WaratekVRT Sign in
Reset
More filters (1)
Columns
Including CVEs outside Waratek scope✕Published from 2007-03-01✕
Overview 405,695 matches · 17,656 in Waratek scope · 1,791 protected · 5,924 exploited · 1,779 CISA KEV · 23,837 public PoC · 3,981 EPSS ≥ 0.5
split by peak 103,724 / year
Withdrawn CVE: 18,953Not applicable: 365,654Outside Waratek scope: 3,432No exploit published: 15,423Mitigation candidate: 420Rule in development: 7Protected by Waratek: 1,806 Unknown: 23,134None: 79Low: 16,286Medium: 165,349High: 156,608Critical: 44,239 not established: 11not blocked: 403,878partly blocked: 15blocked by ARMR today: 1,791 No public exploit: 332,546Forecast only: 815Proof of concept only: 47,237Working exploit published: 19,173Exploited: 5,924
20075,462 Protected by Waratek6 Mitigation candidate11 No exploit published110 Outside Waratek scope55 Not applicable5,206 Withdrawn CVE74 Critical19 High2,560 Medium2,619 Low190 Unknown74 blocked by ARMR today6 not blocked5,456 Exploited38 Working exploit published2,085 Proof of concept only5 Forecast only4 No public exploit3,330 20085,664 Protected by Waratek7 Mitigation candidate11 No exploit published134 Outside Waratek scope51 Not applicable5,429 Withdrawn CVE32 Critical19 High2,846 Medium2,582 Low185 Unknown32 blocked by ARMR today7 not blocked5,657 Exploited42 Working exploit published2,518 Proof of concept only4 Forecast only9 No public exploit3,091 20095,778 Protected by Waratek9 Mitigation candidate16 No exploit published195 Outside Waratek scope45 Not applicable5,467 Withdrawn CVE46 Critical15 High2,734 Medium2,786 Low197 Unknown46 blocked by ARMR today9 not blocked5,769 Exploited74 Working exploit published2,590 Proof of concept only2 Forecast only3 No public exploit3,109 20104,667 Protected by Waratek9 Mitigation candidate14 No exploit published168 Outside Waratek scope74 Not applicable4,374 Withdrawn CVE28 Critical28 High2,093 Medium2,241 Low277 Unknown28 blocked by ARMR today9 not blocked4,658 Exploited73 Working exploit published1,313 Proof of concept only1 Forecast only9 No public exploit3,271 20114,172 Protected by Waratek6 Mitigation candidate13 No exploit published205 Outside Waratek scope83 Not applicable3,843 Withdrawn CVE22 Critical5 High1,784 Medium2,101 Low260 Unknown22 blocked by ARMR today6 not blocked4,166 Exploited50 Working exploit published691 Proof of concept only5 Forecast only4 No public exploit3,422 20125,351 Protected by Waratek9 Mitigation candidate26 No exploit published291 Outside Waratek scope76 Not applicable4,886 Withdrawn CVE63 Critical21 High1,724 Medium3,035 Low508 Unknown63 blocked by ARMR today9 not blocked5,340 not established2 Exploited59 Working exploit published831 Proof of concept only7 Forecast only46 No public exploit4,408 20135,324 Protected by Waratek26 Mitigation candidate19 No exploit published318 Outside Waratek scope284 Not applicable4,540 Withdrawn CVE137 Critical23 High1,735 Medium2,914 Low515 Unknown137 blocked by ARMR today26 not blocked5,297 not established1 Exploited97 Working exploit published520 Proof of concept only3 Forecast only21 No public exploit4,683 20148,008 Protected by Waratek41 Mitigation candidate13 No exploit published292 Outside Waratek scope233 Not applicable7,349 Withdrawn CVE80 Critical20 High1,938 Medium5,314 Low656 Unknown80 blocked by ARMR today41 not blocked7,967 Exploited97 Working exploit published795 Proof of concept only13 Forecast only16 No public exploit7,087 20156,595 Protected by Waratek33 Mitigation candidate7 No exploit published308 Outside Waratek scope171 Not applicable5,975 Withdrawn CVE101 Critical51 High2,354 Medium3,501 Low588 Unknown101 blocked by ARMR today33 not blocked6,562 Exploited96 Working exploit published647 Proof of concept only16 Forecast only19 No public exploit5,817 20166,517 Protected by Waratek61 Mitigation candidate10 No exploit published479 Outside Waratek scope108 Not applicable5,791 Withdrawn CVE68 Critical887 High2,895 Medium2,446 Low221 Unknown68 blocked by ARMR today59 partly blocked2 not blocked6,455 not established1 Exploited103 Working exploit published429 Proof of concept only27 Forecast only32 No public exploit5,926 201718,113 Protected by Waratek108 Mitigation candidate15 No exploit published701 Outside Waratek scope212 Not applicable13,606 Withdrawn CVE3,471 Critical2,113 High6,608 Medium5,687 Low234 Unknown3,471 blocked by ARMR today104 partly blocked4 not blocked18,005 Exploited212 Working exploit published1,259 Proof of concept only52 Forecast only23 No public exploit16,567 201818,154 Protected by Waratek183 Mitigation candidate23 No exploit published724 Outside Waratek scope205 Not applicable15,375 Withdrawn CVE1,644 Critical2,616 High7,571 Medium6,163 Low160 Unknown1,644 blocked by ARMR today182 partly blocked1 not blocked17,971 Exploited236 Working exploit published1,069 Proof of concept only87 Forecast only34 No public exploit16,728 201918,938 Protected by Waratek123 Rule in development1 Mitigation candidate32 No exploit published797 Outside Waratek scope262 Not applicable16,090 Withdrawn CVE1,633 Critical2,657 High7,227 Medium7,117 Low304 Unknown1,633 blocked by ARMR today121 partly blocked2 not blocked18,813 not established2 Exploited329 Working exploit published784 Proof of concept only126 Forecast only51 No public exploit17,648 202019,222 Protected by Waratek157 Mitigation candidate38 No exploit published943 Outside Waratek scope263 Not applicable16,921 Withdrawn CVE900 Critical2,780 High7,782 Medium7,359 Low401 Unknown900 blocked by ARMR today157 not blocked19,065 Exploited344 Working exploit published602 Proof of concept only156 Forecast only66 No public exploit18,054 202121,950 Protected by Waratek124 Rule in development1 Mitigation candidate28 No exploit published669 Outside Waratek scope331 Not applicable18,996 Withdrawn CVE1,801 Critical2,850 High8,770 Medium8,137 Low392 Unknown1,801 blocked by ARMR today124 not blocked21,826 Exploited493 Working exploit published446 Proof of concept only217 Forecast only166 No public exploit20,628 202226,431 Protected by Waratek215 Rule in development1 Mitigation candidate20 No exploit published901 Outside Waratek scope269 Not applicable23,667 Withdrawn CVE1,358 Critical4,441 High10,337 Medium9,908 Low385 Unknown1,360 blocked by ARMR today215 not blocked26,216 Exploited481 Working exploit published565 Proof of concept only2,768 Forecast only97 No public exploit22,520 202330,949 Protected by Waratek161 Mitigation candidate40 No exploit published882 Outside Waratek scope205 Not applicable27,528 Withdrawn CVE2,133 Critical5,031 High11,637 Medium11,824 Low323 Unknown2,134 blocked by ARMR today161 not blocked30,786 not established2 Exploited570 Working exploit published557 Proof of concept only5,590 Forecast only110 No public exploit24,122 202440,704 Protected by Waratek108 Mitigation candidate28 No exploit published620 Outside Waratek scope186 Not applicable39,011 Withdrawn CVE751 Critical4,874 High15,332 Medium18,998 Low740 None1 Unknown759 blocked by ARMR today106 partly blocked2 not blocked40,596 Exploited749 Working exploit published402 Proof of concept only7,466 Forecast only83 No public exploit32,004 202549,972 Protected by Waratek103 Rule in development4 Mitigation candidate25 No exploit published731 Outside Waratek scope139 Not applicable47,148 Withdrawn CVE1,822 Critical4,490 High16,670 Medium23,043 Low3,040 None10 Unknown2,719 blocked by ARMR today103 not blocked49,867 not established2 Exploited746 Working exploit published593 Proof of concept only10,980 Forecast only17 No public exploit37,636 2026103,724 Protected by Waratek317 Mitigation candidate31 No exploit published5,955 Outside Waratek scope180 Not applicable94,452 Withdrawn CVE2,789 Critical11,299 High42,011 Medium37,574 Low6,710 None68 Unknown6,062 blocked by ARMR today313 partly blocked4 not blocked103,406 not established1 Exploited1,035 Working exploit published477 Proof of concept only19,712 Forecast only5 No public exploit82,495
2008201020122014201620182020202220242026
405,695 matches Sign in to download these CVEs as CSV or JSON, or to follow them in a feed. ‹ prev page 1 of 4,057 next ›
CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-99565 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: wait for negotiation before receiving another PDU The receive thread queues a request and can read the next PDU before the negotiation worker finishes. While need_neg is set, the next PDU can cause ksmbd_init_smb_server() to replace conn->ops. A pipelined SMB2 request can therefore make the worker handle an earlier, shorter SMB1 request with SMB2 operations and read beyond its buffer. An SMB1 multi-protocol negotiate may be followed by an SMB2 NEGOTIATE that changes conn->ops again. Wait for work queued while the connection is new or needs negotiation to complete before reading another PDU. This keeps the operations stable for both stages of negotiation without changing when need_neg is cleared.
CVE-2026-99564 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: smbdirect: don't wait for RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED in smbdirect_socket_destroy_sync() smbdirect_socket_destroy_sync() waited for RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED after smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work() called rdma_disconnect(). That can take very long, e.g. if the peer just disappeared, until the rdma cm gives up, or forever if the event already happened, but the status was overwritten afterwards. This is not needed: smbdirect_socket_destroy() drains the qp under rdma_lock_handler(), destroys it and calls rdma_destroy_id(), which only waits for a currently running event handler and makes sure no further events are delivered. The rest of the disconnect protocol (DREQ/DREP and timewait for IB, abrupt close for iWarp) is handled by the rdma core asynchronously. drivers/nvme/host/rdma.c also just calls rdma_disconnect() and ib_drain_qp() before rdma_destroy_id(). So smbdirect_socket_destroy() now also accepts SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_DISCONNECTING and changes the status to SMBDIRECT_SOCKET_DISCONNECTED itself under rdma_lock_handler(). We could still get RDMA_CM_EVENT_DISCONNECTED in the small windows between rdma_unlock_handler() and rdma_destroy_id(), but in that case smbdirect_connection_rdma_event_handler() is basically a no-op.
CVE-2026-99563 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener A child of a listener only left the listen.pending or listen.ready list via smbdirect_socket_accept() or when the listener was destroyed. So every connection that failed before it was accepted (negotiate timeout, peer disconnect, invalid negotiate request, ...) stayed on the list and counted against the backlog until the listener was destroyed. After about backlog (10 for ksmbd) such connections smbdirect_listen_connect_request() rejected every new connection with -EBUSY, so an unauthenticated peer was able to permanently stop ksmbd from accepting SMB-Direct connections. Now a failed child moves itself to a new listen.orphaned list at the end of smbdirect_socket_cleanup_work(), after the disconnect was started, and queues listen.purge_orphaned_work, which releases it with smbdirect_socket_release(), without holding the listener's rdma_lock_handler() lock, in the same way smbdirect_socket_destroy() does for the remaining children. Orphaned sockets still count against the backlog until they are released. sc->accept.listener is now only changed under listener->listen.lock and whoever clears it is responsible for releasing the socket: smbdirect_socket_accept(), purge_orphaned_work or the destroy of the listener. In order to make that work: - a struct smbdirect_socket that is a listener is now freed via kfree_rcu(), so that a child can dereference sc->accept.listener under rcu_read_lock(), even if the listener is released concurrently. - smbdirect_listen_connect_request() adds nsc to the listen.pending list and sets nsc->accept.listener before it calls smbdirect_accept_connect_request(), and always returns 0 so the rdma_cm core keeps the connection id and nsc owns it. On a non-zero return it schedules nsc's teardown with smbdirect_socket_schedule_cleanup(), which orphans it off the listener so that purge_orphaned_work releases it; nsc destroys its own connection id with rdma_destroy_id() in that teardown. The teardown has to be deferred because the rdma_cm core holds nsc's id_priv->handler_mutex across the handler, so nsc->rdma.cm_id must not be destroyed synchronously from here. That same handler_mutex (and the listener's) also guarantees nsc can't go away under us, so setting the listener before the call is safe and lets a failure orphan nsc. - smbdirect_accept_negotiate_recv_work() no longer moves a socket to the ready list if it already failed or no longer belongs to the listener. Every accepting socket has a listener, so if sc->accept.listener is already cleared, it no longer sends a negotiate response, as the socket is about to be released. - smbdirect_socket_destroy() of the listener disables purge_orphaned_work and also releases the orphaned sockets.
CVE-2026-99562 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: reject FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA on a directory handle An authenticated client with a writable tree connection can open a directory with FILE_WRITE_DATA and send FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA on that handle. The handler only checks fp->daccess & FILE_WRITE_DATA_LE, but on a directory FILE_WRITE_DATA is the legitimate add-file right, so the check passes. ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() then calls kernel_write() on the directory file, which has no FMODE_WRITE, and __kernel_write_iter() hits WARN_ON_ONCE(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)), panicking a panic_on_warn kernel. Before commit 25e414db7033 ("ksmbd: report holes in allocated range queries") the dense-file path used vfs_fallocate(), which rejects directories with -EISDIR. The kernel_write() loop that replaced it has no such check. Reject a directory handle in ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() before writing, as ksmbd_vfs_write() already does for SMB2_WRITE. WARNING: fs/read_write.c:608 at __kernel_write_iter+0x74b/0x8c0 Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work Call Trace: kernel_write+0x1ef/0x4d0 ksmbd_vfs_zero_data+0x413/0x590 smb2_ioctl+0x21fa/0x66a0 handle_ksmbd_work+0x61b/0x1ff0
CVE-2026-99561 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fork: don't create io threads once PF_POSTCOREDUMP is set zap_process() skips every thread that already has PF_POSTCOREDUMP set. Such a thread is past synchronize_group_exit(), so a coredump can't catch it anymore. It isn't counted in core_state->threads_remaining and it isn't sent SIGKILL. do_exit() sets PF_POSTCOREDUMP in synchronize_group_exit() and calls io_uring_files_cancel() right after that. The cancellation runs task work and a create_worker_cb() that io-wq queued before the exit creates a new io-wq worker from there. If another thread started a coredump in the meantime that worker joins a thread-group which is already being dumped. zap_process() never saw it so it was never counted. But when it exits it sees signal->core_state in synchronize_group_exit() and decrements threads_remaining like any other thread. So the count reaches zero one thread early and the dumper leaves coredump_wait_inactive() while a thread it counted is still running. The task has no fatal signal pending because zap_process() deliberately didn't send it one, and it never went through get_signal() so it doesn't have PF_SIGNALED either. Refuse to create an io thread when the creator has PF_POSTCOREDUMP. That costs nothing. io_uring_files_cancel() raises IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT before it runs any task work, so a worker created from there only ever gets to exit again, and io_should_retry_thread() doesn't retry -EINTR. Clearing PF_POSTCOREDUMP for the new thread in copy_process() was the other option. It makes the worker a thread like any other, but it only helps while the dump hasn't started. A worker born after zap_process() has run is invisible to it whatever its flags say and still decrements threads_remaining on the way out. Refusing to create it covers both, and then no task is ever born with the flag, so there is nothing to clear. Moving io_uring_files_cancel() ahead of synchronize_group_exit() closes the same window. It runs the cancellation, and whatever that can block on, before the thread announces itself to the dumper. A thread that blocks there never reaches coredump_task_exit() at all, so the dumper ends up waiting for a thread that never parks. Refusing the creation leaves the cancellation where it is. But it's very ugly to run io_uring work even before we did all the generic exit work.
