212
Working exploit published100
Proof of concept only1,809
Forecast only53
No public exploit9,837
Q3 248,659
Protected by Waratek25
Mitigation candidate6
No exploit published111
Outside Waratek scope24
Not applicable8,357
Withdrawn CVE136
Critical1,045
High3,302
Medium4,016
Low160
Unknown136
blocked by ARMR today23
partly blocked2
not blocked8,634
Exploited170
Working exploit published108
Proof of concept only1,864
Forecast only8
No public exploit6,509
Q4 2411,129
Protected by Waratek27
Mitigation candidate5
No exploit published142
Outside Waratek scope72
Not applicable10,805
Withdrawn CVE78
Critical1,191
High4,148
Medium5,502
Low206
None1
Unknown81
blocked by ARMR today27
not blocked11,102
Exploited186
Working exploit published94
Proof of concept only1,869
Forecast only7
No public exploit8,973
Q1 2512,412
Protected by Waratek21
Mitigation candidate4
No exploit published151
Outside Waratek scope23
Not applicable11,747
Withdrawn CVE466
Critical1,155
High4,302
Medium6,190
Low299
Unknown466
blocked by ARMR today21
not blocked12,391
Exploited171
Working exploit published138
Proof of concept only2,409
Forecast only7
No public exploit9,687
Q2 2512,205
Protected by Waratek32
Rule in development1
Mitigation candidate8
No exploit published153
Outside Waratek scope31
Not applicable11,470
Withdrawn CVE510
Critical1,093
High3,931
Medium6,106
Low559
None6
Unknown510
blocked by ARMR today32
not blocked12,173
Exploited196
Working exploit published89
Proof of concept only2,808
Forecast only9
No public exploit9,103
Q3 2512,207
Protected by Waratek23
Rule in development1
Mitigation candidate6
No exploit published238
Outside Waratek scope39
Not applicable11,418
Withdrawn CVE482
Critical1,205
High3,992
Medium5,277
Low1,250
None1
Unknown482
blocked by ARMR today23
not blocked12,184
Exploited194
Working exploit published295
Proof of concept only3,016
Forecast only1
No public exploit8,701
Q4 2513,148
Protected by Waratek27
Rule in development2
Mitigation candidate7
No exploit published189
Outside Waratek scope46
Not applicable12,513
Withdrawn CVE364
Critical1,037
High4,445
Medium5,470
Low932
None3
Unknown1,261
blocked by ARMR today27
not blocked13,119
not established2
Exploited185
Working exploit published71
Proof of concept only2,746
No public exploit10,146
Q1 2616,255
Protected by Waratek33
Mitigation candidate9
No exploit published160
Outside Waratek scope62
Not applicable14,888
Withdrawn CVE1,103
Critical1,663
High5,966
Medium6,183
Low1,211
None33
Unknown1,199
blocked by ARMR today33
not blocked16,221
not established1
Exploited202
Working exploit published134
Proof of concept only4,213
Forecast only3
No public exploit11,703
Q2 2620,871
Protected by Waratek94
Mitigation candidate10
No exploit published754
Outside Waratek scope49
Not applicable19,781
Withdrawn CVE183
Critical2,294
High8,530
Medium8,222
Low1,631
None11
Unknown183
blocked by ARMR today94
not blocked20,777
Exploited254
Working exploit published149
Proof of concept only5,192
Forecast only2
No public exploit15,274
Q3 2637,712
Protected by Waratek120
Mitigation candidate11
No exploit published3,207
Outside Waratek scope47
Not applicable33,568
Withdrawn CVE759
Critical4,751
High15,843
Medium12,187
Low2,207
None19
Unknown2,705
blocked by ARMR today117
partly blocked3
not blocked37,592
Exploited309
Working exploit published146
Proof of concept only6,502
No public exploit30,755
Q4 2629,146
Protected by Waratek70
Mitigation candidate1
No exploit published1,855
Outside Waratek scope22
Not applicable26,454
Withdrawn CVE744
Critical2,606
High11,755
Medium11,117
Low1,669
None5
Unknown1,994
blocked by ARMR today69
partly blocked1
not blocked29,076
Exploited270
Working exploit published48
Proof of concept only3,848
No public exploit24,980
Q4 22Q2 23Q4 23Q2 24Q4 24Q2 25Q4 25Q2 26Q4 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-99381 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: reject short or out-of-range FIND response parameters CIFSFindFirst() and CIFSFindNext() read the SearchHandle, SearchCount, EndofSearch and LastNameOffset of a TRANS2_FIND_FIRST2 or TRANS2_FIND_NEXT2 response at ParameterOffset. validate_t2() bounds the offset at 1024 and ParameterCount below 512, and nothing compares them with the number of bytes SendReceive() copied into the buffer or with the size of the response parameters. smb_init() places the request and the response in the same cifs_request allocation and cifs_buf_get() clears only the start of it, so a short response with a ParameterOffset past its end has the search handle, the entry count, the end-of-search flag and the last-entry offset read out of the request that was just sent, or out of whatever the allocation held before, and a ParameterCount smaller than the parameters has them read past the end of the parameter block. The reads stay inside the allocation, but what they return is not part of the response, and CIFSFindFirst() then hands back a search handle the server never sent. That handle is sent back to the server in the next FIND_NEXT2 or FIND_CLOSE2, so two bytes of the buffer leak at an offset the server picks. SMB1 is not negotiated by default; reaching this code requires an explicit vers=1.0 mount. Reject a response whose parameter area is smaller than the response parameters or extends past the received length, returning smb_EIO2() with a new smb_eio_traces value for each of the two responses, like the other response checks this file gained since v6.19. Backports to trees before v6.19 need smb_EIO2() replaced with -EINVAL and the trace.h hunk dropped. A conforming server is not affected. The parameter block of a transaction response is part of the SMB, so ParameterOffset + ParameterCount cannot exceed the smbCalcSize() bytes that SendReceive() copies, and the response parameters are 10 bytes for FIND_FIRST2 and 8 bytes for FIND_NEXT2, which is what T2_FFIRST_RSP_PARMS and T2_FNEXT_RSP_PARMS hold. This patch depends on "smb: client: reject FIND data areas that run past the received response", whose declarations it extends. |
| CVE-2026-99380 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: validate NT transaction response layout and offsets validate_ntransact() assumes that the response uses the fixed 18-word NT transaction layout. A different WordCount makes get_bcc() locate the byte count at a different offset from pSMBr->ByteCount, allowing the subsequent bounds checks to use inconsistent response boundaries. The function also turns the 32-bit ParameterOffset and DataOffset fields into pointers before checking their bounds. On a 32-bit client, a large offset can wrap the pointer below end_of_smb and pass the one-sided pointer comparison. The caller then dereferences the parameter pointer or copies from the data pointer. Require the expected WordCount before reading the byte count. Check each offset and count against the received SMB length as integers before forming either pointer. Use subtraction after validating the offset so that the range checks cannot overflow. |
| CVE-2026-99379 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: validate SMB1 EA list bounds before parsing CIFSSMBQAllEAs() checks the server-provided EA list length by adding it to the response pointer. On 32-bit systems, a positive length can wrap the pointer and pass the comparison. The parser then walks outside the received response while reading the next FEA header. A response with a list length of 0x40000000 reproduces this as a native i386 page fault and kernel panic from listxattr() against an SMB1 server. Check that the EA list starts within the SMB byte area before reading its header. Keep its length unsigned and compare it with the bytes left in the response without pointer addition. SMB1 is not negotiated by default and requires an explicit vers=1.0 mount. |
| CVE-2026-99378 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pnfs/blocklayout: Complete a device upcall when the pipe is closed Once blkmapd has read a whole upcall, rpc_pipe_read() unlinks the message from every pipe list, so the purges in rpc_pipe_release() and rpc_close_pipes() no longer reach it. bl_upcall_ops supplies no .release_pipe callback, and bl_pipe_destroy_msg() returns without completing the upcall because a downcall is expected to follow. A daemon that exits between the read and the write therefore strands its waiter: bl_resolve_deviceid() sleeps in wait_for_completion() and never returns, and it holds nn->bl_mutex across that wait, so every later device resolution in the net namespace blocks behind it. Add a .release_pipe that completes an upcall blkmapd has consumed and left unanswered. Completing an upcall retires it, so a message the framework has already purged is no longer in flight and is not completed a second time here. |
| CVE-2026-99377 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4/pnfs: bound the CB_NOTIFY_DEVICEID array count before allocating decode_devicenotify_args() hands the server's notification count straight to kmalloc_objs() as the array length, without checking it against the message that carried it. Bound it the way nfs4xdr.c bounds an attribute length, against xdr_stream_remaining(). |
| CVE-2026-99376 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4/pnfs: Free the netid when draining a data-server address list nfs4_pnfs_ds_addr_free() releases all three of an address entry's allocations, but the four sites that drain a decoded list before it reaches a data server open-code the loop and free only da_remotestr and the entry, leaking da_netid. Both layout drivers drain that list when nfs4_pnfs_ds_add() returned a data server already in the cache, and again on their error exits. Lift the drain into nfs4_pnfs_ds_addr_list_free() so an address list has one owner. A striping mount reaches the cached case on nearly every GETDEVICEINFO, since many deviceIDs name the same data servers. |
| CVE-2026-99375 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4/flexfiles: fail I/O to the data server once a lock is lost When a client loses a byte-range lock, because its lease expired and it may not recover the lock (nfs.recover_lost_locks=0) or because reclaim failed, it marks the lock state NFS_LOCK_LOST and fails further I/O by that lock owner. Otherwise an application that believes it holds a lock over a range is never told that the lock is gone, and can overwrite data that another client has since written under its own lock on that range. The NFSv4 READ/WRITE and file layout I/O paths apply this in rpc_call_prepare, where nfs4_set_rw_stateid() returns -EIO for a lost lock. The flexfiles data server I/O path does not: the NFSv3 data server path never checked, and the check on the NFSv4 path was removed when the data server stateid began to be taken from the layout. Fail read and write RPCs to the data server in rpc_call_prepare when the lock is lost. The data server path has no use for the stateid that nfs4_set_rw_stateid() selects, and selecting it looks up a delegation or open stateid on every I/O. Instead add nfs4_lock_context_lost(), which only tests NFS_LOCK_LOST, and check it alongside the open state. Its lookup, __nfs4_lookup_lock_state(), is split out of __nfs4_find_lock_state() and takes no reference: a lock state is only unlinked from state->lock_states under state->state_lock, so one found while holding that lock cannot be freed before it is released. Use it in nfs4_copy_lock_stateid() as well, which only reads the lock state under that lock. That drops a reference get and put from stateid selection for all NFSv4 I/O without changing the stateid selected. Terminating the RPC in rpc_call_prepare is not enough on its own. The done callback reads the -EIO as a data server connection error, forgets the device ID, and resets the I/O to pNFS (or, for an NFSv4 data server, possibly to the MDS). After a reset to pNFS a new LAYOUTGET is granted and rpc_call_prepare fails the I/O again, without end. The existing NFS_CONTEXT_BAD check does not loop, since the open state is then invalid and pnfs_update_layout() fails the reset I/O, but it still forgets the device ID. So when an RPC that was never sent fails and the open context is bad, the open state is invalid, or the lock is lost, complete it with -EIO without error handling. An RPC that was sent and failed is handled as before, so a real data server error is still reported to the MDS. |
| CVE-2026-99374 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4/flexfiles: Use the full 64-bit stripe_unit ff_layout_alloc_lseg() decodes stripe_unit as the 64-bit value the protocol defines and struct nfs4_ff_layout_segment stores it as one, but both consumers narrow it back to 32 bits: nfs4_ff_layout_calc_dss_id() divides with do_div(), which casts the divisor, and ff_layout_pg_test() copies it into a u32 first. A stripe_unit that does not fit is silently truncated, so the client stripes on a unit the server did not specify -- or divides by zero, if the low 32 bits happen to be clear. Divide by the full value, with div64_u64() and div64_u64_rem(). |
| CVE-2026-99373 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS/localio: detect a short read or write before the iterator has moved nfs_local_call_read() and nfs_local_call_write() issue a misaligned DIO as up to three segments and must stop at the first short one, or the next segment lands at the wrong file offset. They test for that by comparing the bytes transferred against iov_iter_count() of the segment, read after read_iter() or write_iter() has advanced the iterator, when the count is the residual rather than the request: before the call: count == expected after the call: count == expected - status The test is therefore status < expected - status, and it fires only when less than half of the segment was transferred. A short I/O that covers between 50% and 99% of a segment slips through: the loop moves on with ki_pos advanced by the short amount, the next segment is issued at the wrong offset, and the header's byte count is over-reported to the caller. A write that slips through also never sets NFS_CONTEXT_WRITE_SYNC, which is what makes the writes that follow a short one synchronous. Take the segment's count before issuing it and compare against that. This is the same defect that commit 250ec14932d5 ("nfsd: fix partial-write detection in nfsd_direct_write") fixed in NFSD's version of this loop. |
| CVE-2026-99372 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: cap the number of listeners accepted in listener_set nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() matches each requested listener against the existing set. The nested loop that does this is O(N * M), where N is the requested count and M is the existing count. The loop runs under sv_lock with bottom halves disabled. A userland request with a very large listener list can therefore spin in atomic context for a long time. Reject a request that carries more than NFSD_NL_LISTENER_MAX (1024) entries. The check goes in nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(), before the code takes any lock. The limit is far above any realistic configuration. This patch does not cap M. Only the message size bounded N; real sockets bound M. A listener_set result set is the requested set, so that path also holds M at the cap, but __write_ports_addxprt() adds two listeners per call and removes none, so repeated calls can push M past it. The worst case under sv_lock is therefore 1024 * M, plus 1024 nla_parse_nested() calls. Both interfaces require CAP_NET_ADMIN. |
| CVE-2026-99371 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: clear XDR padding in GETXATTR replies nfsd4_vbuf_to_stream() uses a raw memcpy() for the first fragment of an attribute value. xdr_reserve_space() aligns the reservation but does not initialize the extra bytes. If the complete value fits in that fragment, the loop that clears padding for the final fragment is never entered. A remote client reading an attribute whose length is not a multiple of four can therefore receive one to three stale bytes from the response page. Encode the first fragment with xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(), matching the final-fragment path and ensuring that any XDR padding is zeroed. |
| CVE-2026-99370 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: copy SETXATTR data from all XDR buffer segments nfsd4_vbuf_from_vector() manually copies the head followed by whole pages starting at offset zero. This assumes that all remaining data starts at the beginning of the page array and that no data is stored in the tail. However, nfsd4_decode_setxattr() passes an xdr_buf returned by xdr_stream_subsegment(). Such a sub-buffer can have a nonzero page_base and can span its page and tail segments. Ignoring that layout can copy the wrong bytes into the value passed to vfs_setxattr(). Use read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(), which observes the complete xdr_buf layout. |
| CVE-2026-99369 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Destroy a recalled delegation the client does not hold A client that answers CB_RECALL with NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE or NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID has no record of the delegation, so the FREE_STATEID that clears it from cl_revoked never arrives. Every later SEQUENCE reply carries SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED, and the client loops issuing TEST_STATEID. Destroy such a delegation when it is reaped rather than revoking it onto cl_revoked. RFC 8881 Section 20.2.4 completes the recall at the reply when its status is neither NFS4_OK nor NFS4ERR_DELAY, so a rejected recall leaves nothing to revoke. An administrative revoke keeps that path, since NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED reports it. A destroyed stateid returns NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID instead of NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED. A client that rejects the recall but still holds the delegation gets no notice that its state was revoked. CB_RECALL can outrun the reply that granted the delegation, so honor a rejection only once the client has seen that grant. Per RFC 8881 Section 2.10.6.3, retirement of the slot that carried the grant is that proof; retry until then, and revoke when the retries lapse. |
| CVE-2026-99368 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Do not send CB_RECALL_ANY to NFSv4.0 clients deleg_reaper() sends CB_RECALL_ANY to every ACTIVE client holding delegations, but CB_RECALL_ANY is an NFSv4.1 operation. An NFSv4.0 client's callback service accepts only CB_GETATTR and CB_RECALL, so it replies OP_ILLEGAL. The decoder maps the unexpected opnum to -EIO, and nfsd4_cb_done() marks the client's callback channel down. Nothing brings the channel back. nfsd4_run_cb_work() sets NFSD4_CB_UP only for a minor version above zero, and the only nfsd4_probe_callback() call site an NFSv4.0 client reaches is nfsd4_setclientid_confirm(). One visit from the reaper therefore leaves the channel marked down until the client re-establishes its clientid. RENEW then returns NFS4ERR_CB_PATH_DOWN for as long as the client holds delegations. nfsd4_cb_channel_good() stops returning true, so the client is granted no further delegations. Skip clients at minor version zero. |
| CVE-2026-99367 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Don't complete a cld upcall the daemon has not read cld_pipe_downcall() matches a reply to its upcall on the xid alone. A write that arrives before the daemon has read that upcall completes __cld_pipe_upcall() while its struct rpc_pipe_msg is still queued on the pipe. The waiter returns, its stack frame goes away, and the pipe keeps a list_head that points into it. The next rpc_queue_upcall() walks that pointer: BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __list_add_valid_or_report Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90007027950 by task syz.0.96/13066 __list_add_valid_or_report+0x6a/0x130 rpc_queue_upcall cld_pipe_upcall nfsd4_cld_grace_start nfsd4_cld_tracking_init The pipe is mode 0600 in rpc_pipefs, so the trigger is a broken or hostile nfsdcld rather than an unprivileged task. Record whether the daemon has consumed the whole message and complete only when it has. cld_pipe_destroy_msg() runs on every path by which the pipe releases a message, so it can maintain that flag under cn_lock. nfsdcld sends its -EINPROGRESS downcalls only after reading the upcall, so the new check does not break the GraceStart record stream. |
