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Engineering CVEs with a working exploit

2 CVEs, 1 protected by Waratek

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Overview 2 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV
2matches 1protected50.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0%
Protected by Waratek 1 50.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 1 50.0% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 2 100.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 1 50.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 1 50.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 2 100.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
split by peak 1 / month
Mitigation candidate: 1Protected by Waratek: 1 High: 2 not blocked: 1blocked by ARMR today: 1 Working exploit published: 2
May 20Jun 20Jul 20
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2020-13935 High 2020-07-14 Mitigation candidate Working exploit published The payload length in a WebSocket frame was not correctly validated in Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M6, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.36, 8.5.0 to 8.5.56 and 7.0.27 to 7.0.104. Invalid payload lengths could trigger an infinite loop. Multiple requests with invalid payload lengths could lead to a denial of service.
CVE-2020-9484 High 2020-05-20 Protected by Waratek Working exploit published When using Apache Tomcat versions 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34, 8.5.0 to 8.5.54 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.103 if a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on the server; and b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a FileStore; and c) the PersistenceManager is configured with sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the attacker provided object to be deserialized; and d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage location used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over; then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able to trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for the attack to succeed.