CVE-2026-99560 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7925: fix reset panic caused by the WM2 rx irq mask mt7925_irq_map sets wm2_complete_mask, but mt7925_dma_layout has no tx done ring, so the MT_RXQ_MCU_WA queue and its NAPI are never set up. On a chip reset, mt7925e_mac_reset() calls napi_disable() on that NAPI and crashes: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000a40 Workqueue: mt76 mt7925_mac_reset_work [mt7925_common] RIP: 0010:mutex_lock+0x1c/0x50 Call Trace: napi_disable+0x1d/0x50 mt7925e_mac_reset+0x327/0x420 [mt7925e] mt7925_mac_reset_work+0x9a/0x1a0 [mt7925_common] Remove the WM2 mask from mt7925_irq_map and from MT7925_INT_RX_DONE_ALL.
CVE-2026-99559 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: 9524/1: mm: align hugetlb mappings to the huge page size mmap(MAP_HUGETLB) on 32-bit Arm can return an address which is not aligned to the huge page size. In a QEMU virt guest, unmapping the VMA then hits the alignment check in __unmap_hugepage_range(): kernel BUG at mm/hugetlb.c:5213! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ARM PC is at __unmap_hugepage_range+0x540/0x584 LR is at __zap_vma_range+0x13a0/0x1410 Commit 7bd3f1e1a9ae ("mm: make hugetlb mappings go through mm_get_unmapped_area_vmflags") made hugetlb mappings use the architecture's arch_get_unmapped_area(). The generic implementations handle hugetlb alignment, but the Arm implementations only account for the optional SHMLBA cache-colouring constraint. A 4 KiB-page kernel can therefore align the mapping to 4 KiB or 16 KiB instead of the required 2 MiB. Set the alignment mask from the file's hstate for hugetlb mappings in both Arm implementations. Huge-page alignment also satisfies the SHMLBA constraint.
CVE-2026-99558 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-crypto: fix NULL deref and UAF in __blk_crypto_evict_key() Sashiko reported a possible NULL pointer dereference, triggered by the following flow: dm-inlinecrypt ctor # first use of the fallback ├─ blk_crypto_init_key() # succeeds, ctx->key.size != 0 ├─ blk_crypto_start_using_key() │ ├─ hw-wrapped key: -EOPNOTSUPP │ │ # profile never allocated (NULL) │ └─ raw key: fallback_start_using_mode() │ └─ blk_crypto_fallback_init() fails │ └─ kfree(profile) # not NULLed ├─ goto bad └─ inlinecrypt_dtr() # evicts whenever key.size is set └─ blk_crypto_evict_key() └─ blk_crypto_config_supported_natively() = false └─ blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() └─ __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile) └─ profile->num_slots # BOOM!!! This issue can be reproduced using the following commands: dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/backing bs=1M count=64 LOOP=$(losetup -f --show /tmp/backing) SZ=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOP) KEY=$(head -c 64 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n') dmsetup create ic --table "0 $SZ inlinecrypt aes-xts-plain64 \ $KEY 0 $LOOP 0 1 keytype:hw-wrapped" And the following oops is triggered: ================================================================== blk-crypto: loop0: no support for wrapped keys Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000058-0x000000000000005f] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 901 Comm: dmsetup 7.3.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:__blk_crypto_evict_key+0x2e/0x3b0 Call Trace: blk_crypto_evict_key+0x24c/0x320 inlinecrypt_dtr+0xf6/0x160 inlinecrypt_ctr+0x2d3/0xbd0 dm_table_add_target+0x661/0xf40 table_load+0x1c4/0x490 ctl_ioctl+0x32f/0x5f0 dm_ctl_ioctl+0xe/0x20 ================================================================== dm-inlinecrypt is the only caller that can evict a key that was never started, as fscrypt frees such a key without evicting it. Fix this by returning early from blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() when tfms_inited[] is not set for the key's mode. tfms_inited[] is only set after blk_crypto_fallback_init() has successfully initialized the profile, so the crash above is no longer reachable. The bug has been latent since commit c984ff1423ae ("blk-crypto: dynamically allocate fallback profile") was merged in v6.5, and only became actually triggerable when commit e7f57d2c47e2 ("dm-inlinecrypt: add target for inline block device encryption") was merged in v7.2.
CVE-2026-99557 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fail readdir when the MDS reply carries no dirfrag A ceph mount oopses in ceph_readdir() when the MDS answers a READDIR request with a reply whose extra blob is empty. parse_reply_info() skips reply blobs whose length is zero, so parse_reply_info_readdir() never runs, r_reply_info.dir_dir stays NULL, and the reply still parses as successful. ceph_mdsc_do_request() returns 0 and ceph_readdir() then reads rinfo->dir_dir->frag with no NULL check: /* extra */ ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, len, bad); if (len > 0) { ... err = parse_reply_info_extra(&p, p + len, req, features, s); ... } The oops on v7.3.0-rc4-00537-ga3ff15db6820, one getdents64(2) on the mount root after an ms_mode=legacy mount, trimmed: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 266 Comm: ls Tainted: G N 7.3.0-rc4-00537-ga3ff15db6820 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:ceph_readdir+0xbff/0x3ea0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __pfx_ceph_readdir+0x10/0x10 wrap_directory_iterator+0xa2/0xe0 iterate_dir+0x1da/0x5d0 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x13b/0x2a0 do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x4a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> The unconditional frag read came in with 81c6aea5275ea ("ceph: handle frag mismatch between readdir request and reply"), so the bug is old. Treat a reply with no dirfrag as a protocol violation: warn once, drop the request and return -EIO, the same way ceph_readdir() already handles the two malformed-reply cases later in the function. Tested on v7.3.0-rc4-00537-ga3ff15db6820 (KASAN). Unpatched, the getdents64(2) above takes the machine down (oops=panic) on the first READDIR reply. With the patch it warns once and getdents64(2) returns -EIO, no oops, no hang. A conformant reply for an empty directory — dirfrag present, zero entries, FRAG_END|FRAG_COMPLETE — still lists "." and ".." and returns EOF on both kernels, so normal readdir behavior is unchanged. The oops is still present in v7.3-rc5 (72d3fcf802c45).
CVE-2026-99556 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: serialize directory emptiness checks with readdir SMB2 QUERY_DIRECTORY holds fp->readdir_lock while it calls iterate_dir() on fp->filp. An SMB2 SET_INFO request with FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION can resolve the same FileId and call ksmbd_vfs_empty_dir() on the same filp without that lock. iterate_dir()'s inode read lock permits concurrent readers and does not serialize per-file iterator state. ext4 stores its dx readdir cursor and fname RB tree in file->private_data. Concurrent reset or refill can therefore free a fname node while the other worker still traverses it or retains its RB-tree link, resulting in use-after-free accesses. An authenticated SMB client with list and delete rights on a directory in a writable KSMBD share backed by ext4 can trigger this when the directory takes the dx readdir path. The client overlaps an SMB2 QUERY_DIRECTORY request with an SMB2 SET_INFO request carrying FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION on one live FileId. In one x86_64 SMP KASAN multi-shot guest using ksmbd-for-next at 171df27077fb, the unmodified kernel reported a cross-worker use-after-free before a panic. The first report's access and free stacks show the two request paths directly (trimmed): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x488/0x550 Read of size 8 by task kworker/2:0/29 Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work Call Trace: ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x488/0x550 htree_dirblock_to_tree+0x535/0x990 ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x319/0xba0 ext4_readdir+0x175a/0x2f40 iterate_dir+0x1b6/0x630 smb2_query_dir+0x1003/0x1cc0 Freed by task 279: free_rb_tree_fname+0x67/0xc0 ext4_readdir+0x13a9/0x2f40 iterate_dir+0x1b6/0x630 ksmbd_vfs_empty_dir+0xa2/0x100 smb2_set_info+0x2ffa/0x45d0 Take fp->readdir_lock across the entire emptiness check. This places both iterators over that handle's filp in the same lock domain while preserving the disposition status handling. The exact code change completed a warning-free x86_64 KASAN bzImage build. Tracing three request pairs showed that the two iterate_dir() calls no longer overlapped and the expected statuses were preserved. A further 1,600 reproducer iterations completed with expected statuses and no KASAN report, Oops, or panic. The reproducer and complete guest configuration are available privately to maintainers on request.
CVE-2026-99555 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: usbtv: fix null-pointer dereference on disconnect A null-pointer dereference can occur in usb_make_path() when called from usbtv_querycap() (and other ioctl handlers) during device disconnection. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000a: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000050-0x0000000000000057] RIP: 0010:usb_make_path include/linux/usb.h:985 [inline] RIP: 0010:usbtv_querycap+0x9c/0x100 drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-video.c:612 ... Call Trace: <TASK> v4l_querycap+0x236/0x470 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:1106 __video_do_ioctl+0x8af/0xc70 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:3133 video_usercopy+0x860/0x1430 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.c:3475 v4l2_ioctl+0x18d/0x1e0 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-dev.c:366 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 This happens due to a race condition between the USB device disconnect routine (usbtv_disconnect()) and V4L2 ioctls. When the device is disconnected, usbtv_disconnect() sets usbtv->udev = NULL without holding the usbtv->v4l2_lock mutex. Concurrently, an ioctl handler like usbtv_querycap() can be executing under the v4l2_lock and attempt to use usbtv->udev, leading to a crash. To fix this, move the usbtv->udev = NULL assignment into usbtv_video_free() and protect it with mutex_lock(&usbtv->v4l2_lock). This ensures that no non-queue ioctl handler can run concurrently with the pointer being nullified. If an ioctl is already running, the mutex will block the disconnect path until the ioctl finishes. If an ioctl is blocked waiting for the lock, it will acquire it after the disconnect routine releases it, but will then check video_is_registered() (which was cleared by vb2_video_unregister_device()) and safely return -ENODEV. Acquiring v4l2_lock after vb2_video_unregister_device() avoids reintroducing a historical deadlock issue, and usbtv_audio_free() remains safe as it is called before usbtv_video_free().
CVE-2026-99554 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: pegasus: do not advance rx_skb->data on dropped frames For the 0x8513 chip, read_bulk_callback() skips the 2-byte receive header by advancing pegasus->rx_skb->data in place. This is done before the pkt_len > PEGASUS_MTU check, and when that check drops the frame the good path resubmits the same skb with the advanced rx_skb->data as the transfer buffer, still PEGASUS_MTU bytes long. Every frame with an oversized length field therefore moves the receive buffer two more bytes towards the end of the skb data area. A device that keeps sending such frames makes the host controller write received data over skb_shared_info and past the end of the allocation, and the corrupted skb_shared_info is used when the skb is eventually freed. With an emulated device sending frames filled with 0x5a on a KASAN kernel: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dummy_timer+0xade/0x3f00 [dummy_hcd] Write of size 1536 at addr ffff888105821202 by task swapper/1/0 ... Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xeb4b474b4b4b4b4c: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x5a5a5a5a5a5a5a60-0x5a5a5a5a5a5a5a67] RIP: 0010:skb_release_data+0x36f/0x800 Only skip the header with skb_reserve() once the frame is going to be passed up, so the receive buffer always starts at the beginning of the skb data area. Unlike the old pointer adjustment, skb_reserve() also moves skb->tail, so the two header bytes now count against the buffer size: lower the length limit for the 0x8513 accordingly, otherwise a pkt_len of PEGASUS_MTU - 1 or PEGASUS_MTU would trip skb_over_panic(). Found by code review with LLM assistance and reproduced with an emulated USB device (raw-gadget + dummy_hcd).
CVE-2026-99553 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix race between client_info_show() and free_client() client_info_show() renders /proc/fs/nfsd/clients/<id>/info and walks clp->cl_sessions under clp->cl_lock to print each session's slot counts. free_client() tears down the same list without taking cl_lock, and is the only unlocked mutator of cl_sessions. A reader can observe a client mid-teardown because get_nfsdfs_clp() pins the nfs4_client but not its sessions: free_client() frees every session before calling nfsd_client_rmdir(), so an in-flight seq_file reader can follow a list_del()'d node whose ->next now holds LIST_POISON1 and take a general protection fault: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead00000000014c CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 132488 Comm: cat RIP: 0010:client_info_show+0x2bf/0x3d0 RAX: dead000000000100 Call Trace: seq_read_iter+0x12a/0x4b0 seq_read+0xf1/0x130 vfs_read+0xbf/0x350 ksys_read+0x6f/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x8b/0xcb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Detach cl_sessions onto a local reaplist under cl_lock, then free the sessions after dropping the lock. Removing entries from cl_sessions under cl_lock matches unhash_session(), and the detach-then-reap shape matches how __destroy_client() reaps cl_delegations. The sessions cannot be freed while cl_lock is held, since free_session() calls nfsd4_del_conns(), which re-acquires it.