| CVE-2026-99366 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: don't modify a session slot when replaying its cached reply nfsd4_sequence() claims a session slot by setting NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE under nn->client_lock. A reply served from the slot's reply cache does not claim it, and that distinction lived only in cstate->status, which nfsd4_sequence() set to nfserr_replay_cache. Commit cc028a10a48c ("NFSD: Hoist status code encoding into XDR encoder functions") moved nfsd4_proc_compound()'s cstate->status assignment below the out: label, and the replay path's goto out was the one path that relied on skipping it. The test in nfsd4_sequence_done() therefore no longer identifies a replay, and every replay now stores its reply and clears NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE as though it owned the slot. NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE is the interlock: check_slot_seqid() rejects every sequence id for a slot that is in use, before replay_matches_cache() runs. A replay never sets it, so two replays can be in flight on the same slot at once. One can read slot->sl_cred under nn->client_lock while the other's completion frees and rebuilds it from the XDR encoder without that lock. Two completions can also collide with each other and release the same group_info twice. free_svc_cred() leaves cr_uid, cr_gid and cr_flavor intact, so the reader passes every earlier test in same_creds() and dereferences a NULL cr_group_info. From a 6.12.91 production server: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004 CPU: 63 UID: 0 PID: 39015 Comm: nfsd RIP: 0010:same_creds+0x38/0xa0 [nfsd] RDX: 0000000000000000 Call Trace: nfsd4_sequence+0x6a8/0x910 [nfsd] nfsd4_proc_compound+0x345/0x670 [nfsd] nfsd_dispatch+0x100/0x220 [nfsd] svc_process_common+0x311/0x700 [sunrpc] svc_process+0x131/0x1c0 [sunrpc] svc_recv+0x7ef/0x9c0 [sunrpc] nfsd+0xa3/0x100 [nfsd] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Since v6.14 a live session's slot table can shrink, and the unowned store becomes a use-after-free write. nfsd4_sequence() defers the shrink while a slot is in use, but it tests NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE, which a replay does not set, so free_session_slots() can kfree() the slot the replay still holds in cstate->slot. Record the claim in cstate->slot_owned when nfsd4_sequence() accepts a request and test that in nfsd4_sequence_done(), so only the request that claimed the slot updates its cached reply and clears NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE. svc_generic_init_request() zeroes the compound response before each request, so the flag starts clear. |
| CVE-2026-99365 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: Fix id-to-name cache entry leak in idtoname_parse() idtoname_lookup() returns the id-to-name cache entry with a new reference. The name is parsed between the lookup and the update call, and when the parsed name is malformed (negative length or longer than IDMAP_NAMESZ), idtoname_parse() jumps to the error label without dropping the reference returned by idtoname_lookup(), leaking the cache entry. Release the reference with cache_put() before taking the error exit. |
| CVE-2026-99364 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Fix out-of-bounds read in the rpc_status dump nfsd_nl_rpc_status_get_dumpit() loads args->opcnt and args->ops separately, then walks ops[] before rechecking rq_status_counter. A COMPOUND that completes between the two loads runs nfsd4_release_compoundargs(), which zeroes opcnt and points ops back at the eight-entry inline array. A dump that already sampled an opcnt of 200 clamps it to the sixteen slots in rq_opnum, then indexes iops[0..15]. iops is the last member of struct nfsd4_compoundargs and rq_argp is allocated at exactly that size, so the walk runs off the end of the allocation. The trailing recheck discards the sampled data, but the read has already happened. NFSD_CMD_RPC_STATUS_GET carries no GENL_ADMIN_PERM, so an unprivileged local user can repeat the dump against a busy server until it lands in the window. Sample opcnt and ops into locals, then finish the counter recheck before dereferencing ops. An unchanged counter means both came from the same COMPOUND, where opcnt cannot exceed what ops holds. |
| CVE-2026-99363 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Map flex file layout IDs through the request's user namespace nfsd4_ff_proc_layoutget() and nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget() translate the file's owner and group with init_user_ns, but every other identity nfsd places on the wire goes through nfsd_user_namespace(). When the transport carries a credential from a non-initial user namespace, the flex file layout reports host-global IDs. The client copies those IDs into the AUTH_SYS credential it presents to the data server, and svcauth_unix_accept() resolves that credential in the transport's namespace, so data server I/O runs under an identity unrelated to the file's owner. Switching to the request's namespace introduces a second hazard. from_kuid() returns (uid_t)-1 when the target namespace has no mapping for the owner, and the IOMODE_READ arm adds one to that result to derive an identity for which the data server denies writes. The addition would wrap to zero, handing the client uid 0 instead of an identity distinct from the owner. Translate both IDs in nfsd4_ff_proc_layoutget(), which has the svc_rqst, and carry the wire values in struct pnfs_ff_layout. from_kuid_munged() substitutes overflowuid for an unmapped owner and thus never returns (uid_t)-1, so the increment cannot wrap to zero. |
| CVE-2026-99362 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: preflight SEQUENCE replies before accepting a slot nfsd4_sequence() narrows the reply buffer to the session's cached reply limit before it accepts the slot seqid. A client may negotiate ca_maxresponsesize_cached down to NFSD_MIN_HDR_SEQ_SZ, and nfsd4_alloc_slot() then gives every slot a zero-length sl_data[]. A COMPOUND tag can fill that narrowed buffer until it holds the SEQUENCE opcode but not the status word that follows. nfsd4_encode_operation() returns without running nfsd4_encode_sequence(), so cstate.data_offset stays zero. It leaves op->status at nfs_ok as well, so the COMPOUND is treated as having succeeded. nfsd4_store_cache_entry() declines to cache a lone SEQUENCE that returned an error. That test reads the status the operation reported, so it passes here. The copy starts at offset zero and takes the whole reply, RPC and COMPOUND headers included, into the zero-length sl_data[]. The COMPOUND tag is copied along with it, so the client picks most of the bytes written past the end of the slot: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390 Write of size 80 at addr ffff888003a549cd by task kunit_try_catch/24 __asan_memcpy+0x38/0x60 read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390 nfsd4_sequence_done+0x5b0/0x810 nfs4svc_encode_compoundres+0x1bf/0x240 Check that the fixed-size SEQUENCE result, plus room for a following operation's error status, fits the negotiated limit before narrowing the buffer and consuming the slot seqid. The slot and its reply cache are left unchanged, as RFC 8881 Section 2.10.6.1.2 requires of an error returned from SEQUENCE. |
| CVE-2026-99361 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: propagate SETXATTR value decode errors nfsd4_decode_setxattr() stores the status returned while assembling a non-empty attribute value, but then unconditionally returns nfs_ok. An allocation failure can therefore leave a NULL value buffer paired with a non-zero length and allow compound processing to continue. Return the decoder status so that the operation stops on the original error. |
| CVE-2026-99360 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: Set nn->cld_net before registering the cld pipe rpc_mkpipe_dentry() instantiates the pipe's dentry before it returns, so the cld pipe can be opened as soon as nfsd4_cld_register_net() has run. __nfsd4_init_cld_pipe() does not store the new cld_net in nn->cld_net until after that call. cld_pipe_downcall() reaches the cld_net only through that pointer and takes cn_lock without checking it, so a write() that lands in the window oopses. Store nn->cld_net once @cn is fully initialized and before the pipe is registered, and clear it again when registration fails. |
| CVE-2026-99359 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSD: validate transport name in listener_set before serv creation nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() holds nfsd_mutex for the whole listener teardown and rebuild. The code checks NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME for presence only, and not for content. An arbitrary name therefore reaches svc_xprt_create_from_sa(). There, a name that matches no registered class calls request_module("svc%s", name). That call is a TASK_KILLABLE usermode helper upcall, and it runs under nfsd_mutex. Check the name against the classes that NFSD can create: tcp, udp and rdma. The check goes in nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(), which runs before the code takes nfsd_mutex. The rejection names the offending attribute through extack, since -EPROTONOSUPPORT on its own does not say which entry carried the bad name. This narrows the upcall. It does not remove it. NFSD accepts "rdma" without a condition, so on a kernel that does not build svcrdma the name still reaches request_module("svcrdma") under nfsd_mutex. That is necessary for the modular case, where the autoload is legitimate. |
| CVE-2026-99358 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: zero NFSv4 COMPOUND tag padding nfs4svc_encode_compoundres() copies the tag bytes into reserved XDR space and skips directly to the aligned end of the field. xdr_reserve_space() rounds the reservation up but does not initialize the padding bytes. A remote client can choose a tag length that is not a multiple of four, causing one to three stale bytes from the response page to be returned in the COMPOUND reply. Use xdr_encode_opaque_fixed() to copy the tag and clear its XDR padding. |
| CVE-2026-99357 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Copy the deferred RPC Call from the head buffer svc_defer() snapshots the RPC Call for replay once a pending cache upcall resolves. It copies the Call starting (rq_arg.len - head[0].iov_len) bytes before head[0].iov_base, a back-up that once covered a transport header. No transport has had one since commit 983084b2672c ("SUNRPC: Remove svc_rqst::rq_xprt_hlen"), so the two lengths are meant to be equal. An RPCSEC_GSS Call breaks that assumption. Unwrapping the integrity service truncates rq_arg.len by the length of the trailing checksum, and unwrapping the privacy service leaves rq_arg.len short by an amount the client sets with trailing bytes after the wrap token. Neither adjusts head[0].iov_len. Both lengths are size_t, so the subtraction underflows and the copy starts past head[0].iov_base. Every deferred integrity Call replays a shifted snapshot. A deferred replay skips GSS verification, so a shifted snapshot runs as an authenticated Call. With the privacy service the offset is client-chosen. A forged Call placed in that window, naming another user's GSS context handle, runs under that identity. Copy the Call from head[0].iov_base. Refuse to defer a Call whose length runs past the head buffer, so the copy cannot read out of bounds. |
