Overview 2 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
1
50.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
1
50.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
1
50.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
1
50.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
2
100.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 1 / quarter
Q4 23Q1 24Q2 24Q3 24Q4 24Q1 25Q2 25
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-27533 | Medium | 2025-05-07 | Mitigation candidate | Working exploit published | Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ. During unmarshalling of OpenWire commands the size value of buffers was not properly validated which could lead to excessive memory allocation and be exploited to cause a denial of service (DoS) by depleting process memory, thereby affecting applications and services that rely on the availability of the ActiveMQ broker when not using mutual TLS connections. This issue affects Apache ActiveMQ: from 6.0.0 before 6.1.6, from 5.18.0 before 5.18.7, from 5.17.0 before 5.17.7, before 5.16.8. ActiveMQ 5.19.0 is not affected. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 6.1.6+, 5.19.0+, 5.18.7+, 5.17.7, or 5.16.8 or which fixes the issue. Existing users may implement mutual TLS to mitigate the risk on affected brokers. |
| CVE-2022-41678 | High | 2023-11-28 | Protected by Waratek | Working exploit published | Once an user is authenticated on Jolokia, he can potentially trigger arbitrary code execution. In details, in ActiveMQ configurations, jetty allows org.jolokia.http.AgentServlet to handler request to /api/jolokia org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#handlePostRequest is able to create JmxRequest through JSONObject. And calls to org.jolokia.http.HttpRequestHandler#executeRequest. Into deeper calling stacks, org.jolokia.handler.ExecHandler#doHandleRequest can be invoked through refection. This could lead to RCE through via various mbeans. One example is unrestricted deserialization in jdk.management.jfr.FlightRecorderMXBeanImpl which exists on Java version above 11. 1 Call newRecording. 2 Call setConfiguration. And a webshell data hides in it. 3 Call startRecording. 4 Call copyTo method. The webshell will be written to a .jsp file. The mitigation is to restrict (by default) the actions authorized on Jolokia, or disable Jolokia. A more restrictive Jolokia configuration has been defined in default ActiveMQ distribution. We encourage users to upgrade to ActiveMQ distributions version including updated Jolokia configuration: 5.16.6, 5.17.4, 5.18.0, 6.0.0. |