CVE-2026-99552 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2/dlm: drain join handlers before releasing module text The code for a registered DLM handler must remain resident until its last invocation finishes. dlm_unregister_net_handlers() only removes dlm_join_handlers from the o2net registry. o2net_handler_get() takes a kref on the wrapper, but that reference does not pin ocfs2_dlm text. o2net_process_message() calls nh_func after dropping o2net_handler_lock. With CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_O2CB=m, ocfs2_dlm can be loaded independently of ocfs2_stack_o2cb while nodemanager continues handling messages from a configured, heartbeating peer. If no dependent module or module reference prevents normal unload, the following ordering is possible: Receive worker Module unload -------------- ------------- o2net_handler_get() take wrapper kref drop handler lock <preempted> dlm_exit() unregister handlers release DLM module text call saved nh_func in released module text Use o2net_unregister_and_flush_handler_list() in the shared DLM unregister helper. It first prevents new lookups, then waits for the ordered o2net workqueue to drain, including a concurrent destruction of that queue. The acquired invocation therefore finishes before dlm_exit() returns and the loader releases the callback code. The same helper covers partial registration and dlm_init() error unwind before module memory is released. Skip the drain when the private join-handler list is empty. Early dlm_init() failures can reach this helper before any handler has been published. Partial-registration failure also reaches it a second time after the first call has already unregistered and drained the list. Neither case needs to take o2net_wq_mutex or drain unrelated work. The list is changed only by serialized module init/exit paths; a nonempty list still uses the full unregister-and-flush helper. Oops report as below: Oops: int3: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware identification omitted. Workqueue: o2net o2net_rx_until_empty [ocfs2_nodemanager] RIP: 0010:0xffffffffc0423871 [Instruction byte dump omitted.] Register dump omitted. Call Trace: <TASK> ? o2net_rx_until_empty+0x19b1/0x3300 [ocfs2_nodemanager] ? __pfx_o2net_rx_until_empty+0x10/0x10 [ocfs2_nodemanager] ? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300 ? process_one_work+0x935/0x1b40 ? process_one_work+0x834/0x1b40 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_release+0xc8/0x290 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? process_one_work+0x9a8/0x1b40 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300 ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kthread_parkme+0x177/0x220 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 ? kthread+0x351/0x460 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ? ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940 ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __switch_to+0x74f/0xf70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: ocfs2_nodemanager [last unloaded: ocfs2_dlm] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
CVE-2026-99551 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: drain quorum work before removing the cluster The configured cluster must remain available until an in-flight quorum decision has finished using its fencing method. o2quo_make_decision() drops qs_lock before calling o2quo_fence_self(), which marks heartbeat regions for unclean stop and then reads o2nm_single_cluster->cl_fence_method. Cluster removal clears the singleton without waiting for this independent system-workqueue item. When a failed-quorum decision overlaps removal of the heartbeat regions, nodes and cluster through configfs, the worker can be preempted after marking the regions and resume after the singleton has been cleared: Quorum worker Configfs removal select fence; drop qs_lock o2hb_stop_all_regions() remove regions; join heartbeat threads remove nodes; stop o2net clear singleton; release cluster read cl_fence_method The resumed read dereferences NULL instead of applying the configured fencing method. The heartbeat thread's dependency protects the local node only until the thread exits, and draining o2net does not wait for qs_work. Add o2quo_flush_work() to drain pending or running quorum decisions before clearing the singleton in o2nm_cluster_group_drop_item(). By this point the heartbeat regions and nodes have been removed, so their work publishers are stopped. The worker can finish while the cluster and its configured fencing method remain available. It does not acquire the configfs mutex held by the removal path. Keep o2quo_exit() as the counterpart of o2quo_init() for module teardown and initialization failure, and have it call the same drain helper. Cluster removal uses only the explicitly named drain operation. KASAN report as below: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000011b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000008d8-0x00000000000008df] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 72 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events o2quo_make_decision RIP: 0010:o2quo_fence_self+0x65/0x200 Register dump omitted. Call Trace: <TASK> o2quo_make_decision+0x345/0x3a0 ? __pfx_o2quo_make_decision+0x10/0x10 ? process_one_work+0x834/0x1b40 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_release+0xc8/0x290 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 process_one_work+0x9a8/0x1b40 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300 ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kthread_parkme+0x177/0x220 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x351/0x460 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940 ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __switch_to+0x74f/0xf70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
CVE-2026-99550 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: pin owning modules for open debugfs files The OCFS2 debugfs file operation tables do not set owner. The full debugfs proxy obtains real_fops with fops_get() at open and keeps it until final release. Without an owner, this does not acquire a reference to the module containing the table and its callbacks. Removing the debugfs entries does not drain retained open files. An open connected_nodes file can therefore outlive ocfs2_nodemanager and make full_proxy_release() read real_fops->release from freed module memory. Heming also reproduced the issue with fs_state and asked for the other OCFS2 debugfs operation tables to be checked. Set owner to THIS_MODULE in all eleven explicit debugfs operation tables: five in ocfs2_nodemanager, four in ocfs2_dlm, and two in ocfs2. The existing debugfs get/put pair then holds the appropriate module until final release. Leave the open, read and release callbacks unchanged. The blockcheck table already sets owner through DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(), so it needs no change. The original controlled test used an unloadable OCFS2 module and case-local probe filters without changing the candidate open, unload or release logic. Closing a retained connected_nodes file after normal unload produced: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff804cfef Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:full_proxy_release+0xbf/0x190 Call Trace: <TASK> __fput+0x39a/0xa60 fput_close_sync+0xff/0x200 __x64_sys_close+0x8c/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Modules linked in: [last unloaded: ocfs2_nodemanager]
CVE-2026-99549 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: do not pass a NULL buf to is_oplock_break() receive_encrypted_read() sets *num_mids = 1 and never writes the caller's bufs[]. Offload returns -1 with *num_mids = 0, so the demultiplex thread skips the frame. The inline decrypt path returns 0 even when smb2_find_mid() fails. cifs_demultiplex_thread() then treats mids[i] == NULL as an oplock break and calls is_oplock_break(bufs[i], server) with bufs[i] still NULL. smb2_is_valid_oplock_break() reads hdr.Command at offset 12 and oopses. A large encrypted READ whose MessageId does not match is enough to panic cifsd. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 PID: 100 Comm: cifsd RIP: smb2_is_valid_oplock_break+0xc8/0x2270 [cifs] cifs_demultiplex_thread Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Return -1 when inline decrypt finds no mid, and skip is_oplock_break() plus the unknown-frame dump when bufs[i] is NULL. receive_encrypted_standard() already assigns bufs[*num_mids].
CVE-2026-99548 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix early procfs exposure race Currently, init_cifs() calls cifs_proc_init() near the beginning of the function, before INIT_LIST_HEAD, leading to a momentarily uninitialized, but exposed, procfs. If a userspace process reads this empty procfs, iterating over a zeroed list_head leads to a NULL pointer dereference and a kernel oops/panic. For example, if a delay is added between cifs_proc_init() and INIT_LIST_HEAD, and a userspace process is polling /proc/fs/cifs/DebugData, the following oops occurs: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000608 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3477 Comm: cat Not tainted 7.3.0-02212-g4df4d2a577db-dirty #6 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0x103/0xd80 [cifs] Call Trace: <TASK> ? seq_read_iter+0x86/0x400 ? seq_read_iter+0x86/0x400 seq_read_iter+0x183/0x400 proc_reg_read_iter+0x62/0x90 copy_splice_read+0x215/0x310 splice_file_to_pipe+0xec/0x1c0 do_splice+0x4b8/0x780 __se_sys_splice+0x18f/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x109/0x330 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Fix this by moving cifs_proc_init() down in init_cifs(), ensuring it runs only after all internal lists, locks, counters, and workqueues are fully ready, but before registering the filesystem. Update the error cleanup ladder and exit_cifs() to maintain proper LIFO order.
CVE-2026-99547 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Do not RPM complete unrelated subtrees on unplug When a Thunderbolt device is unplugged, that switch and every switch subsequent to it on the bus device list is `complete()`d, not just its child devices. In the case of multiple domains, it may cause, eg, an attempt to `complete()` the uninitialized domain 1 root switch RPM completion on unplug of a switch from domain 0 (though ordering is not guaranteed numerically sorted). I initially noticed this issue on a Dell XPS9720 when the system would seem to sporadically not wake after unplugging a Thunderbolt dock. I tried multiple kernel versions including v7.2.7 and v7.3-rc4 to see if that resolved the issue, but the issue persisted. Eventually I found that I could consistently generate a kernel Oops reporting a page fault at 0xffff_ffff_ffff_fff8 on unplug from one side of the laptop and went bug hunting. I became suspicious of the `bus_for_each_dev()` walk that I ultimately ended up changing. To confirm this issue, I did an eBPF trace of `bus_for_each_dev()`, `complete_rpm()`, and `complete()` while unplugging in a variety of situations and found that an unplug from domain 0 tries to `complete_rpm()` domain 1's switch, whose RPM completion is not initialized and thus is holding a null wait-list pointer, triggering the page fault. Here are the key sections of that eBPF trace. Note that HEAD denotes the completion's own wait-list HEAD: ``` RESCAN_ENTER domain=0 COMPLETE rescan_domain=0 target=0-1 target_domain=0 route=0x1 parent=0-0 unplugged=1 COMPLETION done=0 head=HEAD next=HEAD prev=HEAD BUS_WALK domain=0 start=0-1 callback=complete_rpm CALLBACK_ENTER rescan_domain=0 dev=1-0 parent=domain1 is_switch=1 COMPLETE rescan_domain=0 target=1-0 target_domain=1 route=0x0 parent=domain1 unplugged=0 COMPLETION done=0 head=HEAD next=0 prev=0 complete+5 complete_rpm+43 bus_for_each_dev+133 icm_free_unplugged_children+250 icm_rescan_work+42 ``` This patch gates the `complete()` on an additional condition - that the Thunderbolt domain matches the domain of the device that was unplugged. I only have a single system with multiple Thunderbolt domains - the Dell XPS9720. I am consistently able to reproduce the Oops on that system. Since running with this patch, I have not seen the Oops reoccur. I have also tested it on a Thinkpad X1-Gen12, and that system boots and runs well with it, but it only has a single Thunderbolt domain, so it does not exercise the multi-domain failure case.
CVE-2026-99546 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_flower: avoid stale mask references after delete Flower releases a mask reference when a filter is removed from the classifier. The filter object can remain alive while dump, walk, or hardware reoffload paths hold a reference to it. Those paths can then dereference f->mask after the mask has already been released. Keep the mask reference until the filter reference count reaches zero. Release the mask synchronously from the final __fl_put() while the caller still holds the tcf_proto reference, and leave the existing RCU work to free the mask. This keeps the mask available to every reader that still holds the filter. The filter is still removed from the classifier indexes immediately. Therefore, a deleted filter can temporarily retain an otherwise empty mask; fl_delete() uses the handle IDR, rather than the mask list, to determine whether the classifier has become empty. Failed mask assignment can leave fnew->mask as an error or borrowed pointer without an owned mask reference. Clear it before the common failure path so the final put cannot release an unowned reference. This fix does not add fields, snapshots, or per-filter memory.
CVE-2026-99545 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: driver core: take parent lock on deferred probe USB interfaces should be probed with the parent USB device lock held, but this is not honoured when probe is deferred. Add a new bus_probe_device_deferred() helper to handle deferred probe where the parent device lock is not held.
CVE-2026-99544 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices In a CoCo VM the host is untrusted. Since the VMBus ring buffer read and write indices live in shared memory, the guest has to treat both as potentially malicious. hv_ringbuffer_write() copies into the ring at write_index with no bounds checking, so the host can make the guest write packet data at any offset up to 4 GiB past the start of the ring buffer. read_index matters too: the available space derived from both indices is the only bound on how much is copied, and an out-of-range index can make it far larger than the ring. The fix is to validate both indices before use and to use the validated snapshot instead of re-accessing. For invalid indices, hv_ringbuffer_write() logs and returns -EIO. One re-read of write_index is left unchecked in this patch: hv_get_ring_bufferindices() fetches it again for the prev_indices trailer. The value is only returned to the host and is not used as an offset or length for indexing. Since this is not a security issue, it is addressed later in the series. Open-coding the bytes available arithmetic keeps the fix free of prerequisites; a later patch refactors it into a helper function.
CVE-2026-99543 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: backlight: qcom-wled: Fix NULL pointer dereference in wled_remove() wled_probe() doesn't set the driver data for the platform device. As a result, platform_get_drvdata() in wled_remove() will return NULL, and the first dereference of it crashes on unbind. Set the platform device driver data in wled_probe().
CVE-2026-99542 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: deny access for an empty DACL instead of granting the request smb_check_perm_dacl() returns the access mask it computes to the SMB2 CREATE handler, which uses it as the granted access for the open. For a security descriptor whose DACL is present but contains no ACEs, the function is supposed to deny access: an empty (non-NULL) DACL grants no access to anyone except the object owner's implicit READ_CONTROL and WRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5). The empty-DACL branch only denies when both - the DACL has no trailing bytes (pdacl_size == sizeof(struct smb_acl)), and - the request contains bits beyond READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC. In every other case it takes the shared "goto err_out" with rc still 0, which returns success without modifying *pdaccess, so the caller grants the full requested access. Three problems follow: - The READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC carve-out models the owner's implicit rights, but the check runs before is_owner is computed, so those rights are handed to *every* caller, not just the owner. For READ_CONTROL the SMB2 CREATE path does not fall back to inode_permission(), so any user can read the security descriptor of an object whose empty DACL is meant to deny them. - A request of exactly READ_CONTROL and/or WRITE_DAC is granted to any caller. WRITE_DAC lets the handle rewrite the DACL. - A DACL that declares zero ACEs but carries trailing bytes (pdacl_size > sizeof(struct smb_acl)) skips the deny entirely and is granted whatever was requested. On shares where the NT ACL is the authoritative access control -- e.g. "force user" shares, where every client maps to one POSIX identity so POSIX cannot distinguish users -- this is an access-control bypass. Compute is_owner before the empty-DACL branch and deny access from an empty DACL unless the caller is the owner requesting no more than READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC.
CVE-2026-99541 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix OOB read and cross-share confusion in ksmbd_validate_name_reconnect() ksmbd_validate_name_reconnect() indexes ab_pathname[share->path_sz + 1] without checking that the path is longer than share->path_sz + 1 (d_path() fills the buffer from the end). A durable fp is not bound to its original share, so a client can preserve a file from a short-path share and reconnect it on a long-path share, making strcmp() read past the PATH_MAX buffer - with a long enough share path this oopses the kernel, and on a mapped page it also gives a byte-equality oracle on adjacent heap (the reconnect succeeds exactly when the out-of-bounds string equals the requested name). A same-share variant with the durable fp at the share root reads 1 byte past the buffer (strlen(ab_pathname) == share->path_sz). Check before comparing: the path must be longer than share->path_sz, it must start with share->path, and the next character must be '/'. The share root itself is accepted only for an empty name.