| CVE-2026-99356 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Do not credit control-record octets to the RPC stream svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg() receives up to two octets into a local buffer, and returns that count for any record type other than TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT. Nothing reached the caller's buffer, but svc_tcp_read_marker() adds the count to sk_tcplen and svc_tcp_read_msg()'s caller adds it to sk_datalen. The RPC stream advances over octets it never received. The fragment marker is assembled from stale sk_marker octets. The message body comes from pages nothing wrote. A conforming client reaches this. RFC 8446 Section 4.6.3 lets either peer send KeyUpdate once it has sent its Finished, and svcsock has no rekey path. kTLS leaves the partially consumed record on ctx->rx_list, so the body drains two octets per svc_tcp_recvfrom() call. Each pair is credited the same way. Return -EAGAIN for a record that is not an alert. That is what svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg()'s default arm returned before the receive moved into a local buffer. |
| CVE-2026-99355 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: fix oversized GSS proxy token copy gss_read_proxy_verf() allocates one page per token chunk, but it copies the entire linear head of an RPC request into in_token->pages[0]. A UDP datagram can leave more than PAGE_SIZE bytes in the linear head, so a large RPCSEC_GSS INIT token overwrites following pages. Copy the linear head in page-sized chunks before switching to the request page array. The linear head itself can span multiple pages. |
| CVE-2026-99354 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: pin gss module across auth_domain RCU free A gss auth_domain stores a raw pointer to svcauthops_gss in dom->flavour, and its release queues svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu() via call_rcu(). Both live in auth_rpcgss.ko text, and nothing pins the module while a domain referencing it is reachable. rmmod auth_rpcgss can therefore unmap that text while an NFSD export still holds a reference to the domain. The export cache is one such holder. When the export is finally released, the domain reference drops from module text: svc_export_put() auth_domain_put(exp->ex_client) auth_domain_release() dom->flavour->domain_release(dom) /* into module text */ svcauth_gss_domain_release() call_rcu(&dom->rcu_head, svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu) Once auth_rpcgss is unloaded, the domain_release call lands in unmapped memory. The rcu_barrier() in exit_rpcsec_gss() does not help: it waits only for callbacks already queued, and this one is not queued until the export goes away. NFSD's NFSv4 objects import symbols from auth_rpcgss.ko, so only a server built without CONFIG_NFSD_V4 can unload auth_rpcgss while exports still name a gss domain. Take a module reference in svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor() before publishing the domain and drop it at the end of svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu(). The rcu_barrier() then holds the module image until this callback has returned. [ cel: rewrote description ] |
| CVE-2026-99353 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: Reject a socket that already has an svc_sock attached Writing the same socket descriptor to /proc/fs/nfsd/portlist twice attaches a second svc_sock to one socket. svc_setup_socket() saves the socket's callbacks before installing its own, so the second attach records svc_write_space() as the old write_space callback. svc_udp_init() invokes that callback by way of svc_sock_setbufsize(), and svc_write_space() then calls itself until the kernel stack is exhausted: BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc900037d7ff8 svc_write_space+0x90/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:429 svc_write_space+0xe6/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:430 ... 700 more ... svc_sock_setbufsize+0x18d/0x220 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:386 svc_udp_init net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:854 [inline] svc_setup_socket+0xb2f/0x1090 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1498 svc_addsock+0x2fd/0x760 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1547 __write_ports_addfd fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:742 [inline] write_ports+0xa5b/0xcc0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:861 nfsctl_transaction_write+0x106/0x1a0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:112 svc_data_ready() and svc_tcp_state_change() chain through their saved callbacks the same way, so a TCP descriptor added twice recurses on the next incoming segment instead. Reaching any of this takes a writer on portlist, and the nfsd filesystem sets no FS_USERNS_MOUNT, so the reproducer needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user namespace. Reject a socket that already carries sk_user_data. svc_setup_socket() overwrites that field unconditionally, so a socket some other consumer has claimed is one NFSD would corrupt whether or not the callbacks recurse. |
| CVE-2026-99352 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: trace an accepted transport before publishing it svc_handle_xprt() publishes a newly accepted transport before tracing it. svc_add_new_temp_xprt() places the transport on sv_tempsocks and clears XPT_BUSY, so another nfsd thread can dequeue it at once. If the peer has already closed the connection, that thread runs svc_delete_xprt(), which drops the list reference, the only reference the new transport holds. trace_svc_xprt_accept() then reads the transport's addresses and network namespace from freed memory. Before publication the accepting thread owns the transport exclusively: XPT_BUSY is still set from svc_xprt_init() and the transport is on no list. Emit the tracepoint there. [ cel: trace before publication instead of taking an extra reference ] |
| CVE-2026-99351 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sunrpc: treat empty auth.unix.gid replies as negative entries When rpc.mountd cannot resolve a uid (getpwuid() or getgrouplist() failure, e.g. while winbind or sssd is briefly unreachable), it answers the auth.unix.gid upcall with zero groups. unix_gid_parse() installs that as a valid positive entry, and svcauth_unix_set_client() then replaces the credential's group list with the empty one on every request, RPCSEC_GSS included via svcauth_gss_set_client(). One failed lookup strips that uid of all supplementary groups on every export for up to mountd's configured TTL (30 minutes by default), long after the NSS backend has recovered. mountd cannot send an empty list for a successful lookup, since getgrouplist(3) always includes at least the user's primary group, so a zero-group reply can only mean the lookup failed. Record it as a negative entry: unix_gid_find() then returns -ENOENT and svcauth_unix_set_client() keeps the groups the RPC credential already carries. This is the fallback that commit 3fc605a2aa38 ("[PATCH] knfsd: allow the server to provide a gid list when using AUTH_UNIX authentication") promised when no answer is available, and the same state try_to_negate_entry() already creates when no listener holds the channel open. |
| CVE-2026-99350 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix update of call->tx_pending without holding lock Currently, rxrpc_send_data() updates call->tx_pending just before it returns - but it won't be holding the call->user_mutex when it does this if a wait was interrupted by a signal. This would allow a parallel sendmsg() to race. Further, both the callers of rxrpc_send_data() call it with the lock held, and then it returns an indication through the parameter list to say whether it has dropped the lock or not - after which the callers both just drop the lock if it's still held. Fix this by: (1) Moving the release of call->user_mutex down into rxrpc_send_data() and get rid of the indicator parameter. This makes it easier to see where the lock is held. (2) After waiting, if the attempt to reacquire the mutex is interrupted, just return directly there rather than going to out_unlock (3) Restricting the txb variable to inside the buffering loop and leaving ->tx_pending set until we've queued the buffer. Note that there's a slight change in behaviour in that wait_for_space failure now doesn't check for completion because it doesn't hold the call user_mutex. The caller, however, should re-issue the send and pick up any error at a second attempt. |
| CVE-2026-99349 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix lack of short-send handling in rxrpc_kernel_send_data() Fix rxrpc_kernel_send_data() to loop around if it detects a short send. David Laight suggested doing it here rather than wrapping all the calls in loops. Further, remove the len argument and use the iterator count instead and return 0 on success, not the amount copied. Note this is also a prerequisite for changing the way rxrpc_send_data() works to return a short send rather than an error if some data was buffered. |
| CVE-2026-99348 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix afs to abort the rxrpc call on send error Fix afs_send_empty_reply() and afs_send_simple_reply() to always try to abort the rxrpc call rather than just aborting on -ENOMEM and otherwise abandoning it. If the call is already complete due to network failure or a received abort, this will do nothing. Also make afs_make_call() always abort on send error; again, it does nothing if the rxrpc call is already dead. |
| CVE-2026-99347 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: x86: hdmi: fix chmap array missing terminator entry had_build_channel_allocation_map() allocates a single struct snd_pcm_chmap_elem via kzalloc() and stores it as intelhaddata->chmap->chmap. struct snd_pcm_chmap.chmap is expected to be a zero-terminated array (see snd_pcm_std_chmaps[]), but had_register_chmap_ctls() never overrides the TLV callback installed by snd_pcm_add_chmap_ctls(), so the generic pcm_chmap_ctl_tlv() from ALSA core is left in place. pcm_chmap_ctl_tlv() is reachable by any local user via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_TLV_READ on the "Playback Channel Map" control and walks the array with "for (map = info->chmap; map->channels; map++)". Since the driver's single element is never terminated, this walks past the allocation. The same pointer is also freed on hot-unplug and rebuilt on hot-plug under intelhaddata->mutex, while the TLV callback runs under card->controls_rwsem without that mutex, so the walk can also race a concurrent free of the array. Fix this by allocating a second, zeroed element so the array is properly terminated, and by dropping the inherited TLV callback entirely at registration time, since the driver never implements one of its own. |
