Overview 3 matches · 0 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches
0in Waratek scope0.0%
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
1
33.3%
Not applicable
2
66.7%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
3
100.0%
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-32640 | Medium | 2021-05-25 | Outside Waratek scope | No public exploit | ws is an open source WebSocket client and server library for Node.js. A specially crafted value of the `Sec-Websocket-Protocol` header can be used to significantly slow down a ws server. The vulnerability has been fixed in ws@7.4.6 (https://github.com/websockets/ws/commit/00c425ec77993773d823f018f64a5c44e17023ff). In vulnerable versions of ws, the issue can be mitigated by reducing the maximum allowed length of the request headers using the [`--max-http-header-size=size`](https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html#cli_max_http_header_size_size) and/or the [`maxHeaderSize`](https://nodejs.org/api/http.html#http_http_createserver_options_requestlistener) options. |
| CVE-2016-10542 | High | 2018-05-31 | Not applicable | No public exploit | ws is a "simple to use, blazing fast and thoroughly tested websocket client, server and console for node.js, up-to-date against RFC-6455". By sending an overly long websocket payload to a `ws` server, it is possible to crash the node process. This affects ws 1.1.0 and earlier. |
| CVE-2016-10518 | High | 2018-05-31 | Not applicable | No public exploit | A vulnerability was found in the ping functionality of the ws module before 1.0.0 which allowed clients to allocate memory by sending a ping frame. The ping functionality by default responds with a pong frame and the previously given payload of the ping frame. This is exactly what you expect, but internally ws always transforms all data that we need to send to a Buffer instance and that is where the vulnerability existed. ws didn't do any checks for the type of data it was sending. With buffers in node when you allocate it when a number instead of a string it will allocate the amount of bytes. |