CVE-2026-99540 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix parent dentry lifetime in directory enumeration ksmbd_populate_dot_dotdot_entries() builds the ".." entry from the open directory's d_parent and passes that pointer to ksmbd_vfs_fill_dentry_attrs() without taking a reference. That pointer is only valid while the directory stays under this parent. If a concurrent rename moves the directory elsewhere, the old parent loses its last reference; a following rmdir then turns it into a negative dentry with d_inode cleared, and after the RCU grace period the dentry itself is freed. The worker still holds the raw pointer and dereferences d_inode through vfs_getattr() and vfs_getxattr(). A remote SMB client, authenticated or guest, triggers this by listing a directory while that directory is moved under a new parent and the old parent is deleted. It can be done by the client itself with write access or by other concurrent writers, triggering null-ptr-deref and slab-use-after-free on a KASAN build. KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work RIP: 0010:xattr_permission+0x9d/0x160 Call Trace: vfs_getxattr+0x9c/0x1b0 ksmbd_vfs_getxattr+0x82/0x100 ksmbd_vfs_get_dos_attrib_xattr+0x7f/0x130 ksmbd_vfs_fill_dentry_attrs+0x435/0x650 ksmbd_populate_dot_dotdot_entries+0x25e/0x630 smb2_query_dir+0xcf9/0x1a20 handle_ksmbd_work+0x5f1/0x1c80 process_one_work+0x90b/0x19d0 Fix by using the dentry reference counting APIs: take the parent with dget_parent(), take a matching dget() on ".", and dput() the dentry once ksmbd_vfs_fill_dentry_attrs() has returned or the pattern does not match.
CVE-2026-99539 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix session reference leak on compounded SESSION_SETUP A compound request can place SESSION_SETUP after another command. That earlier command leaves a reference to its session in work->sess. smb2_sess_setup() then overwrites work->sess with the session it looks up or creates, and the dispatcher later puts work->sess only once. The inherited reference is never dropped. That leaks the session, together with its setup connection and socket, and every repeat of the compound leaks another. unreferenced object (size 512): __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x32c/0x3a0 ksmbd_smb2_session_create+0xf6/0x9c0 [ksmbd] smb2_sess_setup+0xda4/0x6280 [ksmbd] handle_ksmbd_work+0x88c/0x1cb0 [ksmbd] Save the inherited session on entry. After the request has been processed, release it once, but only when smb2_sess_setup() has replaced work->sess with its own session or cleared it. Do this after ksmbd_conn_unlock() so the put does not run under srv_mutex. An error path may instead leave the inherited session in work->sess. Keep it there, so the dispatcher still puts it and the error response is still signed or encrypted with it as before.
CVE-2026-99538 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: ignore network devices of other namespaces With no interface list configured, ksmbd binds every interface that comes up. ksmbd_netdev_event() does not look at the device's namespace, and create_socket() opens the listener in the namespace of the task raising NETDEV_UP. A container with its own address on a bridge brings up its interface and finds port 445 in its namespace already taken by ksmbd, so an SMB server running inside the container fails with "Address already in use". Interfaces are also matched by name only, so a container's eth0 going down would stop the listener on the host's eth0. Only handle netdev events for devices in init_net.
CVE-2026-99537 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: preserve unreadable named streams on open A write-only client can open an existing named stream with FILE_OPEN_IF without permission to read the underlying file. The case-insensitive lookup finds the xattr name, but querying its value length then fails with -EACCES. smb2_set_stream_name_xattr() treats every negative result as a missing stream and replaces the existing xattr with an empty value. A failed xattr list is not proof that the stream is absent either: for example, -ENOMEM can lead to the same empty replacement. Preserve listing errors and create a stream only for -ENOENT or -ENODATA. The latter can occur if the xattr is removed between listing its name and querying its value. Return other lookup errors without changing the stream. A write-only FILE_OPEN now reports access denied instead of name not found. FILE_OVERWRITE_IF and FILE_SUPERSEDE on an unreadable stream also fail instead of appearing to replace it. Stream writes and EOF changes already need to read the old value, so such handles cannot update the stream after opening either.
CVE-2026-99536 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: prevent session binding in compound requests A failed multichannel binding can retain its target session on the work item so that the error response can be signed. Subsequent compound commands can then use that session together with a tree connection left over from an earlier command. Limit binding SESSION_SETUP requests to standalone messages during message validation, before smb2_sess_setup() can replace work->sess. Check both NextCommand and the current request offset to cover binding in the first, middle and last positions of a compound. The existing validation error path returns STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER and stops processing the remaining commands. This intentionally limits support for compounded binding. It is not a protocol requirement that binding be standalone. Standalone binding and non-binding compounds retain their existing behavior, without changing session, tree or response encryption handling.
CVE-2026-99535 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: prevent share root removal through empty paths A FileLinkInformation request can supply "/" as the new link name. smb2_get_name() strips the trailing slash and passes an empty string to ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_start_removing(). ksmbd_vfs_path_lookup() resolves an empty pathname as the configured share path, without LOOKUP_BENEATH. With ReplaceIfExists set, smb2_create_link() can therefore remove the share root from its parent before link creation fails. An authenticated client with a writable share and DELETE access to a file can trigger this if the share root is empty and the mapped user has write and search permission on its parent directory. Return -EINVAL for empty pathnames when for_remove is set, before resolving the share path or acquiring removal resources. Ordinary lookups continue to accept empty pathnames for opening the share root.
CVE-2026-99534 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: prevent stale data from being written by SMB2 WRITE requests Initialize the compatibility byte in request buffers without zeroing the entire allocation. Keep the one-byte compatibility exception for SMB2 messages so valid zero-length WRITE requests remain compatible, and validate the data range in the WRITE handlers against the current compound request before accessing it. This prevents stale request-buffer data from being written to files or sent to IPC pipes.
CVE-2026-99533 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate AppInstanceId takeover target AppInstanceId lookup currently selects the first open with the matching identifier. CREATE for an unrelated share or path can therefore force-close another session's open before authorization of the new target. Matching only the base path also conflates alternate data streams with the unnamed stream. MS-SMB2 requires the old open to match the share and path, belong to a different ClientGuid, and be closed only when the requester has GENERIC_READ access. Search all opens with the ID and match share, resolved path, stream, and the current connection's client GUID. Retain a share configuration reference in ksmbd_file and reuse its name instead of allocating a name for every open. This keeps matching safe during tree connection teardown and preserves name-based matching across configuration updates. Refresh the share reference on durable reconnect and restore the old reference if reopening fails. Serialize connection and share comparisons with durable disconnect/reconnect, and recheck the target before closing it. Keep the original ClientGuid for durable replay and lease checks. Check AppInstanceVersion before querying access, even when GENERIC_READ is absent, and before disconnected delete-on-close cleanup. Rejected CREATE must leave other durable opens untouched. Calculate maximal access on the matched open's referenced path so a rename cannot substitute another file's authorization. Require read access with the effective VFS credentials as well as the NT DACL before takeover. Access denial only skips takeover and leaves CREATE to its normal access checks. Restore filesystem credentials before returning a takeover error. Handle takeover before checking FILE_CREATE collisions, and re-resolve the path after closing the old open. This lets delete-on-close remove the old file before a new one is created. Include SYNCHRONIZE in the baseline maximal-access mask so read-only files report GENERIC_READ correctly.
CVE-2026-99532 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate security descriptor offsets before pointer arithmetic parse_sec_desc() constructs SID and DACL pointers by adding untrusted 32-bit offsets to the security descriptor before checking their bounds. The existing checks reject offsets into the descriptor header, but do not reject offsets beyond the descriptor's length. On a 32-bit kernel, a large offset can wrap the pointer before the descriptor. The end-only checks in parse_sid() and parse_dacl() can then accept it, allowing an authenticated SMB2 SET_INFO request to access memory outside the security descriptor and fault the kernel. Check each nonzero offset against acl_len before constructing its pointer. Initialize the optional owner and group SID pointers to NULL so an omitted SID remains absent when parsing the DACL.
CVE-2026-99531 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: verify transform SessionId matches the decrypted header When an encrypted request comes in, the decryption key is picked by the SessionId in the transform header, but the request is then authorized under whatever session the decrypted inner header names. Nothing ever compares the two, so on a connection with more than one session a client can get a request decrypted with one session's key and run it as another session. Encrypted requests are exempt from signing too, so a valid AEAD tag is the only proof of session identity, and it is checked against the wrong session. MS-SMB2 says the server must check that the transform SessionId matches the one in the decrypted SMB2 header and treat a mismatch as a protocol error. Add that check in __handle_ksmbd_work() after decryption, before dispatching: the message has to be at least one fixed SMB2 header, the first operation must not set SMB2_FLAGS_RELATED_OPERATIONS and its SessionId must match the transform SessionId, and every following non-related operation in a compound chain must carry the same SessionId. NextCommand offsets must be 8-byte aligned and stay inside the message; the bounds check is done by subtraction so it cannot wrap. When the decrypted payload is a compression transform, the existing decompression step runs first and the decompressed SMB2 message is checked instead, since a compression transform header carries no SessionId.
CVE-2026-99530 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: serialize migrations of newly forked processes With favordynmods enabled, a cgroup.procs migration takes the target threadgroup's cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem for writing. A process fork holds the forking threadgroup's semaphore for reading. These are different semaphores when fork creates a new process. copy_process() publishes the child's PID before cgroup_post_fork() links the child to its css_set. A writer can find the child in that interval, take its uncontended semaphore, and migrate it while child->cgroups still points to init_css_set and child->cg_list is empty. Migration links the node into init_css_set.mg_tasks. cgroup_post_fork() then adds the same node to the intended css_set as though it were unlinked, corrupting both task lists and their css_set ownership. This regresses the fork/migration race fixed by commit b12b533fa523 ("cgroups: add lock for child->cgroups in cgroup_post_fork()") and restored again in 2012 after the lock had been removed. The old task_lock protection was later superseded by global css_set and cgroup threadgroup locking. The change identified by the Fixes tag narrowed only the migration side back to a per-threadgroup lock, recreating the different-process exclusion failure. Take the new threadgroup's semaphore for reading before the child becomes visible and hold it through cgroup_post_fork(). Use a nested lock subclass because fork already holds the parent's semaphore. CLONE_THREAD children share the parent's signal_struct and remain covered by the existing lock. Migrations of unrelated, fully initialized threadgroups remain concurrent. An AI coding assistant was used to identify and reproduce the regression and to develop and test this fix.
CVE-2026-99529 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: b43: fix use-after-free in b43_bcma_remove() b43_one_core_detach() frees the struct b43_wldev it is given the bus device of. b43_bcma_remove() then reads wldev->dev again to free the bus device, which is a read of freed memory. b43_ssb_remove() does not have the problem: it takes a copy of wldev->dev at the start. Do the same here.
CVE-2026-99528 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: fix netns use-after-free in write_gssp() While fuzzing with a customized syzkaller, I hit a refcount warning in xprt_alloc(), reached from a write to /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0xf8/0x120 CPU: 0 PID: 10404 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc1-00096-gcfebfd3db73d Call Trace: <TASK> xprt_alloc+0x83f/0x9d0 xs_setup_xprt+0xaf/0x3c0 xs_setup_local+0x47/0x7f0 xprt_create_transport+0x16c/0x730 rpc_create+0x38e/0x7f0 gssp_rpc_create+0xe2/0x180 set_gssp_clnt+0xba/0x1b0 write_gssp+0x200/0x310 proc_reg_write+0x240/0x330 vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1050 ksys_write+0x12a/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x117/0x750 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> create_use_gss_proxy_proc_entry() stores the struct net pointer as the proc entry's private data without taking a reference on it, and an open file descriptor does not pin the namespace either, as procfs only pins the proc_dir_entry. write_gssp() reads that pointer back with pde_data() and hands it to set_gssp_clnt(), which reaches xprt_init(): xprt->xprt_net = get_net_track(net, &xprt->ns_tracker, GFP_KERNEL); get_net_track() -> get_net() -> refcount_inc() is unconditional, so rpc_create() assumes its caller holds a reference on args.net. write_gssp() does not. Dropping the last ns.count reference does not make the file go away. __put_net() only queues cleanup_net() on a workqueue, and the remove_proc_entry() that fences off further writes runs from the rpcsec_gss pernet .exit method, that is, from inside cleanup_net(). A write landing between those two points increments a refcount that is already zero. cleanup_net() does not re-read ns.count, so the namespace is freed anyway and the rpc_xprt -- along with the AF_LOCAL socket opened for it -- is left pointing at freed memory. The resurrected count is visible to the rest of that teardown too: with CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE the same cleanup_net() worker then trips !mr_can_free_table() in ip6mr_free_table(), which tests check_net() on the namespace it is freeing. It reduces to opening /proc/net/rpc/use-gss-proxy inside a new network namespace, calling setns() back to the original one to drop the last reference, and then writing "1" to the still-open descriptor. Take the reference in write_gssp() itself and refuse the write when the namespace is already gone. This is what procfs does for every other /proc/net file: get_proc_net() is maybe_get_net(PDE_NET(PDE(inode))) and seq_open_net() returns -ENXIO when it fails. PDE_NET() cannot be reused here because the parent directory /proc/net/rpc carries no namespace pointer. Adding a .pre_exit to rpcsec_gss_net_ops so the entry is removed earlier would only narrow the window, since pre_exit also runs from cleanup_net(). Live namespaces are unaffected: a write still returns the error from set_gssp_clnt(), a write of "2" still returns -EINVAL, and reads are untouched.
CVE-2026-99527 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spmi: Fix potential use-after-free by grabbing of_node reference As noticed by Sashiko during a review run of an unrelated patch, in of_spmi_register_devices(), for_each_available_child_of_node() is used to loop through children, and to also assign a node to a newly created SPMI child device. Problem is that the refcount is dropped at every iteration so, in the specific case of DT overlays, a use-after-free may occur when an overlay is dynamically unloaded! To resolve this, increase the of_node refcount when assigning (in function of_spmi_register_devices) and release the reference in spmi_device_remove().