| CVE-2026-99346 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: Trigger new ASID allocation in both VMCBs on pCPU switch When the pCPU where the VMCB was most recently used is switched, reset the ASID generation in both VMCBs, triggering new ASID allocation for the immediate VMRUN as well as the next VMRUN on the other VMCB. The ASID is shared between vmcb01 and vmcb02, and gets flushed on every nested transition. However, since pCPU tracking is done per VMCB, it is possible for one VMCB to allocate a new ASID when migrated to a new pCPU, and then the other VMCB reuses that ASID on the old pCPU. This can result in the same ASID being used by multiple vCPUs on the old pCPU. Example scenario: - vCPU runs on pCPU A, vmcb01 is active, asid=1. - vCPU migrates to pCPU B, vmcb01 pCPU changes, new asid=2. - Another vCPU runs on pCPU A and allocates asid=2 as well. - vCPU migrates back to pCPU A, and then switches to vmcb02 before it runs again with vmcb01. - No pCPU switch is detected for vmcb02, so VMRUN is done with asid=2. - Two vCPUs end up using asid=2 on the same pCPU. Keep the VMCB dirtying to the active VMCB only. Clean bits are tracked by a pCPU for each VMCB, so do not unnecessarily dirty a VMCB if its pCPU does not change. Additionally, initialize the tracked pCPU for vmcb02 to -1 on nested enablement as hardening, so that a new ASID allocation is always triggered when nested is disabled and re-enabled. No performance regression was noticed when overcommitting L1 vCPUs in L0 (to force rescheduling), pinning L1 <-> L2 vCPUs, and running CPUID in a tight loop bouncing between 2 vCPUs in L2. An alternative (and perhaps more proper) fix would be tracking the ASID per-VMCB instead (e.g. [1]). However, that's a more involved change, and it would result in having different ASIDs for L1 and L2 without actually properly maintaining them. It would probably work because all TLB flushes target the current VMCB, and the other VMCB is always flushed on nested transitions, but the code ends up in an arguably more fragile state. Punt a proper clean fix to an incoming (and overdue) overhaul of SVM's ASID usage [2]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250205182402.2147495-2-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev [2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20260728003557.1136583-1-yosry@kernel.org |
| CVE-2026-99345 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nSVM: Reject KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE if L1 has EFER.LMA=1 && EFER.LME=0 Reject KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE if the incoming L1 host state has what is effectively an impossible EFER combination of LMA=1 but LME=0, i.e. if the state says long mode is active but not enabled. Unlike VMX, SVM doesn't have an explicit consistent check for the illegal combination; presumably hardware simply ignores EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0. Unfortunately, KVM doesn't ignore EFER.LMA in this case and consumes the illegal state when constructing the shadow MMU for L2. E.g. if userspace also clears CR4.PAE, then kvm_calc_cpu_role() will compute a role with 4 or 5 levels of paging, but shadow_mmu_init_context() will wire up the MMU to use the paging32 template, which maxes out its levels at 2. Note, the "real badness" is effectively the same as what happened with the nVMX bug fixed by commit 112e66017bff ("KVM: nVMX: add missing consistency checks for CR0 and CR4"). Unfortunately, the sanity check added by commit 72e2fb24a0b0 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if a vCPU ends up in long mode without PAE enabled") doesn't work for this case, since L2 state is active at the time of the page fault, but it's L1 that has the bad state. |
| CVE-2026-99344 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: nSVM: Ignore EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0 when preparing L2 state Force EFER.LMA=0 if EFER.LME=0 when preparing L2 state for VMRUN, i.e. mimic real hardware's behavior of ignoring EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0. VMRUN unfortunately allows the nonsensical combination, i.e. doesn't fail, but KVM itself has an invariant EFER.LMA can be set et if and only if EFER.LME is set. Breaking that invariant can lead to a variety of issue, particularly in MMU code that keys off EFER.LMA when determining whether to emulate/virtualization 4/5-level paging versus PAE paging. |
| CVE-2026-99343 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if KVM attempts to walk more levels than the MMU has Extend the "EFER.LMA && !CR4.PAE" check, which exists largely to guard against KVM configuring a paging32 MMU with more than 2 levels of paging, with a very explicit check for exactly that: that KVM isn't trying to walk more levels of paging than the MMU template provides. I.e. harden KVM against all bugs that would cause KVM to generates accesses beyond the bounds of guest_walker's arrays, regardless of how KVM ended up with the misconfigured MMU. Note, don't use w->cpu_role.base.level directly as the paging64 template only provides two levels of page tables for PAE paging on 32-bit hosts, and handles the third level by manually emulating the PDPTR access. |
| CVE-2026-99342 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/xen: Enforce 4-byte alignment of vcpu_info registration Xen's map_guest_area() enforces that vcpu_info is aligned to sizeof(xen_ulong_t). KVM has no such check, allowing a guest to register vcpu_info at an arbitrary byte alignment. Enforce unconditional 4-byte alignment regardless of the current shinfo mode. This is sufficient because subsequent commits ensure that all locked atomic operations on vcpu_info fields use at most 32-bit accesses. Return -ENXIO on failure, matching Xen's map_guest_area() behaviour for unaligned requests. Originally observed in review of an unrelated patch: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260604193554.1BA311F00893@smtp.kernel.org/ |
| CVE-2026-99341 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Request event processing for exception VM-Exits Request event processing whenever kvm_queue_exception_vmexit() queues an exception VM-Exit. Most callers reach the helper through kvm_multiple_exception(), which already sets KVM_REQ_EVENT, but nested asynchronous page faults call it directly. Without another event request, vcpu_enter_guest() skips kvm_check_and_inject_events() and re-enters L2. A subsequent VM-Exit can clear the pending exception while reconstructing vectoring state, losing the synthetic #PF VM-Exit. The APF reason remains PAGE_NOT_PRESENT and a later regular #PF can consume the stale value. Setting KVM_REQ_EVENT in the common helper ensures that L1 receives the queued VM-Exit before KVM re-enters L2. |
| CVE-2026-99340 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Take SRCU in kvm_zap_gfn_range() kvm_zap_gfn_range() walks memslots and rmaps and may drop mmu_lock to reschedule. Callers that do not already hold kvm->srcu (or slots_lock) can race with memslot deletion: synchronize_srcu_expedited() does not wait, kvm_free_memslot() frees the old slot and its rmap, and the zap resumes on freed memory. The VFIO noncoherent-DMA path hits this by zapping the entire GPA space without SRCU. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in slot_rmap_walk_next+0x82/0x1c0 Read of size 8 at addr ffffc900005c1008 Call Trace: slot_rmap_walk_next+0x82/0x1c0 __kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range+0x17a/0x280 kvm_zap_gfn_range+0x2a6/0x6a0 kvm_vfio_set_attr+0x576/0x770 kvm_device_ioctl+0x1ff/0x3b0 Take SRCU inside kvm_zap_gfn_range() so every caller is covered. Nesting with an existing kvm->srcu critical section is fine; the helper uses a local index. Drop the now-redundant SRCU pair from __kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(). |
| CVE-2026-99339 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Zero reserved synic flags when delivering message to avoid stack leak Ensure all reserved flags are zeroed when setting the msg_pending flag as part of SynIC message delivery, as setting only msg_pending can leak seven bits of kernel stack data to the guest. E.g. gcc typically uses a bitwise-OR to set the msg_pending flag, without initializing the on-stack variable. Precisely zero the flags, e.g. as opposed to zeroing the entire structure, to make it somewhat more obvious that the flags *need* to be zeroed. E.g. it would be quite easy to misread the initial read of guest memory and think that zeroing the entire structure is completely superfluous. |
| CVE-2026-99338 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: TDX: Enable Notify VM exit Enable Notify VM exit functionality for TDX guests. Notify VM exit is an existing feature supported by KVM. Userspace can enable Notify VM exit through KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT when it's reported as supported. However, KVM reports the support of this CAP just based on the hardware capability but doesn't differentiate between VMX and TDX. This leads to the issue that userspace can enable this cap for TDX guests without getting an error, but the feature is not actually enabled because KVM doesn't call the TDX module API to program the relevant TD VMCS fields. Enable Notify VM exit for TDX guests by: - Invoking TDX module API calls to set NOTIFY_VM_EXITING and Notify Window in TD VMCS. It's done in tdx_vcpu_init() where other TD VMCS bits are set. Since TDX vCPU cannot be reset, it only needs to be configured once when initializing the TDX vCPU. - Adding corresponding exit handler for TDX Notify VM Exit. Notify VM exit can happen when executing the IRET instruction. If the IRET unblocks the NMI blocking state, bit 12 of the exit qualification is set. In this case, the VMM needs to restore the "blocked by NMI" state when it decides to re-enter the guest. For TDX, KVM cannot manage the GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO and it's TDX module's responsibility to handle it. Extract the common part without NMI blocking handling into a helper in common.h so that it can be shared between VMX and TDX. Note, KVM uses "pre-production" terminology for the feature formally called Notify VM-Exit. All public versions of the SDM refer to the feature as Instruction Timeout. This will be remedied in the near future, for now, use KVM's terminology for consistency. Note, #2, there is no enumeration bit for Notify VM exit by TDX module because all TDX modules support it, and allow to set the corresponding TD VMCS fields as long as the hardware supports the feature. |
