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High Base CVEs with a working exploit

2 CVEs, 1 protected by Waratek

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Overview 2 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV
2matches 1protected50.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0%
Protected by Waratek 1 50.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 1 50.0% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 2 100.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 1 50.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 1 50.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 2 100.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2023-34468 High 2023-06-12 Mitigation candidate Working exploit published The DBCPConnectionPool and HikariCPConnectionPool Controller Services in Apache NiFi 0.0.2 through 1.21.0 allow an authenticated and authorized user to configure a Database URL with the H2 driver that enables custom code execution. The resolution validates the Database URL and rejects H2 JDBC locations. You are recommended to upgrade to version 1.22.0 or later which fixes this issue.
CVE-2020-9484 High 2020-05-20 Protected by Waratek Working exploit published When using Apache Tomcat versions 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34, 8.5.0 to 8.5.54 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.103 if a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on the server; and b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a FileStore; and c) the PersistenceManager is configured with sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the attacker provided object to be deserialized; and d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage location used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over; then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able to trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for the attack to succeed.