CVE-2026-99526 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix use-after-free infoleak via the readdir resume name CIFSFindNext() copies the resume name that cifs_save_resume_key() recorded from the last entry of the previous response into its request; psrch_inf->presume_name points into the response buffer that entry came from, and nothing ever clears it. find_cifs_entry() records a new name only from a response with a usable last entry, and cifs_readdir() only from an entry it walks to, so a response that carries no entries and leaves last_entry NULL, because CIFSFindFirst() or CIFSFindNext() rejected LastNameOffset, refreshes neither and presume_name keeps pointing into the previous response. That buffer has already been released: by CIFSFindNext() before it installs the new response, or by find_cifs_entry() when it rewinds the search, which does not drop the name either and can then fail in initiate_cifs_search() before a new response replaces it. The next CIFSFindNext() then copies up to PATH_MAX - 1 bytes of the resume name out of the released buffer into its request and sends them to the server: a use-after-free read that leaks kernel memory to a malicious or compromised server, which can provoke it with a single FindNext response that carries no entries and a LastNameOffset above CIFSMaxBufSize, which is all the existing check rejects. With KASAN enabled, a server that answers a listing that way gives: CIFS: VFS: ignoring corrupt resume name ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in CIFSFindNext+0x8ca/0x14c0 Read of size 4080 at addr ffff88807c823f98 by task ls/83 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 83 Comm: ls Tainted: G B 7.3.0-rc4-00457-gf14572c203d5 #69 PREEMPT(lazy) Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE Call Trace: <TASK> kasan_report+0xdf/0x1a0 kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 CIFSFindNext+0x8ca/0x14c0 cifs_readdir+0xf51/0x29c0 iterate_dir+0x1c0/0x570 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x133/0x270 do_syscall_64+0x109/0x5d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Allocated by task 83 on cpu 1 at 13.497119s: cifs_buf_get+0x36/0x90 smb_init+0x4f/0x110 CIFSFindNext+0xf7/0x14c0 cifs_readdir+0xf51/0x29c0 Freed by task 83 on cpu 0 at 13.584018s: cifs_buf_release+0x41/0x80 CIFSFindNext+0xfce/0x14c0 cifs_readdir+0xf51/0x29c0 The buggy address is located 16280 bytes inside of freed 16588-byte region [ffff88807c820000, ffff88807c8240cc) ================================================================== The same memcpy() first reads past the end of that object while it is still live, a slab-out-of-bounds read that the following patches bound; that is the taint the report above carries. SMB1 is not negotiated by default; reaching this code requires an explicit vers=1.0 mount. Clear presume_name and resume_name_len whenever a new response is installed and when the rewind path releases the search buffer, so that the name never outlives the buffer it points into, and reset resume_key with them, since it was taken from the same entry and would otherwise be sent with an empty name. A response without a usable last entry then continues the search with an empty resume name rather than a stale one; CIFSFindNext() skips the copy of a zero-length name so that it never runs on the NULL pointer. The next patch in the series leaves last_entry NULL for a response that carries no entries, and bounds LastNameOffset against the received response rather than against CIFSMaxBufSize. Responses that are given a last entry today then take the path fixed here, so that patch must not be applied without this one.
CVE-2026-99525 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix use-after-free in cifs_ses_add_channel() The error path of cifs_ses_add_channel() calls cifs_put_tcp_session() before cifs_chan_clear_need_reconnect(). The latter reaches cifs_ses_get_chan_index(), which dereferences server->terminate; if the put was the final reference, TCP_Server_Info is already freed and this is a use-after-free. Same put-then-use pattern as the recently fixed sibling in commit 717e0a25036b ("cifs: Fix server use-after-free in cifs_chan_skip_or_disable()"). Move the put last, but do not read chan->server after dropping chan_lock: chan points into ses->chans[], and once chan_count is decremented a concurrent add_channel can reuse the slot and overwrite the pointer, so the put would act on the new channel's server. Cache the pointer under chan_lock, clear the reconnect bit and decrement chan_count while still holding the reference, and release it after the unlock. This issue was discovered by Tencent CodeBuddy Security.
CVE-2026-99524 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Fix use-after-free of a local reenq node left on an inactive cpu A local DSQ reenq is queued on the rq through a per-sched node and run from deferred work. When the reenq is requested from dispatch, the work is a balance callback queued once dispatch is done. A cpu going down installs balance push early in its teardown, and queue_balance_callback() refuses new callbacks from then on. ops.dispatch() keeps running on that cpu until the rq goes offline after an RCU grace period, so a reenq it requests in that window may never run. The IMMED handling in dispatch_one() requests one the same way. A reenq requested from elsewhere for a cpu that is already offline goes through irq_work_queue_on(), which warns, and its work doesn't run until the cpu comes back. Either way the node stays on the rq's list. When the scheduler is freed, scx_sched_free_rcu_work() warns and frees the pcpu with the node still linked, and the list is walked again once the cpu comes back. An inactive cpu's local DSQ holds only tasks that are bound to it or are being moved off, so the reenq is pointless. Ignore reenqs of an inactive cpu's local DSQ. The test is lockless. The hotplug thread of a cpu going down runs on that cpu, and it marks the cpu inactive before it installs balance push. A dispatch on the cpu runs to completion before that thread can run there, so a dispatch that saw the cpu active has queued its callback by then. Requests from outside dispatch run from the wakeup path or through irq_work, which balance push doesn't affect. The grace period after the cpu goes inactive waits for any requester that saw it active, so that irq_work is queued while the cpu is online.
CVE-2026-99523 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/uverbs: Fix DMABUF use-after-free during ufile cleanup The DMABUF release can race with ufile cleanup. When the cleanup holds hw_destroy_rwsem for write, uverbs_uobject_release() fails its trylock and leaves the uobject on the ufile list, but the dma_buf is freed as soon as the release returns. The cleanup then destroys the uobject and uses the freed dma_buf: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in uverbs_dmabuf_fd_destroy_uobj+0x46/0x200 Read of size 8 at addr ff11000109cf14b0 by task repro/435 Call Trace: uverbs_dmabuf_fd_destroy_uobj+0x46/0x200 destroy_hw_fd_uobject+0x3f/0x50 uverbs_destroy_uobject+0xc5/0x380 __uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0x1a8/0x260 uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x54/0x160 ib_uverbs_close+0x34/0x110 Allocated by task 435: dma_buf_export+0x1b5/0x530 ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_DMABUF_ALLOC+0x223/0x3f0 Freed by task 436: kfree+0x301/0x530 dentry_kill+0x14c/0x560 __fput+0x23a/0x4a0 rdma_user_mmap_entry_remove() dereferences the same pointer. Protect the stored dma_buf pointer with a mutex and clear it before release returns. Use a shared revoke helper so uobject destruction and mmap entry removal both skip a cleared pointer. Hold a temporary uobject reference across uverbs_uobject_release() and the pointer update. Use a separate mutex because uobject destruction can free the mmap entry before release finishes. Map and unmap use attachment->dmabuf directly, so they do not need to take the new mutex while holding the reservation lock.
CVE-2026-99522 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/irdma: avoid use-after-free in icrdma_remove icrdma_remove() dereferences iwdev after calling irdma_ib_unregister_device(): irdma_ib_unregister_device(iwdev) -> ib_unregister_device(&iwdev->ibdev) -> __ib_unregister_device() -> ib_dealloc_device() irdma registers irdma_ib_dealloc_device() as the dealloc_driver callback in its ib_device_ops. The RDMA core explicitly documents ib_unregister_device() that when ops.dealloc_driver is used, ib_dev will be freed upon return from the function. The ib_device is embedded in struct irdma_device and iwdev itself was allocated by ib_alloc_device(irdma_device, ibdev). Consequently, once irdma_ib_unregister_device() returns, iwdev must no longer be dereferenced. However, icrdma_remove() currently accesses iwdev->rf afterwards when deinitializing interrupts, destroying ah_tbl_lock, and freeing rf. Although the final ib_device storage is released with kfree_rcu(), the object lifetime has already ended and callers must not rely on the RCU grace period to continue dereferencing iwdev. Save iwdev->rf before unregistering the RDMA device and use the saved pointer for the remaining cleanup. This issue was found by manual code inspection.
CVE-2026-99521 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rapidio: mport_cdev: fix use-after-free in mport_mm_close() A use-after-free vulnerability was identified in mport_mm_close() in drivers/rapidio/devices/rio_mport_cdev.c, identical to the pattern previously addressed in dma_req_free(). This is observable from userspace when an application creates an mmap mapping via the RapidIO character device and subsequently unmaps it (or terminates, triggering exit_mmap()). During munmap, mport_mm_close() is invoked and drops the mapping reference via kref_put(). If kref_put() drops the last reference, mport_release_mapping() is called, which frees the underlying rio_mport_mapping structure. The subsequent mutex_unlock() then dereferences map->md to unlock buf_mutex, leading to a use-after-free: mport_mm_close() -> mutex_lock(&map->md->buf_mutex); ... -> kref_put(&map->ref, mport_release_mapping); /* map is freed */ -> mutex_unlock(&map->md->buf_mutex); /* UAF: map used */ Fix this by caching map->md before kref_put() and using the cached pointer for mutex unlocking, ensuring that freed memory is not accessed.
CVE-2026-99520 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pps: generators: fix use-after-free when closing a removed device The cdev of a PPS generator is embedded in struct pps_gen_device, but nothing ties the lifetime of that structure to the cdev: pps_gen is freed by the release function of its device, and an open file holds a device reference only until pps_gen_cdev_release() drops it. When the generator is unregistered while /dev/pps-genN is open, that put_device() drops the last reference and frees pps_gen, and __fput() then calls cdev_put() on the freed cdev: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cdev_put+0x53/0x60 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801383e138 by task ppsgen64/149 Call Trace: cdev_put+0x53/0x60 __fput+0x745/0xad0 fput_close_sync+0xd9/0x1b0 __x64_sys_close+0x86/0xf0 ... Freed by task 149: kfree+0x25a/0x6d0 device_release+0xca/0x3c0 kobject_put+0x169/0x320 pps_gen_cdev_release+0x51/0x80 __fput+0x36a/0xad0 pps.c had the same bug, fixed in commit c79a39dc8d06 ("pps: Fix a use-after-free"). Fix it the usual way: embed the struct device in pps_gen_device and register both with cdev_device_add(). This makes the device the parent of the cdev, so the cdev holds a device reference until the last file is closed.
CVE-2026-99519 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PM: EM: Fix use-after-free of perf domain in netlink doit handlers The doit handlers dropped em_pd_list_mutex before dereferencing the perf domain, so a concurrent device unregister could free it while the reply was being built. Encode the reply from em_perf_domain_for_id() callbacks, which run under the mutex, and allocate the skb outside of it, like the dumpit path already does. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.
CVE-2026-99518 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: asus-wmi: fix use-after-free unregistering kbd_led led kbd_led_update_all() registers asus->kbd_led with devm_led_classdev_register() on the platform device, but kbd_led is embedded in struct asus_wmi, which asus_wmi_remove() frees at its end. The driver core calls .remove() before devres_release_all(), so the deferred devres release runs led_classdev_unregister() on memory that has already been freed. Whether that faults depends on whether the slab has been reused in between, which makes the crash on module unload intermittent and silently corrupts the led classdev state in the remaining runs. Unregister the led classdev explicitly in asus_wmi_led_exit(), after the led workqueue has been destroyed: kbd_led_work can then neither run nor be queued anymore, since asus_ref.asus is NULL too, so kbd_led_registered is stable and the classdev can be released while the memory embedding it is still alive. devm_led_classdev_unregister() also drops the devres entry, leaving nothing to run at unbind cleanup time; it warns when no devres entry exists, hence the kbd_led_registered check.
CVE-2026-99517 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet: fix use-after-free of the old registrant in nvmet_pr_preempt() nvmet_pr_preempt() handles a preempt sent by the reservation holder by changing the reservation type with nvmet_pr_update_reg_attr(), unless the reservation is of an All Registrants type. For the holder that helper does not modify the registrant in place: it puts a copy on the registrant list, points pr->holder to the copy and passes the old registrant to kfree_rcu(). If the reservation type changed, nvmet_pr_preempt() then hands &reg->hostid of that old registrant to nvmet_pr_resv_released(). Unless the reservation released notification is masked, that function takes subsys->lock and compares the host id against every controller of the subsystem. The caller only holds pr->pr_sem and is not in an RCU read-side critical section, so nothing keeps the old registrant alive while it is read. The result is a read of 16 freed bytes that decides which controllers get the notification. Found by code inspection. kfree_rcu() defers the free, so it usually happens after the read; when the pending free is forced to run before the read, KASAN reports the host id as freed memory. Pass the host id of the controller that sent the command instead. The registrant was looked up by that host id, and the controller outlives the request.
CVE-2026-99516 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-fc: fix use-after-free in nvmet_fc_ls_create_connection() nvmet_fc_ls_create_connection() looks up the association with nvmet_fc_find_target_assoc(), which returns it with a reference held, and drops that reference as soon as the target queue has been allocated. iod->assoc is then dereferenced again by nvmet_fc_makeconnid() while building the connection id. The queue only borrows the pointer and takes no reference of its own. Once the lookup reference is dropped the association is kept alive solely by the reference taken when it was created, so a disconnect LS or a remote port unregister running concurrently can free it before nvmet_fc_makeconnid() reads it: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work (drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:193 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1841 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1995 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:2021) Read of size 8 at addr ffff888179f1b000 by task kworker/u9:2/1167 Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: nvmet-wq nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work (drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:193 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1841 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1995 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:2021) process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:3322 kernel/workqueue.c:3405) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (archkernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) </TASK> Freed by task 1167 on cpu 0 at 405.998150s: kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:57 mm/kasan/common.c:78) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:584) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:253 mm/kasan/common.c:285) kfree (include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2705 mm/slub.c:6405 mm/slub.c:6720) nvmet_fc_handle_ls_rqst_work (drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1808 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:1995 drivers/nvme/target/fc.c:2021) process_scheduled_works (kernel/workqueue.c:3322 kernel/workqueue.c:3405) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (archkernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888179f1b000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 2048-byte region [ffff888179f1b000, ffff888179f1b800) Hold the lookup reference until the response has been built, and drop it on the error path as well.
CVE-2026-99515 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Fix event queue release use-after-free iommufd_eventq_fops_release() drops the file's users reference before reading eventq->ictx. Once that reference is dropped, IOMMU_DESTROY in another thread can remove and free the event queue, so the later load accesses freed memory. Read ictx while the users reference still pins the event queue, then drop the reference and put the saved context. The context reference taken by iommufd_eventq_init() keeps ictx valid until the put. Fault and vEVENTQ file descriptors share this release path.
CVE-2026-99514 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: landlock: Fix superblock use-after-free in release_inode() Without this fix, release_inode() (task 1) can race with a umount operation in hook_sb_delete() (task 2). The order of operations in which the race occurs is: * task 2: hook_sb_delete() arrives at the end of the function, waiting for landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs to become zero. * task 1: release_inode(): does atomic_long_dec_and_test(), decrementing inode_refs to zero. * task 2: gets woken up through some other means, sees that inode_refs is zero and returns. The caller is the unmount operation and proceeds to release the superblock. * task 1: Runs wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs), *dereferencing the sb_security on the freed-up superblock*. Notably, wake_up_var() does not dereference the pointer passed to it, and only uses it to determine an overapproximated set of tasks to wake up. So while it's potentially possible for an attacker to provide a different value for that pointer, this only results in the wrong set of tasks getting woken up, and in this scenario, no further tasks are actually waiting. Nevertheless, KASAN detects it as a slab-use-after-free read on sb->s_security: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in release_inode+0x196/0x290 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888103b6c0a8 by task repro/217 release_inode+0x196/0x290 landlock_put_object+0x71/0x90 landlock_free_rules+0x38/0xc0 landlock_put_ruleset+0x47/0x130 fop_ruleset_release+0x33/0x40 __fput+0x305/0x780 Freed by task 54: kfree+0x11c/0x390 process_scheduled_works+0x766/0xe50 worker_thread+0x7bc/0xb20 The fix is to determine &landlock_superblock(inode->i_sb)->inode_refs only once earlier in release_inode(), and later use that precalculated address for the wake_up_var() call, without having to dereference through the superblock.