| CVE-2026-99337 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: TDX: Enable Bus Lock VM exit Enable Bus Lock VM exit functionality for TDX guests. Bus Lock VM exit is an existing feature supported by KVM. Userspace can enable Bus Lock VM exit through KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT when it's reported as supported. However, KVM reports the support of this CAP just based on the hardware capability but doesn't differentiate between VMX and TDX. This leads to the issue that userspace can enable this cap for TDX guests without getting an error, but the feature is not actually enabled because KVM doesn't call the TDX module API to program the relevant TD VMCS fields. Enable Bus Lock VM exit for TDX guests by programming the BUS_LOCK_DETECTION control in the TD VMCS and by adding the exit handler. Note, there is no enumeration bit for this feature by TDX module because all TDX modules support it and allow to set the TD VMCS as long as the hardware supports the feature. |
| CVE-2026-99336 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: guest_memfd: take the invalidate lock when unbinding a dying file kvm_gmem_unbind() takes mapping->invalidate_lock only if the get_file_active() succeeds. When the guest_memfd file is dying, its reference count is already zero so get_file_active fails and the binding is removed without holding the invalidate lock. kvm_gmem_invalidate_{start,end}() checks f->bindings independently to decide whether to begin or end KVM MMU invalidation. So, the bindings must therefore remain stable between the two calls. Otherwise, unbind can remove a binding after start increments mmu_invalidate_in_progress, but before end finds the binding and decrements it. Example, unbind race with memory failure: CPU 0: memory failure CPU 1: memslot delete ---------------------------------- --------------------------- (guest_memfd file is dying) kvm_gmem_error_folio() kvm_gmem_invalidate_start() finds binding mmu_invalidate_in_progress++ kvm_gmem_unbind() get_file_active() fails removes binding kvm_gmem_invalidate_end() no binding found counter stays elevated mmu_invalidate_retry() then returns 1 forever, so guest page faults retry without ever installing a mapping and the guest hangs. Remove the distinction between live and dying files in the unbind path. Always use slot->gmem.file and take the invalidate lock when it's non-NULL. Normal unbind callers hold slots_lock, which prevents release from clearing the pointer or freeing the file state until unbind completes. Final VM teardown can only see a NULL pointer because guest_memfd pins the KVM until release has cleared all bindings. |
| CVE-2026-99335 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: guest_memfd: Establish memslot<=>guest_memfd bindings *after* memslot is ready Wait to bind a memslot to a guest_memfd instance until *after* the memslot is fully prepared, as creating the binding in guest_memfd will effectively expose the memslot to readers. As pointed out by Sashiko, binding the memslot before it's ready to be exposed to the rest of the world can break various memslot assumption and rules. E.g. x86 could observe a NULL rmap pointer if a PUNCH_HOLE hit the guest_memfd after the binding was created, but before KVM made it through kvm_prepare_memory_region(). |
| CVE-2026-99334 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add preempt_disable() around virtual-mode HPTE bit-lock users kvmppc_hv_find_lock_hpte() requires virtual-mode callers to run with preemption disabled, because it can return with HPTE_V_HVLOCK still held until the caller later unlocks the HPTE. Existing virtual-mode callers in book3s_64_mmu_hv.c already follow that rule. Two virtual-mode call paths do not: 1. kvmppc_handle_exit_hv() calls kvmppc_hpte_hv_fault() for hash-mode data-side and instruction-side faults after guest exit, with preemption already enabled. kvmppc_hpte_hv_fault() calls kvmppc_hv_find_lock_hpte() directly. 2. kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall() executes virtual-mode handlers for HPT hcalls via kvmppc_pseries_do_hpt_hcall() with preemption enabled. The handlers for H_ENTER, H_REMOVE, H_READ, H_CLEAR_MOD, H_CLEAR_REF, H_PROTECT, and H_BULK_REMOVE spin on try_lock_hpte() or lock_rmap(), and H_ENTER also reaches kvmppc_do_h_enter(), which uses arch_spin_lock() on kvm->mmu_lock. That raw lock choice is intentional because kvmppc_do_h_enter() is also used by real-mode callers, so the correct fix is to establish the proper preemption context at the virtual-mode caller boundary. If a vCPU thread is preempted while holding HPTE_V_HVLOCK, any other thread on the same CPU trying to acquire the same bit-lock can spin indefinitely. The same applies to lock_rmap() users and to the H_ENTER path while holding the raw mmu_lock. Fix this by adding preempt_disable()/preempt_enable() pairs around the two kvmppc_hpte_hv_fault() call sites in kvmppc_handle_exit_hv(), and around the kvmppc_pseries_do_hpt_hcall() invocation in kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall(). Targeting only the HPT hcall helper avoids wrapping non-HPT hcalls (such as H_RTAS, H_CONFER, H_REGISTER_VPA) that perform page faults, blocking memory allocations, or context switches. |
| CVE-2026-99333 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: amd_sfh: Use report type from request node Use report type from request node while sending feature and input reports to HID core. The cli_data report type array is never assigned and feature reports are sent as input reports. |
| CVE-2026-99332 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: core: Fix out-of-bounds left shift by 32 in s32ton() Syzbot reported an out-of-bounds shift (32-bit integer shifted left by 32) in the s32ton() routine in the HID core. This routine converts a signed 32-bit integer to a signed n-bit integer, and it caps the value of n at 32. But when n == 32 there's no need to do anything; it can simply return the input value. This will avoid calculating (1 << n) when n is 32, which was the cause of the invalid shift. |
| CVE-2026-99331 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: cp2112: validate response report lengths The HID core invokes raw_event callbacks before validating the report length. cp2112_raw_event() reads every field of a transfer status response without checking size. For a data response, it reads the length at offset two and copies that many bytes from offset three, again without ensuring that the input report contains them. Require a complete transfer status structure. For data responses, first require the header and then ensure the clamped payload length fits in the received report before copying it. Commit 47669bec44fe ("HID: asus: refactor the two workqueues and init sequence") added the same kind of raw_event length validation to hid-asus. |
| CVE-2026-99330 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: mcp2200: validate READ_ALL response length The HID core invokes raw_event callbacks before validating the report length. mcp2200_raw_event() casts a READ_ALL response to struct mcp_read_all_resp and reads fields through offset ten without checking that the response contains the structure. A one-byte READ_ALL response reproduced the issue under KASAN: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mcp2200_raw_event+0x24b/0x3a0 Read of size 1 by task hidtrigger/89 Call Trace: mcp2200_raw_event+0x24b/0x3a0 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 Reject an incomplete READ_ALL response with a protocol error before reading its fields. The common completion path then wakes the command waiter with the error instead of leaving it to time out. Commit 47669bec44fe ("HID: asus: refactor the two workqueues and init sequence") added the same kind of raw_event length validation to hid-asus. |
| CVE-2026-99329 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: mcp2221: always initialize and cancel init_work The writable gpio_mode_enforce parameter can change between probe and remove. If it changes from false to true after probe, remove skips cancellation of init_work. Pending or running work can then access devm-managed driver state after teardown. Changing it from true to false can make remove cancel an uninitialized delayed work item. Initialize init_work whenever IIO is reachable and cancel it unconditionally on remove. Keep the parameter check only for scheduling the initialization. The false-to-true cancellation gap was previously reported by Sashiko. We also encountered this issue during our static-analysis research. |
| CVE-2026-99328 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: picoLCD: check for fb_deferred_io_init() error fb_deferred_io_init() allocates deferred I/O state, populating info->fbdefio_state, or leaving it NULL if an error occurs. Currently picolcd_init_framebuffer() ignores its return value. Therefore if an error arises in fb_deferred_io_init() (for instance, due to an allocation failure) info->fbdefio_state is left NULL. When the file is subsequently opened, fb_open() will dereference a NULL pointer (calling fb_deferred_io_open()). Fix this by checking for the error. Also correct cleanup ordering - defio is initialised after the sysfs file, so cleanup defio first. |
| CVE-2026-99327 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: roccat: kovaplus: reject short button reports The raw event callback runs before HID core validates and zero-pads the report. It passes the buffer to helpers which inspect data[0] and read a complete struct kovaplus_mouse_report_button for button reports. A truncated report can therefore cause an out-of-bounds read. Require enough data for the button report before calling either helper. Commit 47669bec44fe ("HID: asus: refactor the two workqueues and init sequence") added the same kind of raw-event length validation to hid-asus. |
| CVE-2026-99326 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: hid-lenovo-go-s: Prevent deadlock if device removed during setup hid_gos_cfg_remove() calls a mutex before canceling delayed work. That delayed work function calls mcu_property_out(), which holds the same mutex. Prevent deadlock my removing the mutex prior to stopping the work. Additionally, since cancel_delayed_work has the potential to re-arm, switch to disable_delayed_work. |
| CVE-2026-99325 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: hid-lenovo-go-s: Add suspend function and gate access under bool. Currently a device can suspend while delayed work is pending or executing. Cancel delayed work if it was pending and restart it if it hasn't run yet. Gate access to show/store functions behind a bool to prevent access prior to cfg_setup() being completed. |
| CVE-2026-99324 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read when padding the final compound response Compound response handling pads the last response of a compound to an 8-byte boundary by growing the final iov and the RFC1002 length. smb2_allocate_rsp_buf() allocates exactly response_sz. A command can fill the response buffer to within 7 bytes of its end, for example a QUERY_INFO whose output is bounded only by the space left. The padding can then run past the allocation, and ksmbd_tcp_writev() reads those bytes when it sends the response. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_iter+0x744/0x10e0 Call Trace: _copy_from_iter+0x744/0x10e0 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2290/0x3f80 ksmbd_tcp_writev+0x10c7/0x1ab0 [ksmbd] Allocate room for the padding when the request is a compound, as smb2_read() and smb2_read_pipe() do for their payloads. response_sz is unchanged, so commands still fill only up to it, and kvzalloc() zeroes the padding. |
| CVE-2026-99323 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix invalid pointer dereference when get_inode_acl() fails When get_inode_acl() fails, it returns an ERR_PTR(), but ksmbd_acls_fattr() stored that pointer in smb_fattr without checking for errors. Later callers then passed the error pointer to security descriptor helpers or posix_acl_release(), resulting in an invalid pointer dereference. This was reproduced on an XFS-backed share when xfs_get_acl() returned ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM). Querying the SMB ACL from a CIFS client triggered the crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffff8 RIP: smb_acl_sec_desc_scratch_len+0x58/0x90 [ksmbd] Call Trace: smb2_query_info+0x40d/0x17c0 [ksmbd] handle_ksmbd_work+0x1ca/0x770 [ksmbd] Fix this by checking the return values from get_inode_acl() in ksmbd_acls_fattr(). Treat -EOPNOTSUPP as indicating that no ACL is available, and propagate all other errors to the callers. Update smb2_open() and smb2_get_info_sec() to handle these errors. |
| CVE-2026-99322 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: rebind completed CREATE replays without draining the old channel A completed DurableHandleReqV2 CREATE can be replayed through another channel while its original channel is exiting. The existing replay path returns the open but leaves its connection and oplock references pointing at the old channel. Its open count also stays on that channel, and a later CLOSE through the surviving channel decrements the wrong counter. After checking the owner, lease key and persistent flag, verify that an active open is still published in the requesting session's file table. Do this even when no oplock was granted, and before processing a consumed replay. Do not read a borrowed opinfo session pointer for this check. Keep a healthy original binding. If the original channel is exiting or releasing, move the open and its own oplock references to the requesting channel. Serialize this with CLOSE using the session file-table lock, and with detach, reconnect and notification snapshots using m_lock. The earlier lock index and lease-table changes make their lifetimes independent of this connection change. No old-channel r_count wait is needed, including when an unrelated request remains active there. Account final close against fp->conn in one place, balance durable detach and reconnect, and transfer the count with a replay binding change. A final global lookup put may run after CLOSE has removed the volatile id; unlink the open from the inode list on that final close as well. A live completed CREATE replay may follow a break that lowered the durable open's batch oplock. Apply the batch eligibility check only to detached reconnects, while retaining the owner, lease key and persistent flag checks for active replays. |
| CVE-2026-99321 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust_binder: wake epoll on self-work queued to poll thread When a thread pushes work to its own todo list, InnerThread::push_work() returns PushWorkRes::OkNotifyPoll if the thread uses epoll, but four call sites in thread.rs discard this return value. As a result, a non-blocking BC_* write that enqueues work onto the calling thread's todo list without also reading will not wake epoll. Check the return value and call self.process.notify_poll(false) when PushWorkRes::OkNotifyPoll is returned. This is similar to commit 97830f3c3088 ("binder: signal epoll threads of self-work"), but in C Binder pending thread work also prevented subsequent process work from waking epoll, causing a permanent hang, which is not the case in Rust Binder. This means that in practice, it merely delays notifications rather than completely failing to send them. |
| CVE-2026-99320 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: raw: fix use-after-free in rawv6_send_hdrinc() rawv6_send_hdrinc() caches the route before handing the skb to l3mdev_ip6_out(). The VRF output path may replace skb->dst and release the original route, leaving the cached pointer stale. The function later dereferences that pointer for statistics accounting and as the output device passed to NF_HOOK(). Its RCU read-side critical section starts after l3mdev_ip6_out(), so it cannot prevent the old route from being reclaimed in between. Reload the route from the current skb destination after l3mdev_ip6_out() returns. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free in rawv6_sendmsg(), with the route allocated by ip6_dst_alloc(), freed by dst_destroy() from rcu_core(), and the related RCU callback queued from vrf_l3_out(). |
| CVE-2026-95517 | Unknown | 2026-11-19 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Reliance on obfuscation or encryption of Security-Relevant inputs without integrity checking, Improper validation of integrity check value, Cleartext transmission of sensitive information vulnerability in the EncryptInterceptor of Apache Tomcat. This issue affects Apache Tomcat: from 11.0.0-M1 through 11.0.27, from 10.1.0-M1 through 10.1.61, from 9.0.13 through 9.0.123. The following versions were EOL at the time the CVE was created but are known to be affected: from 8.5.38 through 8.5.100, from 7.0.100 through 7.0.109. Other unsupported versions may also be affected. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 11.0.29, 10.1.62 or 9.0.124 and switch to TLS-PSK to encrypt cluster communication, which fixes the issue. Note: Tomcat 11.0.28 was not released |
| CVE-2026-93917 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | An improper authorization vulnerability in WatchGuard Dimension's device management registration process allows an attacker who controls one enrolled managed device's credentials to take over another managed device's identity. This allows the attacker to receive the victim device's queued configuration and apply attacker-supplied configurations under the victim device's identity. |
| CVE-2026-93916 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | An insufficient session expiration vulnerability in WatchGuard Dimension's administrator session management allows an attacker holding a valid Super Administrator WebUI session to retain full Super Administrator privileges after that account has been downgraded or deleted by another administrator. |
| CVE-2026-93915 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A missing authorization vulnerability in WatchGuard Dimension's legacy system settings configuration handler allows a low-privileged authenticated user to execute arbitrary commands with elevated privileges on the underlying OS. |
| CVE-2026-93914 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | An improper input validation vulnerability in WatchGuard Dimension's database snapshot restore feature allows an authenticated Dimension Administrator to execute arbitrary operating system commands as root by uploading a specially crafted database snapshot archive. |
| CVE-2026-93912 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A code injection vulnerability in WatchGuard Dimension's log notification processing allows an authenticated managed device, or an attacker in possession of a valid device logging key, to achieve arbitrary code execution on the Dimension appliance. |
| CVE-2026-93911 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A SQL injection vulnerability in WatchGuard Dimension's log collection service allows an authenticated managed device, or an attacker in possession of a valid device logging key, to achieve arbitrary code execution on the Dimension appliance. |
| CVE-2026-92907 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | IBM watsonx.data 2.4.0 through 2.4.0 patch 8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to conduct a server-side request forgery due to a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. |
| CVE-2026-92906 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | IBM watsonx.data 2.4.0 through 2.4.0 patch 8 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service due to client-side enforcement of business rules. |
| CVE-2026-92613 | Low | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | In Eclipse iceoryx-rs, versions 0.0.11 to 0.0.13 and 0.1.0 as well as on the latest main branch. `SampleReceiver::<T>::take()` and `Sample::<T>::deref()` are safe functions that hand the caller a `&T` pointing at a chunk written by another iceoryx process, but the subscriber path neither requires `T: ShmSend` nor verifies that the received chunk is at least `size_of::<T>()` bytes / `align_of::<T>()`-aligned. A peer process that publishes an undersized chunk, or any chunk at all when the subscriber chose a pointer-bearing `T`, drives a `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` subscriber into out-of-bounds reads of adjacent shared-memory chunks or dereference of a publisher-controlled pointer. Resolution: It will not be fixed since this is a known limitation in iceoryx as it is the users responsibility to specify the same data type on sender and receiver side. [iceoryx2](https://github.com/eclipse-iceoryx/iceoryx2) is the successor of iceoryx-rs where the API is designed to prevent this by default. It is strongly recommended to migrate to iceoryx2 which is actively maintained and receives security support. The iceoryx-rs package has officially reached End-of-life and will not receive any features, bugfixes or security fixes. |
| CVE-2026-91139 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | Deco BE65 firmware contains a cryptographic weakness in the local web-management authentication flow due to the use of insufficient RSA key sizes. The /login?form=auth endpoint returns a 512-bit RSA public key and sequence value. Successful exploitation may compromise the cryptographic protections applied to local web-management authentication traffic. |
| CVE-2026-91138 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | The Deco BE65 v3 firmware contains a shared hard-coded password hash for the root account in /etc/shadow. Where the corresponding credential is accepted by a production authentication path, an attacker with existing unprivileged shell access may recover or otherwise obtain the plaintext password and use it to escalate privileges. Successful exploitation may grant root-level access to the affected device. |
| CVE-2026-87977 | Critical | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 is vulnerable to SQL injection in the edge-controller component. An unauthenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to access or modify sensitive database information. |
| CVE-2026-87956 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | When Private data source connect (PDC) or a secure SOCKS proxy is used, the MQTT data source plugin does not apply TLS to broker connections for the tls, ssl, tcps, mqtts and mqtt+ssl schemes. The configured TLS settings are ignored, and the broker username and password are sent unencrypted on the hop between the proxy and the broker. The server certificate is not verified, and a configured client certificate is not sent. |
| CVE-2026-87868 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | MRemoteNG uses single MD5 hash with no salt and no iterations for key-derivation. An attacker who obtains the encrypted data can brute-force a weak or moderate passphrase offline at extreme speed and then decrypt every stored connection password. When the default passphrase is in use, no cracking is needed at all; the key is derived from a publicly known value. Vendor did not provide the range of vulnerable versions. Only version 1.76.20 was tested and confirmed vulnerable. Other versions may also be vulnerable. |
| CVE-2026-87867 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | MRemoteNG establishes encrypted but unauthenticated channel with Microsoft SQL Server backend. Client accepts any certificate the server presents, including a self-signed certificate supplied by an attacker. An attacker positioned between the client and the SQL server (for example via ARP/DNS spoofing) can transparently pintercept the connection (man-in-the-middle) and read all traffic, including the encrypted connection-password table read and the database login. Vendor did not provide the range of vulnerable versions. Only version 1.76.20 was tested and confirmed vulnerable. Other versions may also be vulnerable. |
| CVE-2026-86130 | Critical | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A missing authentication vulnerability in WatchGuard Dimension's log collection service allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary SQL statements and ultimately execute arbitrary code as the Dimension WebUI process user by sending specially crafted network requests. |
| CVE-2026-86126 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in WatchGuard Dimension's user management interface allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to create a persistent local Super Administrator account by tricking an authenticated Super Administrator into visiting a malicious web page. |
| CVE-2026-86094 | Critical | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | WatchGuard Dimension records unredacted session identifiers for logged-in users in its web UI diagnostic log. A low-privileged Dimension Administrator can retrieve this log and extract a Super Administrator's session token while that administrator is logged in, enabling account takeover. This vulnerability is a secondary unmitigated attack path for CVE-2026-78174. |
| CVE-2026-85776 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | The WP Duplicate – WordPress Migration Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in versions up to, and including, 1.1.11. This is due to a missing capability check and missing nonce check on the start_zip_creation, start_zip_download, local_sync_get_init_root_files, and local_sync_get_files_by_key AJAX actions in the start_zip_creation_dev() and sibling functions. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the plugin's prod_site_url setting so it points at an attacker-controlled host and enumerate arbitrary server directories, which when combined with a subsequent administrator-triggered sync results in an unsigned attacker-supplied ZIP archive being fetched, extracted via a WordPress-independent bridge deployed under the web root, resulting in remote code execution on the affected site. |
| CVE-2026-85413 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | The Foxtool All-in-One: Contact chat button, Custom login, Media optimize images plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'foxtool_image_id' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 2.5.3 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. A subscriber-level attacker can store a payload in their own profile's foxtoolpic user-meta that executes in an administrator's browser session when the administrator views the user via the Users → Edit screen. |
| CVE-2026-85018 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 is vulnerable to improper TLS certificate validation in the GDP Terraform provider, allowing a network attacker with a man-in-the-middle position to intercept sensitive credentials transmitted to the Guardium appliance. |
| CVE-2026-84998 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | The NextScripts: Social Networks Auto-Poster plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via 'comment_author' and 'comment_agent' Comment Fields in all versions up to, and including, 4.4.8 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The injected payload executes in an administrator's browser session when the administrator views the WordPress comment moderation queue, including pending and unapproved comments, meaning no prior approval of the comment is required for exploitation. |
| CVE-2026-84322 | Critical | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | WatchGuard Dimension returns unredacted session identifiers for logged-in users in a management API response. A low-privileged Dimension Administrator can retrieve the active session IDs of other administrators, including Super Administrators, while they are logged in, enabling account takeover. |
| CVE-2026-84273 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 is vulnerable to path traversal in the datasource functionality. An authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to delete arbitrary files on the appliance. |
| CVE-2026-84236 | Critical | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 is vulnerable to insecure deserialization in the SharePoint Tap MulticastTransceiver component. An unauthenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code on the affected system. |
| CVE-2026-84211 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 could allow a remote attacker to inject forged audit records due to improper output neutralization for logs. |
| CVE-2026-84087 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 is vulnerable to local privilege escalation via the SUID-root podman_wrapper binary on the Collector appliance. A local attacker with low-privileged access to the Collector can exploit insufficient argument validation in the SUID binary to execute arbitrary commands as root, resulting in full compromise of the Collector appliance. |
| CVE-2026-84065 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information or cause a denial of service due to an out-of-bounds heap read. |
| CVE-2026-83631 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | On Intel-based macOS systems, the Okta Device Access (ODA) component of Okta Verify for macOS configures a LaunchDaemon service whose program path resolves via a symbolic link in /usr/local/bin. In environments where non-standard directory permissions grant local non-root users write access to this path, the symbolic link target can be modified, causing the LaunchDaemon to execute the replacement binary upon service restart. |
| CVE-2026-82950 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | The device only supports Wi-Fi protocols vulnerable to deauthentication attacks (WEP/WPA/WPA2). Should any event which would typically be logged to the user’s mobile device (such as arming or disarming the alarm or any tamper events) be incurred whilst the device is temporarily disconnected from its Wi-Fi network (such as via a deauthentication attack), those alerts will not be sent even after connection is regained. |
| CVE-2026-82949 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | The static codes used for information transmission throughout the 433.92 MHz system of the Guardian 2 system allow an attacker in proximity to monitor the movements of users inside the premises where the sensors are set up. This is further aided by the fact that codes transmitted reveal sensor type, although sensor location cannot be inferred from this traffic alone. |
| CVE-2026-82948 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | The Guardian 2 alarm unit lacks a mechanism to authenticate control commands sent over 433.92 MHz, which allows an attacker to replay the static commands to impersonate activity. The attacker can also disarm or arm the system at will if a Nexsmart keypad (product link) is in use, thus compromising the functionality of the alarm system completely. |
| CVE-2026-82342 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 is vulnerable to a stack-based buffer overflow when processing a specially crafted PROXY protocol v1 header. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial of service or potentially execute arbitrary code. |
| CVE-2026-82339 | Critical | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.2 is vulnerable to missing authentication in the SharePoint S-TAP RelayService, allowing an unauthenticated network attacker to inject forged audit events and access the active monitoring policy. |
| CVE-2026-81499 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | Incus is a system container and virtual machine manager. Prior to 7.3.0, the six network address set handlers in cmd/incusd/network_address_sets.go resolved the effective project with project.NetworkProject(), which returns default when features.networks is unset. The expandProject authorization switch in cmd/incusd/daemon.go omitted auth.ObjectTypeNetworkAddressSet, so authorization used the requested project instead of the effective project. This issue is fixed in version 7.3.0. |
| CVE-2026-81434 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WatchGuard Dimension's Device Configuration History page allows an authenticated attacker with view permission on a device to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another authenticated user's browser by enticing the victim to open a specially crafted link. |
| CVE-2026-81430 | High | 2026-11-19 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A vulnerability in WatchGuard Dimension's system upgrade process allows an authenticated administrator to create or overwrite arbitrary files on the appliance filesystem by uploading a specially crafted upgrade archive. |