Overview 210 matches · 107 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 3 public PoC · 2 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
107
51.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
1
0.5%
No exploit published
102
48.6%
blocked by ARMR today
107
51.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
103
49.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
6
2.9%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
204
97.1%
split by
peak 35 / year
201821
Protected by Waratek17
No exploit published4
Critical3
High9
Medium6
Low3
blocked by ARMR today17
not blocked4
No public exploit21
201927
Protected by Waratek20
No exploit published7
Critical1
High3
Medium10
Low13
blocked by ARMR today20
not blocked7
No public exploit27
202035
Protected by Waratek23
No exploit published12
High3
Medium13
Low19
blocked by ARMR today23
not blocked12
No public exploit35
202117
Protected by Waratek10
No exploit published7
High2
Medium11
Low4
blocked by ARMR today10
not blocked7
Proof of concept only1
No public exploit16
202229
Protected by Waratek15
No exploit published14
High4
Medium22
Low3
blocked by ARMR today15
not blocked14
Proof of concept only4
No public exploit25
202320
Protected by Waratek9
No exploit published11
High1
Medium9
Low10
blocked by ARMR today9
not blocked11
Proof of concept only1
No public exploit19
202426
Protected by Waratek5
No exploit published21
High4
Medium8
Low14
blocked by ARMR today5
not blocked21
No public exploit26
202512
Protected by Waratek4
No exploit published8
High2
Medium7
Low3
blocked by ARMR today4
not blocked8
No public exploit12
202623
Protected by Waratek4
Mitigation candidate1
No exploit published18
Critical2
High8
Medium9
Low4
blocked by ARMR today4
not blocked19
No public exploit23
201820192020202120222023202420252026
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2016-1000352 | High | 2018-06-04 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the ECIES implementation allowed the use of ECB mode. This mode is regarded as unsafe and support for it has been removed from the provider. |
| CVE-2016-1000346 | Low | 2018-06-04 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the other party DH public key is not fully validated. This can cause issues as invalid keys can be used to reveal details about the other party's private key where static Diffie-Hellman is in use. As of release 1.56 the key parameters are checked on agreement calculation. |
| CVE-2016-1000345 | Medium | 2018-06-04 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the DHIES/ECIES CBC mode vulnerable to padding oracle attack. For BC 1.55 and older, in an environment where timings can be easily observed, it is possible with enough observations to identify when the decryption is failing due to padding. |
| CVE-2016-1000344 | High | 2018-06-04 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the DHIES implementation allowed the use of ECB mode. This mode is regarded as unsafe and support for it has been removed from the provider. |
| CVE-2016-1000343 | High | 2018-06-04 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the DSA key pair generator generates a weak private key if used with default values. If the JCA key pair generator is not explicitly initialised with DSA parameters, 1.55 and earlier generates a private value assuming a 1024 bit key size. In earlier releases this can be dealt with by explicitly passing parameters to the key pair generator. |
| CVE-2016-1000342 | High | 2018-06-04 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier ECDSA does not fully validate ASN.1 encoding of signature on verification. It is possible to inject extra elements in the sequence making up the signature and still have it validate, which in some cases may allow the introduction of 'invisible' data into a signed structure. |
| CVE-2016-1000341 | Medium | 2018-06-04 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier DSA signature generation is vulnerable to timing attack. Where timings can be closely observed for the generation of signatures, the lack of blinding in 1.55, or earlier, may allow an attacker to gain information about the signature's k value and ultimately the private value as well. |
| CVE-2016-1000340 | High | 2018-06-04 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider versions 1.51 to 1.55, a carry propagation bug was introduced in the implementation of squaring for several raw math classes have been fixed (org.bouncycastle.math.raw.Nat???). These classes are used by our custom elliptic curve implementations (org.bouncycastle.math.ec.custom.**), so there was the possibility of rare (in general usage) spurious calculations for elliptic curve scalar multiplications. Such errors would have been detected with high probability by the output validation for our scalar multipliers. |
| CVE-2016-1000339 | Medium | 2018-06-04 | No exploit published | No public exploit | In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the primary engine class used for AES was AESFastEngine. Due to the highly table driven approach used in the algorithm it turns out that if the data channel on the CPU can be monitored the lookup table accesses are sufficient to leak information on the AES key being used. There was also a leak in AESEngine although it was substantially less. AESEngine has been modified to remove any signs of leakage (testing carried out on Intel X86-64) and is now the primary AES class for the BC JCE provider from 1.56. Use of AESFastEngine is now only recommended where otherwise deemed appropriate. |
| CVE-2016-1000338 | High | 2018-06-01 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the DSA does not fully validate ASN.1 encoding of signature on verification. It is possible to inject extra elements in the sequence making up the signature and still have it validate, which in some cases may allow the introduction of 'invisible' data into a signed structure. |