CVE-2026-99513 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: lockd: Fix use-after-free in nlmsvc_retry_blocked nlmsvc_retry_blocked() examines the block at the head of nlm_blocked under nlm_blocked_lock, then releases the lock before calling nlmsvc_grant_blocked() or retry_deferred_block(). The nlm_blocked list reference is all that keeps the block alive across that window. nlmsvc_grant_blocked() does take one of its own, but not until after the lock has been dropped. Unmounting the nfsd filesystem while a lock request is still blocked reaches nlmsvc_traverse_blocks(), which drops the list reference and frees the block along with the nlm_rqst hanging off it. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nlm_async_call+0xd6/0x230 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811b04c808 by task lockd/8377 nlm_async_call+0xd6/0x230 nlmsvc_retry_blocked+0x61c/0x800 lockd+0x144/0x1c0 Freed by task 8392: nlmsvc_release_block+0x231/0x290 nlmsvc_traverse_blocks+0x139/0x1b0 nlm_traverse_files+0x1aa/0xa00 nlmsvc_free_host_resources+0x12/0x60 nlm_shutdown_hosts_net+0x127/0x280 lockd_down+0xd5/0x1c0 Take a reference before releasing nlm_blocked_lock and drop it once the retry has run.
CVE-2026-99512 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: au0828: fix use-after-free in bulk_timeout timer on disconnect start_urb_transfer() arms dev->bulk_timeout, whose callback au0828_bulk_timeout() queues dev->restart_streaming; that work in turn calls start_urb_transfer() and re-arms the timer. au0828_dvb_unregister() cancels restart_streaming on disconnect but does not sync bulk_timeout. au0828_usb_release() then frees dev with kfree(), so a timer still armed or pending at that point can fire after the free and dereference dev through timer_container_of(). Sync the timer with timer_shutdown_sync() before cancel_work_sync(). The timer callback queues the work, so the timer must be stopped first; the shutdown variant is needed because the work re-arms the timer through start_urb_transfer(). The dvb->frontend == NULL early return guards the register-failure path where the timer was never set up. This bug was found by static analysis.
CVE-2026-99511 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cx23885: Fix use-after-free in cx23885_finidev due to race condition In cx23885_v4l2_dev_notify_init, &dev->cx25840_work is bound with cx23885_av_work_handler, and &dev->ir_rx_work and &dev->ir_tx_work are bound with cx23885_ir_rx_work_handler and cx23885_ir_tx_work_handler. cx23885_irq can schedule these works on system_wq when an AV_CORE interrupt is received, and the IR subdevice can also schedule the IR works from its interrupt service routine via the v4l2_device notify callback. If we remove the device, cx23885_finidev makes cleanup and the memory allocated for dev is released by kfree(dev), while the works mentioned above may still be pending or running. The sequence of operations that may lead to a UAF bug is as follows: CPU0 CPU1 | cx23885_irq | schedule_work(&dev->cx25840_work) cx23885_finidev | cx23885_input_fini(dev) | cx23885_ir_fini(dev) | cx23885_shutdown(dev) | free_irq(pci_dev->irq, dev) | pci_disable_device(pci_dev) | cx23885_dev_unregister(dev) | v4l2_device_unregister(v4l2_dev) | kfree(dev) | // dev is freed | | cx23885_av_work_handler | // use dev (use-after-free) Fix it by canceling the works after the IRQ handler that can schedule them has been stopped, and before proceeding with the remaining cleanup in cx23885_finidev. Note that the flush_work() calls in cx23885_input_ir_stop() do not close this race: they only wait for works that are already queued or running at that moment, they do not prevent the IRQ handler, which is still registered at that point, from scheduling the works again afterwards, and they are skipped entirely when dev->sd_ir is NULL. The cancel_work_sync() calls are therefore placed after free_irq(), the only point at which no new work can be scheduled.
CVE-2026-99510 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: hackrf: fix use-after-free in hackrf_alloc_urbs() error path hackrf_alloc_urbs() frees the URBs it allocated so far when one allocation fails, but leaves the entries in dev->urb_list[] and dev->urbs_initialized untouched. The caller, hackrf_start_streaming(), then calls hackrf_free_urbs() on the error path, which walks dev->urbs_initialized entries and calls usb_free_urb() a second time on the already-freed URBs, causing a use-after-free (slab-use-after-free Write in usb_free_urb()). Drop the redundant cleanup loop inside hackrf_alloc_urbs() and let hackrf_free_urbs(), which the caller already invokes on error, own the cleanup of the successfully allocated URBs.
CVE-2026-99509 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: imon: fix use-after-free in display_close via dev_dbg ictx->dev is a raw pointer to the usb_interface's embedded device. On disconnect, usb_disconnect() can drop the last reference on the interface and free it while a userspace fd for /dev/lcd0 is still open. When that fd is later closed, display_close() dereferences the now-freed ictx->dev via dev_dbg(), causing a use-after-free. Remove the dev_dbg() calls that dereference ictx->dev in display_close() and free_imon_context(), rather than taking a reference on the device.
CVE-2026-99508 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: ipu-bridge: Fix use-after-free in IVSC error path ipu_bridge_get_ivsc_acpi_dev() returns an ACPI device with a reference held. If no matching CSI device is found, ipu_bridge_check_ivsc_dev() drops that reference before passing the device to dev_err(). Concurrent CSI device and ACPI namespace removal can drop the other references, making this the final put. dev_err() then reads the freed struct acpi_device and its kobject name. This was reproduced without kprobes by racing normal CSI platform-device unregistration and ACPI configfs table removal against the production ipu_bridge_init() entry. KASAN reported the final free through device_release(), followed by invalid reads through _dev_err(). Emit the error message while the lookup reference is still held, then drop the reference as before. Source reproducers and vulnerable/fixed serial logs, with only the build hostname redacted, are available at: https://github.com/kimaiden1984-boop/linux-ipu-bridge-acpi-uaf-reproducer The fixed target builds with W=1 on x86-64. This was not tested on physical IPU hardware. The tests establish runtime reachability but do not measure occurrence frequency on shipping systems or establish exploitability.
CVE-2026-99507 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/hugetlb: fix use-after-free in hugetlb_mfill_atomic_pte() Let's fix another instance where we use a folio after dropping the PTL, where someone else could e.g., MADV_DONTNEED it once we drop the PTL, making us trigger a use-after-free on the folio.
CVE-2026-99506 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/hugetlb: fix use-after-free of a new anon folio For a fault in a private mapping with nothing in the page cache, hugetlb_no_page() allocates a folio, locks it and maps it. The folio has one reference, which belongs to the page table entry from then on. After dropping the page table lock the function still sets the migratable flag of the folio and unlocks it. Whoever zaps the entry in between frees the folio. The fault holds the fault mutex and the lock of the vma. MADV_DONTNEED and the first unmap of a hole punch, hugetlb_vmdelete_list(), do not take the fault mutex, and a private vma only has a lock if it owns a reservation map: not with MAP_NORESERVE, and not in the child after fork(). Then the flag is set in, and folio_unlock() is called on, a folio that is free or has a new owner. A surplus page goes back to the page allocator while it is locked: BUG: Bad page state in process init pfn:108e00 flags: 0x200000000000059(locked|uptodate|dirty|head|node=0|zone=2) page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set A page of the pool can be given to the next user, of any file, who locks it and loses the lock to the late folio_unlock(): kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:1532! hugetlb_no_page+0x111b/0x23e0 hugetlb_fault+0x3a9/0x14a0 An unprivileged process is enough: threads that write to a MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_NORESERVE hugetlb mapping, threads that call MADV_DONTNEED on it, and one that takes the freed pages for another file. Until commit 3a47c54f09c4 ("hugetlbfs: revert use i_mmap_rwsem for more pmd sharing synchronization") the fault held i_mmap_rwsem for reading, which everybody who zaps takes for writing. The lock that commit bf4916922c60 ("hugetlbfs: extend hugetlb_vma_lock to private VMAs") gave to private vmas closed the window again, but only for those with a reservation map. Be done with the folio before the page table lock is dropped, as hugetlb_wp() is with its copy. The function already unlocks page cache folios under that lock. Original fix generated by an LLM and sent in private by Josef. [david@kernel.org: simplify+move comment]
CVE-2026-99505 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: fix a use-after-free in aa_lookupn_ns() aa_lookupn_ns() takes a reference on the namespace it finds with aa_get_ns(), which is kref_get() on the reference count that the namespace is released through, without checking whether the namespace is still in use. A concurrent removal of a ":"-prefixed namespace looks the same namespace up and only then takes the parent lock to remove it, so the last reference can be dropped between the lookup and the aa_get_ns() call: the reference count then reports the increment on a zero count and the kernel classifies the following use of the object as a use-after-free. A user with CAP_MAC_ADMIN can trigger this by writing a ":<name>" removal and a ":<name>/<profile>" removal to /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove concurrently. refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0xc0/0xe0, CPU#6 Call Trace: <TASK> aa_lookupn_ns+0xa9/0xc0 aa_remove_profiles+0x4fb/0x730 ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x219/0x5c0 ? __pfx_aa_remove_profiles+0x10/0x10 ? aa_loaddata_alloc+0x65/0x1f0 ? _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 ? aa_loaddata_alloc+0x111/0x1f0 profile_remove+0x2ee/0x4a0 vfs_write+0x21e/0xcf0 ? rcu_core+0x29c/0x1740 ? timerqueue_linked_add+0x1f4/0x3d0 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? mutex_lock+0x81/0xe0 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_rcu_core+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_hrtimer_update_next_event+0x10/0x10 ? mutex_unlock+0x7b/0xd0 ? fdget_pos+0x24d/0x4b0 ksys_write+0xf7/0x1c0 ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 ? restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x37/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x540 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Fix by rejecting a namespace whose reference count is zero.
CVE-2026-99504 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: audio-graph-card2: Fix use-after-free in audio_graph2_link_c2c() of_graph_get_next_port() consumes the reference of its prev argument. port0 is only borrowed from the caller's iterator, so the call drops a reference the function does not own, and port0 is dereferenced again afterwards. Pass an extra reference, as graph_count_c2c() does, so the reference the callee consumes is the one taken here.
CVE-2026-99503 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ata: sata_fsl: Fix use-after-free of host_priv on probe() failure sata_fsl_host_stop() releases hcr_base and host_priv: static void sata_fsl_host_stop(struct ata_host *host) { struct sata_fsl_host_priv *host_priv = host->private_data; iounmap(host_priv->hcr_base); kfree(host_priv); } ->host_stop() is called by the driver core through the ata_host_stop() devres action which ata_host_start() registers, so it is called both when the device is unbound and when probe() fails after the host has been started. The error_exit_with_cleanup label of sata_fsl_probe() releases hcr_base and host_priv as well, and it is reachable from the two device_create_file() calls which are done after the host has been activated. In that case sata_fsl_host_stop() runs on an already freed host_priv, resulting in a use-after-free and a double iounmap()/kfree(). Add a separate error label for the failures happening after the host has been activated, which only detaches the host and leaves hcr_base and host_priv to sata_fsl_host_stop(). Note that ata_host_detach() is dropped from error_exit_with_cleanup, as that label is now only reachable while host is still NULL.
CVE-2026-99502 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/pci: Fix double-free and NULL deref in zpci MSI domain cleanup zpci_remove_parent_msi_domain() dereferences zbus->msi_parent_domain unconditionally and does not clear it afterwards. zpci_bus_create_pci_bus() removes the domain when pci_create_root_bus() fails, then zpci_bus_release() removes it again on the last kref_put(), reading ->fwnode from the freed irq_domain and freeing it twice. If zpci_alloc_domain() or zpci_create_parent_msi_domain() fails, no domain is created at all; zbus is kzalloc'd, so the same release path dereferences NULL. Return early when there is no domain, and clear the pointer after removing one.
CVE-2026-99501 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/pci: Fix MSI directed-mode teardown IRQ bit count On s390 with directed interrupts enabled, zpci_msi_teardown_directed() frees the platform's maximum number of MSI bits (zdev->max_msi) instead of the actual allocated count (zdev->msi_nr_irqs). This corrupts the shared IRQ bitmap used by all PCI functions, causing lost interrupts and heap corruption. Fix zpci_msi_teardown_directed() to only free the actual allocated IRQ bit count.
CVE-2026-99500 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/pci: Fix resource leak in zpci MSI setup If airq_iv_create() fails in __alloc_airq(), the zpci_sbv bit allocated by airq_iv_alloc_bit() is never freed. This permanently leaks one of the ZPCI_NR_DEVICES summary bits, reducing system capacity with each failed device hotplug. In systems with repeated device insertion failures or under memory pressure, all summary bits can be exhausted, preventing new PCI devices from being added until reboot. Add proper error handling to free the zpci_sbv bit and reset zdev->aisb if the AIBV creation fails.
CVE-2026-99499 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/pci: Fix use-after-free race in zpci floating interrupt cleanup zpci_clear_irq() stops the adapter from raising new interrupts for the function, but a zpci_floating_irq_handler() already running on another CPU can still be scanning zdev->aibv when zpci_msi_teardown_floating() releases it. Clear the zpci_ibv[] entry so no further handler picks the vector up, then wait for a grace period before releasing it. The handler runs inside the rcu_read_lock() section that do_airq_interrupt() holds across airq->handler(), so synchronize_rcu() drains any handler still in flight. Release the vector and free the summary bit only after the grace period, so neither can be reused while a reader still holds the old pointer. zpci_ibv served both delivery modes, indexed by function under FLOATING and by cpu under DIRECTED. Only the floating vectors are published to and torn down under the interrupt handler, so split the directed vectors out into zpci_dibv and annotate zpci_ibv __rcu, which lets sparse check the accessors above.
CVE-2026-99498 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/kprobes: Prevent kprobes on instructions with exception table entry The mvcos exception handler ex_handler_ua_mvcos() decodes the faulting instruction, assuming it is an mvcos instruction. In case the instruction is kprobed the decoded instruction is a breakpoint instruction instead, which leads to incorrect instruction decoding and potential register corruption. Fix this by simply preventing to set a kprobe on such instructions, similar like arm64 is doing it.
CVE-2026-99497 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/probes: Fix wrong opcode for cgrb fixup The last byte of the cgrb instruction is 0xe4, however the probes code compares against 0xe6. Fix it.
CVE-2026-99496 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/vmcp: Initialize full session info to zero The cma_alloc bit as well as the response can contain old data. cma_release will not free the kmalloced memory in that case and the response code might leak kernel stack data to CAP_SYS_ADMIN users.
