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Netty-handler CVEs with no public exploit

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Product netty-handler✕
Overview 10 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
10matches 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 10 100.0%
Critical 2 20.0% High 7 70.0% Medium 1 10.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 10 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 10 100.0%
split by peak 5 / year
No exploit published: 10 Medium: 1High: 7Critical: 2 not blocked: 10 No public exploit: 10
20171 No exploit published1 High1 not blocked1 No public exploit1 20180 20190 20202 No exploit published2 Critical1 High1 not blocked2 No public exploit2 20210 20220 20232 No exploit published2 High1 Medium1 not blocked2 No public exploit2 20240 20250 20265 No exploit published5 Critical1 High4 not blocked5 No public exploit5
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-75596 High 2026-08-19 No exploit published No public exploit Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final, the default io.netty.handler.ssl.SniHandler constructors use the pre-handshake ClientHello aggregation path in handler/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/ssl/SslClientHelloHandler.java at io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode, where handshakeBuffer.clear() and writeBytes() recopy all previously received body bytes for every additional TLS record. An unauthenticated remote peer can advertise a large ClientHello and deliver its body in thousands of tiny records, causing quadratic CPU work on the event loop before the TLS handshake completes and degrading TLS handling for other clients. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.
CVE-2026-75595 Critical 2026-08-19 No exploit published No public exploit Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route's mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.
CVE-2026-50010 High 2026-06-12 No exploit published No public exploit Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, SimpleTrustManagerFactory.engineGetTrustManagers() and related paths wrap any user-supplied plain X509TrustManager in X509TrustManagerWrapper, which extends X509ExtendedTrustManager but implements the 3-arg checkServerTrusted(chain, authType, SSLEngine) by discarding the SSLEngine and calling the 2-arg delegate. Because the object now IS an X509ExtendedTrustManager, neither SunJSSE's internal AbstractTrustManagerWrapper nor Netty's own OpenSslX509TrustManagerWrapper will re-wrap it to add endpoint-identification. Consequently, even though Netty 4.2 sets endpointIdentificationAlgorithm="HTTPS" by default, a client built with `SslContextBuilder.forClient().trustManager(somePlainX509TrustManager)` performs no hostname verification at all. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
CVE-2026-45416 High 2026-06-12 No exploit published No public exploit Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, SslClientHelloHandler.decode() reads the 24-bit TLS handshake length and, when the ClientHello does not fit in the first record, eagerly allocates `ctx.alloc().buffer(handshakeLength)` (line 161). The guard at line 140 is `handshakeLength > maxClientHelloLength && maxClientHelloLength != 0`, and the commonly-used SniHandler/AbstractSniHandler constructors (SniHandler(Mapping), SniHandler(AsyncMapping), AbstractSniHandler()) pass maxClientHelloLength=0 and handshakeTimeoutMillis=0, so the length guard is disabled and no timeout is scheduled. A 16 MiB request exceeds the default pooled chunk size and becomes a huge/unpooled allocation performed immediately. The buffer is retained in the handler until the channel closes. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
CVE-2026-44249 High 2026-06-11 No exploit published No public exploit Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-handler prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, an attacker can bypass IPv6 subnet rules due to an incorrect masking operation in IpSubnetFilterRule.compareTo(). Valid public IP addresses can bypass the restrictions. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
CVE-2023-4586 High 2023-10-04 No exploit published No public exploit A vulnerability was found in the Hot Rod client. This security issue occurs as the Hot Rod client does not enable hostname validation when using TLS, possibly resulting in a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack.
CVE-2023-34462 Medium 2023-06-22 No exploit published No public exploit Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. The `SniHandler` can allocate up to 16MB of heap for each channel during the TLS handshake. When the handler or the channel does not have an idle timeout, it can be used to make a TCP server using the `SniHandler` to allocate 16MB of heap. The `SniHandler` class is a handler that waits for the TLS handshake to configure a `SslHandler` according to the indicated server name by the `ClientHello` record. For this matter it allocates a `ByteBuf` using the value defined in the `ClientHello` record. Normally the value of the packet should be smaller than the handshake packet but there are not checks done here and the way the code is written, it is possible to craft a packet that makes the `SslClientHelloHandler`. This vulnerability has been fixed in version 4.1.94.Final.
CVE-2019-20445 Critical 2020-01-29 No exploit published No public exploit HttpObjectDecoder.java in Netty before 4.1.44 allows a Content-Length header to be accompanied by a second Content-Length header, or by a Transfer-Encoding header.
CVE-2020-7238 High 2020-01-27 No exploit published No public exploit Netty 4.1.43.Final allows HTTP Request Smuggling because it mishandles Transfer-Encoding whitespace (such as a [space]Transfer-Encoding:chunked line) and a later Content-Length header. This issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2019-16869.
CVE-2016-4970 High 2017-04-13 No exploit published No public exploit handler/ssl/OpenSslEngine.java in Netty 4.0.x before 4.0.37.Final and 4.1.x before 4.1.1.Final allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop).