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Vendor ca.uhn.hapi.fhir✕
Overview 6 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
6matches 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 6 100.0%
Critical 2 33.3% High 3 50.0% Medium 1 16.7% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 6 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 6 100.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-81876 High 2026-09-16 No exploit published Proof of concept only HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to version 6.9.12, SHCParser in org.hl7.fhir.r5/src/main/java/org/hl7/fhir/r5/elementmodel/SHCParser.java can enter an infinite loop while processing attacker-controlled Smart Health Card JWT content whose header contains zip: "DEF" and whose raw-DEFLATE payload is empty or truncated. SHCParser.decodeJWT() reaches SHCParser.inflate(), where Inflater.inflate() can return zero while Inflater.finished() remains false and Inflater.needsInput() is true. The loop also lacks an Inflater.needsDictionary() termination check, SHCParser.decompress() contains the same zero-progress pattern, and ResourceChecker.java can reach SHC parsing during file-format detection. A malformed validation request can pin a JVM worker thread indefinitely, and concurrent requests can exhaust all validation workers. This issue is fixed in version 6.9.12.
CVE-2026-81875 High 2026-09-16 No exploit published Proof of concept only HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to version 6.9.12, SHCParser in org.hl7.fhir.r5/src/main/java/org/hl7/fhir/r5/elementmodel/SHCParser.java can consume attacker-controlled Smart Health Card JWT content whose header contains zip: "DEF" and whose small raw-DEFLATE payload expands to a very large value. SHCParser.decodeJWT() passes the decoded payload to SHCParser.inflate(), which accumulates all decompressed bytes in a ByteArrayOutputStream without an output-size limit before JSON parsing, and SHCParser.decompress() contains the same unbounded pattern. An application or validator service that accepts attacker-supplied SHC content can therefore suffer excessive heap allocation, severe garbage-collection pressure, request failure, process instability, or process termination. This issue is fixed in version 6.9.12.
CVE-2026-55470 High 2026-07-08 No exploit published Proof of concept only HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to 6.9.10, the fix for CVE-2026-45367 incompletely patched the DSTU2 module, leaving FHIRPathEngine.matches() in org.hl7.fhir.dstu2/utils/FHIRPathEngine.java to call raw String.matches(sw) without RegexTimeout protection while replaceMatches() was updated, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to trigger catastrophic regex backtracking and exhaust server CPU. This issue is fixed in version 6.9.10.
CVE-2026-34361 Critical 2026-03-31 No exploit published Proof of concept only HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to version 6.9.4, the FHIR Validator HTTP service exposes an unauthenticated "/loadIG" endpoint that makes outbound HTTP requests to attacker-controlled URLs. Combined with a startsWith() URL prefix matching flaw in the credential provider (ManagedWebAccessUtils.getServer()), an attacker can steal authentication tokens (Bearer, Basic, API keys) configured for legitimate FHIR servers by registering a domain that prefix-matches a configured server URL. This issue has been patched in version 6.9.4.
CVE-2026-34360 Medium 2026-03-31 No exploit published Proof of concept only HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to version 6.9.4, the /loadIG HTTP endpoint in the FHIR Validator HTTP service accepts a user-supplied URL via JSON body and makes server-side HTTP requests to it without any hostname, scheme, or domain validation. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the validator can probe internal network services, cloud metadata endpoints, and map network topology through error-based information leakage. With explore=true (the default for this code path), each request triggers multiple outbound HTTP calls, amplifying reconnaissance capability. This issue has been patched in version 6.9.4.
CVE-2026-34359 Critical 2026-03-31 No exploit published Proof of concept only HAPI FHIR is a complete implementation of the HL7 FHIR standard for healthcare interoperability in Java. Prior to version 6.9.4, ManagedWebAccessUtils.getServer() uses String.startsWith() to match request URLs against configured server URLs for authentication credential dispatch. Because configured server URLs (e.g., http://tx.fhir.org) lack a trailing slash or host boundary check, an attacker-controlled domain like http://tx.fhir.org.attacker.com matches the prefix and receives Bearer tokens, Basic auth credentials, or API keys when the HTTP client follows a redirect to that domain. This issue has been patched in version 6.9.4.