CVE-2026-99495 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/zcrypt: Fix and improve zcrypt reply message verification checks Add or improve checks related to buffer sizes and reply sizes to the handling of replies from the crypto cards for CCA, EP11 (AP message type 6) and ICA (AP type 50) messages. The verification code related to reply field length was not designed well and thus firmware deficiencies could lead to unexpected behavior in the zcrypt device driver. Thus improve the code to more closely inspect especially length fields at message replies. Add length validation before accessing reply message structures in zcrypt_msgtype6_receive(), zcrypt_msgtype6_receive_ep11(), and zcrypt_msgtype50_receive() to prevent out-of-bounds reads and potential kernel memory disclosure. Also rework these three functions to validate reply lengths more carefully before copying data back into the request buffer. Use size_t for length calculations, reject inconsistent reply sizes, and add defensive handling for short invalid replies. For XCRB replies, validate both reply segments and derive the effective message length from the covered range instead of trusting only the second segment. Additionally improve some of the later invoked evaluation functions which further check the payload. Add comments about length assumptions and for the type50 processing rework the payload processing completely with removing a misplaced BUG_ON().
CVE-2026-99494 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/zcrypt: Fix out-of-bounds ptr advance in cca_query_crypto_facility() The FQ reply parser code blindly advanced the walk pointer by a length value read directly from the hardware reply payload without checking that the advance stayed within the allocated reply buffer. A corrupt or malicious device response could push ptr beyond the cprbmem region, causing an out-of-bounds dereference or kernel memory exposure via the subsequent memcpy(). Fix this by tracking the remaining reply buffer space in a variable and validating each device-supplied length field against it before advancing or dereferencing the pointer.
CVE-2026-99493 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/zcrypt: Guard domain index uses against speculative bypass The previous array_index_nospec() placement only covered the admin permission check, leaving ap_test_config_usage_domain() and ap_test_config_ctrl_domain() in the CCA path exposed to speculative execution. Move the sanitization to before all permission and config checks in both the CCA and EP11 paths. Hold the sanitized domain value in another variable so that the later use can choose to use either the original value (subject to speculative execution) or the sanitized value (which may in case of AUTOSEL_DOM reflect the wrong value). Before that, check the domain value to be either AUTOSEL_DOM or in range 0...AP_DOMAINS-1 and return with -EINVAL in case this check does not pass.
CVE-2026-99492 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: Advertise SW_MUTE_DEVICE capability prior to registration Input subsystem guidelines require that device capabilities are advertised before the input device is registered. The Wacom driver was violating this by advertising the SW_MUTE_DEVICE capability post-registration in wacom_set_shared_values() (and duplicating it in device-specific setup cases). Resolve this by moving the SW_MUTE_DEVICE capability setup to wacom_setup_touch_input_capabilities() for all touch devices that support it. For generic touch devices whose capabilities depend on mute switch usages parsed from a sibling Pen/Pad interface, defer registration with -EPROBE_DEFER until the sibling has parsed its descriptors and initialized shared capabilities.
CVE-2026-99491 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: Fix Use-After-Free in wacom_intuos_pad wacom_intuos_pad() accesses wacom->shared->touch_input locklessly inside the interrupt handler context. If the Touch sibling device is disconnected, wacom_remove_shared_data() clears 'touch_input' outside any lock, creating a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition where a preempted reader in interrupt context dereferences the freed pointer, leading to a Use-After-Free. Resolve this by introducing RCU protection for the touch_input pointer: - Annotate 'touch_input' in wacom_shared struct with __rcu - Wrap all lockless readers in wacom_wac.c with guard(rcu)() and rcu_dereference() using a unified wacom_report_touch_mute() helper - Update writers in wacom_sys.c using rcu_assign_pointer() - Call synchronize_rcu() in wacom_remove_shared_data() to ensure all active RCU readers have finished before the input device is freed Also wrap wacom_set_shared_values() and touch/pen assignments in wacom_add_shared_data() inside the wacom_udev_list_lock to serialize concurrent probe assignments, and verify that 'shared->touch == hdev' before setting touch_input to prevent concurrent sibling probe state desynchronization.
CVE-2026-99490 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: Fix Use-After-Free in wacom_bamboo_pad wacom_bamboo_pad_pen_event() accesses wacom->shared->pen locklessly relative to wacom_remove_shared_data() which nullifies it. This can lead to a Use-After-Free if the sibling device is removed while events are being processed. Resolve this by introducing RCU protection for pen and touch pointers: - Annotate 'pen' and 'touch' in wacom_shared struct with __rcu. - Wrap lockless readers in wacom_bamboo_pad_pen_event() with rcu_read_lock() and rcu_dereference(). - Update writers in wacom_sys.c using rcu_assign_pointer(). - Use rcu_dereference_protected for comparisons under wacom_udev_list_lock. - Also use rcu_access_pointer in wacom_sibling_pending() and wacom_mode_change_work() to avoid warnings (while lockless access in the latter remains a pre-existing issue).
CVE-2026-99489 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: Redesign shared sibling data lifecycle The Wacom driver coordinates state between sibling interfaces of the same physical device using a shared structure 'wacom_shared' inside 'wacom_hdev_data'. The driver kept a volatile representative pointer 'data->dev' pointing to a sibling 'hid_device' for physical path comparisons during sibling matching. This pointer management is fragile. When the representative device is disconnected, wacom_remove_shared_data() failed to clear/update 'data->dev', leading to a Use-After-Free vulnerability when subsequent sibling probes dereference the dangling 'data->dev' pointer. Resolve this issue by redesigning the sibling data lifecycle: - Eliminate the volatile 'data->dev' representative pointer completely - Redesign 'wacom_hdev_data' to store stable static copies of the required attributes upon first allocation: 'phys' path string, 'vendor', 'product' IDs and the sibling's 'device_type' - Use these static attributes for stable sibling matching in wacom_are_sibling() and wacom_get_hdev_data() This ensures sibling matching remains safe and stable even if individual siblings are dynamically added or removed. To secure the lifecycle against concurrent probe/disconnect races: - Switch kref_put() to kref_put_mutex() in wacom_remove_shared_data() to serialize refcount drops with list traversal and lookup - Modify wacom_release_shared_data() to assume the list lock is already held Also, do not accumulate the 'device_type' capability flag during subsequent sibling probes. Keeping only the first probed sibling's device_type exactly preserves the original sibling matching behavior without introducing side effects.
CVE-2026-99488 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: klist: avoid accesses after waking klist_remove() klist_remove() waits until a node is unreferenced so that its caller can free the containing object. klist_release() currently publishes waiter->woken and wakes the waiter before its final accesses to the waiter and node. klist_remove() can then return, allowing its stack waiter and the containing object to be freed or reused while klist_release() is still running. In particular, bus_remove_driver() can free drv->p while __device_attach() walks the same bus klist with bus_for_each_drv(). On an arm64 Cortex-A72 system, an unpatched 7.2.0-rc3 kernel with CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y reproduced the bug through the in-tree I2C/at24 path. KASAN reported a use-after-free in klist_dec_and_del() reached from klist_next()/bus_for_each_drv() while at24 was being unregistered. Clear n_klist and take a task reference before publishing woken. Use release/acquire accesses for that publication and wake the referenced task. The task reference keeps the waiter task alive if it returns and exits before wake_up_process().
CVE-2026-99487 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust: bug: pass TAINT_WARN to warn_slowpath_fmt() on UML On UML, `warn_flags!` calls `warn_slowpath_fmt()` directly. Its third argument is a taint number, but `warn_on!` passes its bug flags there. As a result, `add_taint()` gets 2304 instead of 9 (`TAINT_WARN`). The warning is not recorded: `/proc/sys/kernel/tainted` stays 0 after `warn_on!` fires, where it should be 512. It also causes an out-of-bounds write in `add_taint()`. Pass `TAINT_WARN` directly, as C does on UML.
CVE-2026-99486 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust: configfs: fix data offset calculation for subsystem callbacks `get_group_data()` chooses between `Group::<Parent>::container_of()` and `Subsystem::<Parent>::container_of()` based on whether `this` represents the root group of a configfs subsystem. It detects this by checking `(*this).cg_subsys.is_null()`, but `link_group()` in `fs/configfs/dir.c` unconditionally sets `cg_subsys` for every `config_group` attached anywhere in a registered subsystem, including the subsystem's own `su_group`. The only `config_group` with a NULL `cg_subsys` is the configfs root, on which userspace cannot trigger callbacks. The check is therefore always false at runtime, and the `Subsystem` branch is dead. Subsystem-level callbacks reach the `Group` branch and may read `data` at the wrong offset. Thus change the `is_root` check to correctly identify whether a group is a root group by comparing `this` to `subsys.su_group`. [ Andreas: Fix clippy warning on 1.85.0 by moving safety comment. ]
CVE-2026-99485 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails aie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a failed start frees it again: hwctx->priv->mbox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev->mbox); ... ret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann, ...); if (ret) goto free_channel; ... free_channel: xdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann); hwctx->priv->mbox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a usable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL, aie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them. It matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls aie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live, after aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context survives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return value entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every later user of it takes the non-NULL branch: - the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(), - a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() -> aie2_destroy_context(), - closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() -> aie2_release_resource() -> xrs_release_resource() -> aie2_xrs_unload() -> aie2_destroy_context(), and aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel() followed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel. The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly - aie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev->aie.mgmt_chann right after freeing it. Do the same here. The create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails, xrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling ->unload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer never outlives the structure holding it. Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and request_irq() can fail.
CVE-2026-99484 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: emux: Fix UAF of soundfont zones at note-on snd_emux_note_on() looks up the matching zones via snd_soundfont_search_zone(), which takes sflist->lock only during the lookup and returns the raw zone pointers after releasing it. The caller then stores them in vp->zone without any protection. Meanwhile, a concurrent SNDRV_EMUX_IOCTL_REMOVE_LAST_SAMPLES ioctl may unlink and free those zones in snd_soundfont_remove_unlocked(); this leads to a use-after-free in snd_emux_note_on(), and later at accessing the cached vp->zone, e.g. in snd_emux_send_effect(). Fix it by holding sflist->lock in snd_emux_note_on() over the whole zone lookup and voice setup, and let snd_soundfont_search_zone() require the caller to hold the lock, instead. snd_soundfont_lock_preset() takes sflist->lock for setting presets_locked, so the removal path now syncs with the note-on finish.
CVE-2026-99483 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: pcmtest: handle multiple wraps in random capture fill The random capture helpers assume that the data generated for one timer tick wraps the DMA ring at most once. However, b_rw describes 200 ms of audio because the timer runs at 5 Hz, so it can be several times larger than a small ring. For 48 kHz, S16_LE, four-channel capture with a 512-frame buffer, the DMA ring is 4096 bytes while one tick generates 76800 bytes. After filling the 4096-byte tail, the existing code issues a second 72704-byte write from the ring base, writing 68608 bytes beyond the ring. Both interleaved and non-interleaved capture are affected. KASAN reports the first write into the adjacent free page as a use-after-free in the random-byte generator. The underlying defect is an out-of-bounds write from the live DMA ring, not a stale DMA allocation. Split each random write repeatedly at the interleaved ring or per-channel block boundary. Keep the hardware-pointer update exactly once after the complete logical write. The issue reproduced on three of three clean boots. With this change, the same vulnerable geometry completed six times without a sanitizer finding. Boundary, pattern-fill, no-timer, open/close, and module-reload controls also completed normally. snd-pcmtest is a test driver, and selecting random fill requires an administrator-controlled module parameter. The written values come from the kernel random generator; no privilege escalation or attacker-controlled write primitive was demonstrated.
CVE-2026-99482 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: amd: ps: fix snd_acp63_remove() teardown ordering The ACP IRQ handlers dereference the SoundWire, SoundWire DMA, and PDM child platform devices, but snd_acp63_remove() unregisters them while the interrupt is still held by devres, which frees it only after remove returns. An interrupt in this window is a use-after-free. Mask the ACP interrupt sources and call devm_free_irq() before the first child device is unregistered. The masking goes through the new acp_hw_ops->disable_interrupts callback, keeping the remove path platform-agnostic. The interrupt line is shared, and acp_hw_deinit() clears the sources only after the children are gone, which would leave the line raised with no handler left to ack it. The window predates the tagged refactor, which only reshaped the dereferences. devm_free_irq() waits for in-flight handlers, but not for work the hardirq has already queued: acp63_irq_handler() schedules amd_sdw_irq_thread on the SoundWire manager. Draining that work in the manager's remove path is a soundwire-side change and follows separately. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.
CVE-2026-99481 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_vhci: Pin module for debugfs file operations An open debugfs file retains its file_operations pointer in the debugfs proxy state. However, force_suspend_fops, force_wakeup_fops, aosp_capable_fops, and force_devcoredump_fops have no .owner set to THIS_MODULE. As a result, full_proxy_open_regular() calls fops_get() which succeeds without taking a reference to the hci_vhci module. When userspace opens any of these debugfs files and later closes the /dev/vhci file descriptor (triggering vhci_release() and debugfs file removal), the open debugfs file descriptor remains valid in userspace. Because the module refcount was not incremented, the hci_vhci module can be unloaded via delete_module (rmmod hci_vhci). When the userspace process subsequently closes the debugfs file descriptor, full_proxy_release() accesses the already unmapped file_operations structure, resulting in a kernel page fault / oops: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff846f18b #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:full_proxy_release+0x8e/0x140 Call Trace: <TASK> __fput+0x39f/0xa60 fput_close_sync+0xff/0x200 __x64_sys_close+0x8c/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK> Modules linked in: ... [last unloaded: hci_vhci(E)] The issue was discovered via manual code audit of drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c and verified on a Linux 7.3-rc6 test VM with CONFIG_BT_VHCI=m by keeping a debugfs file open across controller teardown and module unload. Set .owner = THIS_MODULE on all four file_operations structures so that debugfs pins the module until all file descriptors are closed.
CVE-2026-99480 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/panthor: Fix TOCTOU race between GROUP_REGISTERED check and erase panthor_group_destroy() checks the GROUP_REGISTERED mark and then calls xa_erase() without holding the xarray lock across both. If the handle is destroyed by another thread in between, and a concurrent GROUP_CREATE reuses the freed ID, the first destroy erases and releases the new, still-initializing group, leading to a use-after-free in panthor_group_create(). Do the mark check and erase atomically under xa_lock().
CVE-2026-99479 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: atmel_lcdfb: Prevent FIFO work after removal The LCD controller IRQ schedules sinfo->task to recover from a FIFO underflow. Probe currently requests the IRQ before initializing the work, so an early interrupt can schedule an uninitialized work item. The probe error path and remove path cancel the work before freeing the IRQ. A FIFO-underflow interrupt can schedule the work again after that cancellation. framebuffer_release() may then free sinfo while the work is still pending. KASAN reported a use-after-free in atmel_lcdfb_task() when an underflow interrupt occurred during removal. With the IRQ freed before the work was cancelled, the same test completed without a kernel diagnostic. Initialize the work before requesting the IRQ. In both cleanup paths, free the IRQ before cancelling the work so that it cannot be scheduled again after cancellation.
CVE-2026-99478 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: filelock: keep superblock active through delegation wait A caller may drop its path after try_break_deleg() returns a delegated inode but before break_deleg_wait() finishes. The extra inode reference held in struct delegated_inode does not keep the superblock active. After a lazy unmount, closing the delegation holder can release the last mount reference and shut down the superblock while another task waits for the delegation break. The waiter's final iput() can then enter the filesystem's eviction code after its superblock-private state was freed. This has been observed as a KASAN use-after-free in shmem_evict_inode(). When try_break_deleg() saves a delegated inode, take an active reference to its superblock while the caller still pins the mount. Keep that reference through break_deleg_wait() and the final iput(), then release it with deactivate_super(). This protects every caller of the helpers, including the mknod, mkdir, symlink and rmdir paths that drop their path before waiting.
CVE-2026-99477 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/proc/task_mmu: pin mm_users in do_pagemap_scan() The PAGEMAP_SCAN ioctl takes mmap_read_lock() on an mm obtained from /proc/<pid>/pagemap without holding a reference to mm_users. proc_mem_open() deliberately grabs only mm_count, so a consumer that touches the address space has to call mmget_not_zero() first. Every other consumer in this file does -- m_start(), do_procmap_query(), show_smaps_rollup() and pagemap_read() -- but do_pagemap_scan() does not. Without that reference the target can reach exit_mmap() concurrently, and exit_mmap() calls unmap_vmas() while holding mmap_lock only for reading, which does not exclude the scanner. For ordinary VMAs this is harmless, as free_pgtables() and remove_vma() run afterwards under mmap_write_lock. A shared hugetlb VMA is different: __hugetlb_zap_end() frees the VMA's hugetlb_vma_lock inside the read-locked phase. walk_hugetlb_range() can therefore load vma->vm_private_data, have the lock freed underneath it, and then down_read() a freed rw_semaphore. The load happens before the freeing side clears the pointer, so this is a use-after-free and not a NULL dereference. Any unprivileged user can reach it with no huge pages configured, as hugetlb_reserve_pages() allocates the lock before the VM_NORESERVE early return. Pin mm_users across the scan, the way the other consumers do. mmput() from the exiting task can then no longer reach exit_mmap() while a walk is in progress. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded & undesirable test for !mm]
CVE-2026-99476 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fsverity: Set S_VERITY only after rollback is no longer possible Commit f77f281b6118 ("fsverity: use a hashtable to find the fsverity_info") changed the implementation of FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY to make concurrent reads start going through fsverity verification slightly earlier than they did before. Instead of it happening when enable_verity() calls fsverity_set_info(), it now happens when ->end_enable_verity() sets S_VERITY. However, ext4 and btrfs can roll back verity after they set S_VERITY, causing a use-after-free. Fix that by making ext4 and btrfs set S_VERITY only after rollback is no longer possible. On failure, don't roll back S_VERITY, but do roll back the filesystem-specific verity flag. Also update enable_verity() to handle any future instances of this bug more safely by warning and *not* freeing the fsverity_info. Finally, tweak some comments. Clarify one, and move information from another to its proper place in the comment for ->end_enable_verity().
CVE-2026-99475 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: genirq: Defer kfree(irqaction) until irq_thread_dtor() finishes When an interrupt thread exits abnormally via do_exit() (e.g. the interrupt handler oopses) without returning from irq_thread(), a concurrent call to free_irq() could free the irqaction before the irq_thread_dtor() exit task work runs. irq thread (oopsed) free_irq() ------------------- ---------- do_exit() exit_mm() complete_vfork_done() -------> kthread_stop() returns exit_files() ... kfree(action) exit_task_work() irq_thread_dtor() action->... <- use-after-free Track the pending exit work with the IRQTF_EXIT_WORK thread flag, and have __free_irq() wait for the bit to clear before kfree(). irq_thread_dtor() only runs on irq_thread abnormal exit. If that dtor also faults, free_irq() will hang indefinitely, but double IRQ thread faults require a reboot anyways. [ tglx: Add missing include ]
CVE-2026-99474 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: hiddev: keep state alive through disconnect unlock mutex_unlock() clears the mutex owner before taking its wait lock. A thread spinning in the final hiddev file release can acquire existancelock after hiddev_disconnect() clears the owner, then free hiddev before the disconnecting thread reaches the mutex wait lock. This causes a use-after-free in the mutex slow unlock path. Give the connection and each open file an explicit reference. Drop each reference only after its existancelock critical section has completed, so neither unlock path can free the mutex while the other is still using it.
CVE-2026-99473 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: guest_memfd: Gracefully handle xarray errors when binding a memslot If inserting a memslot into a guest_memfd's bindings xarray fails, propagate the error back to the caller, i.e. fail memslot creation as well. Signalling success and continuing on with memslot creation results in use-after-free, as the guest_memfd instance will remain reachable via the memslot after the file is freed (kvm_gmem_release() won't nullify the file pointer due to lack of a valid binding). Opportunistically WARN and reject binding if KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY is already set, partly to guard against goofs elsewhere, but mostly so that KVM doesn't need to worry about clobbering flags when unwinding on failure. Regarding the unwind, the slot must be fully prepared before inserting it into the bindings, at which point the slot becomes reachable. I.e. waiting to update the slot in order to avoid the ugly unwind isn't an option. And as part of the unwind, explicitly nullify the relevant bindings, as xarray can store a subset of entries when populating a range.
CVE-2026-99472 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: pfncache: use a dedicated invalidation sequence for cache refresh The gfn_to_pfn_cache refresh path guards against mmu notifier invalidations which complete while it has dropped gpc->lock for the HVA->PFN lookup: hva_to_pfn_retry() samples kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq and retries if it changed, or if mn_active_invalidate_count is still elevated. That is insufficient for HVA-based caches. mmu_invalidate_seq is only advanced by kvm_mmu_invalidate_end() when the invalidated range overlaps a memslot, and an HVA-based cache (e.g. the Xen shared_info page mapped with KVM_XEN_ATTR_TYPE_SHARED_INFO_HVA) need not be backed by any memslot at all. An invalidation of the cached HVA which starts and ends entirely within the lookup window is thus invisible to the retry check: mn_active_invalidate_count is back to zero and the sequence never moved. The refresh then publishes a mapping of a page which has already been freed, and the next reader dereferences it: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kvm_xen_shared_info_init+0x3c6/0x440 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880599c2900 by task syz.2.383/7257 Since gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start() deliberately skips caches which are not currently valid (including one whose refresh is in progress, as the refresh clears the valid flag before dropping the lock), the retry check is the only line of defence, and it must fire for *any* invalidation, not just those hitting a memslot. Add a dedicated kvm->gpc_invalidate_seq, incremented by every kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end() under mn_invalidate_lock before mn_active_invalidate_count is decremented, and check it in hva_to_pfn_retry() instead of mmu_invalidate_seq. Incrementing in range_end() in the same critical section as the in-progress count also closes the variant where the cache is activated with the contested HVA only after invalidate_range_start() has run. The same bug is also reachable through the per-vCPU vcpu_info cache (KVM_XEN_VCPU_ATTR_TYPE_VCPU_INFO_HVA), where the stale mapping is then dereferenced by kvm_setup_guest_pvclock() on the next KVM_RUN: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kvm_setup_guest_pvclock+0x5bf/0x660 This intentionally makes refresh retry on *unrelated* mmu notifier events; restoring precision (and reworking the GPC locking more generally) is left for a subsequent series. Reproducers: https://david.woodhou.se/xen_shinfo_race.c https://david.woodhou.se/vcpu_info_race.c
CVE-2026-99471 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add SRCU protection for virtual-mode HPT hcalls The virtual-mode HPT hcall handlers (H_ENTER, H_REMOVE, H_BULK_REMOVE, H_CLEAR_REF, H_CLEAR_MOD) call into book3s_hv_rm_mmu.c, which accesses memslots via kvm_memslots_raw(). kvm_memslots_raw() uses rcu_dereference_raw_check() to bypass SRCU lockdep annotation checking. This is safe in real mode because the entire guest entry/exit is wrapped in srcu_read_lock/unlock inside kvmppc_run_core() and kvmhv_run_single_vcpu(). However, since commit 6165d5dd99db ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: add virtual mode handlers for HPT hcalls and page faults"), these same handlers are also executed in virtual mode via kvmppc_pseries_do_hcall(), which runs after SRCU has already been released on guest exit. A concurrent KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION deletion or move can therefore call synchronize_srcu_expedited() — which does not wait for this thread — and then kfree(slot) and vfree(slot->arch.rmap) while the hcall handler still holds a raw pointer to the memslot. lock_rmap() then writes to freed vmalloc memory, leading to use-after-free and memory corruption. Because kvm_memslots_raw() suppresses lockdep checks, this race is entirely silent. Fix this by factoring out the 7 HPT hcall handlers (H_REMOVE, H_ENTER, H_READ, H_CLEAR_MOD, H_CLEAR_REF, H_PROTECT, H_BULK_REMOVE) into a helper function, kvmppc_pseries_do_hpt_hcall(), and wrapping its call site in srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu) / srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx). Targeting only the HPT hcalls avoids wrapping non-HPT hcalls that sleep (such as H_CONFER, H_REGISTER_VPA, H_PAGE_INIT) or handlers that already acquire SRCU internally (such as H_RTAS).
CVE-2026-99470 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cx23885: unregister DVB bus when SP2 CI setup fails The DVBSKY S950C, DVBSKY T980C and TechnoTrend CT2-4500 CI paths register the DVB bus before attaching their SP2 CI client. If that client cannot be created, bound, or pinned, the current error path removes the I2C frontend components and only deallocates the frontend list, leaving the registered DVB adapter behind. Removing an I2C demod before unregistering the DVB bus can also expose the use-after-free ordering fixed for the normal remove path. Unregister the DVB bus immediately when SP2 CI setup fails, before the existing I2C client cleanup. The bus helper empties the frontend list, so the later frontend deallocation has nothing left to release. Keep failures from vb2_dvb_register_bus() on the existing cleanup path. Also release an unbound SP2 client and propagate the actual I2C creation or CI registration error. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.
CVE-2026-99469 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: gspca: use vb2_video_unregister_device() on disconnect gspca uses vb2_fop_release(), but gspca_disconnect() only unregisters the video device. If the queue owner closes the device after USB disconnect, vb2_fop_release() releases the queue and invokes gspca_stop_streaming() at that point. gspca_stream_off() calls subdriver stop callbacks and usb_set_interface() through gspca_dev->dev. By the time the late close runs, the USB core can have freed the usb_device, resulting in a use-after-free. This was observed as a KASAN use-after-free in sd_stopN(). Use vb2_video_unregister_device() so the queue is released and streaming is stopped synchronously during disconnect, while the usb_device is still valid. Since the helper takes the queue lock, which is usb_lock, call it after dropping that lock.
CVE-2026-99468 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: imx-jpeg: cancel timeout worker when streaming stops Each per-fd context ctx owns a delayed_work (ctx->task_timer, callback mxc_jpeg_device_run_timeout) armed via schedule_delayed_work() at the end of mxc_jpeg_device_run() to recover a stalled encode/decode job. The only existing cancellation is cancel_delayed_work() in the frame-done IRQ handler, which de-queues a pending work item but does not wait for a callback that has already started, and it only runs when a frame completes. When the fd is closed while a job is in flight (the frame-done IRQ has not fired yet), nothing syncs the worker before mxc_jpeg_release() frees ctx with kfree() after v4l2_m2m_ctx_release(). A queued or executing mxc_jpeg_device_run_timeout() can then recover ctx through container_of(&ctx->task_timer) and dereference it (ctx->mxc_jpeg, slot_data, dev_warn) after ctx has been freed. Cancel the worker from mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming(). The cancel cannot live in mxc_jpeg_release(): mxc_jpeg_device_run() arms the timer while holding only hw_lock, not the mxc_jpeg->lock mutex that release holds, so a cancel in release could still race a concurrent mxc_jpeg_device_run() that re-arms the timer afterwards. mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming() instead runs inside v4l2_m2m_ctx_release() -> vb2_queue_release(), i.e. after v4l2_m2m_cancel_job() has set TRANS_ABORT and waited for any in-flight job to finish (so __v4l2_m2m_try_queue() will not queue and v4l2_m2m_try_run() will not run any further job for this context, which prevents mxc_jpeg_device_run() from re-arming the timer) and before the m2m context is freed. cancel_delayed_work_sync() removes a pending work item and waits for a running callback, so the worker can no longer race with the subsequent kfree(). The cancel is placed before the buffer-release loop so a concurrently running timeout callback cannot race with it over the same buffers. If the frame-done IRQ canceled a still-pending timer, this cancel is a no-op; if the timeout callback has already started, it waits for the callback to finish. The same mxc_jpeg_stop_streaming() call is also reached from VIDIOC_STREAMOFF, which drains the worker early, although STREAMOFF itself does not free ctx -- the use-after-free arises only when the fd is later closed. This bug was found by static analysis.
CVE-2026-99467 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: marvell: mcam: stop DMA and cancel s_bh_work before freeing DMA buffers In vmalloc mode the frame-completion IRQ queues mcam_frame_work() on cam->s_bh_work, which memcpy()s from the dma_bufs[] that mcam_free_dma_bufs() frees with dma_free_coherent(). mccic_shutdown() frees those buffers without stopping the controller, so while streaming a late frame IRQ can re-arm the work after the buffers are gone, causing a use-after-free. Stop the controller in mccic_shutdown() when streaming is still active (gated on an open fd, which holds a runtime-PM reference, so the device is powered), cancel s_bh_work in mcam_free_dma_bufs(), and move INIT_WORK() into mccic_register() before the device can be published.
CVE-2026-99466 Unknown 2026-11-19 Not applicable No public exploit In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: microchip-csi2dc: fix async notifier leak on probe error path csi2dc_of_parse() ends up calling csi2dc_prepare_notifier(), which registers the V4L2 async notifier with v4l2_async_nf_register(). The probe error label csi2dc_probe_cleanup_notifier is reached after csi2dc_of_parse() has already succeeded (e.g. when media entity init, csi2dc_power() or v4l2_async_register_subdev() fail), but it calls only v4l2_async_nf_cleanup() and never v4l2_async_nf_unregister(). The notifier therefore stays chained in the global notifier_list while the enclosing struct csi2dc_device is freed, leading to list corruption and a use-after-free when the list is next walked. Unregister the notifier before cleaning it up on the error path, matching the teardown already done in csi2dc_remove().
‹ prev page 1 of 4,057 next ›