Overview 15 matches · 6 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 11 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
6
40.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
5
33.3%
No exploit published
4
26.7%
blocked by ARMR today
6
40.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
9
60.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
15
100.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 4 / year
20181
Protected by Waratek1
Critical1
blocked by ARMR today1
Proof of concept only1
20194
Protected by Waratek4
Critical1
High1
Medium2
blocked by ARMR today4
Proof of concept only4
20203
Mitigation candidate3
Critical1
High2
not blocked3
Proof of concept only3
20213
Protected by Waratek1
Mitigation candidate2
High3
blocked by ARMR today1
not blocked2
Proof of concept only3
20220
20230
20240
20251
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
20263
No exploit published3
High2
Medium1
not blocked3
Proof of concept only3
201820192020202120222023202420252026
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68494 | High | 2026-08-04 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | The fix released in jackson-core 2.18.6 and 2.21.1 for CVE-2026-18401 (GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq, number length constraint bypass in the non-blocking parser) is incomplete. This record covers the remaining bypass. The earlier fix wired validateIntegerLength() into a new _setIntLength() helper and invoked it wherever the integer portion of a number is decided: a terminator byte arrives, a '.' or 'e'/'E' is seen, or input ends inside a fully buffered value. It was not invoked on the attacker-relevant path where the parser runs out of input while still inside the MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS minor state and returns NOT_AVAILABLE to the caller. As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, keeps the parser inside MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS indefinitely. _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment() grows the accumulator on every chunk while validateIntegerLength() is never called. The accumulator is bounded only by maxStringLength (20 MiB by default) rather than by maxNumberLength (1000 by default), an amplification of roughly 20,000x over the documented limit. Because Java char values occupy two bytes, a single connection can be driven to approximately 40 MiB of heap before the validator finally fires when the value completes. The equivalent fraction-path code is correct: _finishFloatFraction() calls _setFractLength() before its NOT_AVAILABLE return. The missing call affects the integer-digit paths in _startPositiveNumber(), _startNegativeNumber() and _finishNumberIntegralPart() in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase. Impact: reactive frameworks such as Spring WebFlux/Reactor, Quarkus, Helidon and Vert.x feed inbound HTTP or gRPC bytes to the async parser as they arrive, which is precisely the chunked-feed shape required. Operators who set StreamReadConstraints.maxNumberLength expecting it to cap memory per number value do not get that guarantee; memory accumulates per concurrent connection and attacker-controlled concurrency can exhaust the JVM heap. The synchronous parsers (UTF8StreamJsonParser, ReaderBasedJsonParser) and the async parser operating on complete input are not affected. Exploitation requires only the ability to stream data to a parsing endpoint; no privileges or user interaction are needed. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.7, and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.3, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.1.3. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9 states the affected 2.x range without a lower bound. The 2.22.x and 3.2.x release lines are not affected: those branches were created after the fix commit landed on 2026-05-21 and therefore contain it from their initial releases (2.22.0, tagged 2026-06-03, and 3.2.0, tagged 2026-06-08). |
| CVE-2026-18401 | Medium | 2026-08-04 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service. The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses. Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() are performed. Because that validation step is skipped, maxNumberLength is never enforced on the async code path. Impact: an attacker sending a JSON document containing an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (for example a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application) can cause unbounded allocation in the TextBuffer and an OutOfMemoryError. If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM may additionally be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing, causing CPU-based denial of service. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.5 and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.0, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.0.x. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq records the lower bound of the affected 2.x range as 2.0.0. |
| CVE-2026-54512 | High | 2026-06-23 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4. |
| CVE-2025-49128 | Medium | 2025-06-06 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Jackson-core contains core low-level incremental ("streaming") parser and generator abstractions used by Jackson Data Processor. Starting in version 2.0.0 and prior to version 2.13.0, a flaw in jackson-core's `JsonLocation._appendSourceDesc` method allows up to 500 bytes of unintended memory content to be included in exception messages. When parsing JSON from a byte array with an offset and length, the exception message incorrectly reads from the beginning of the array instead of the logical payload start. This results in possible information disclosure in systems using pooled or reused buffers, like Netty or Vert.x. This issue was silently fixed in jackson-core version 2.13.0, released on September 30, 2021, via PR #652. All users should upgrade to version 2.13.0 or later. If upgrading is not immediately possible, applications can mitigate the issue by disabling exception message exposure to clients to avoid returning parsing exception messages in HTTP responses and/or disabling source inclusion in exceptions to prevent Jackson from embedding any source content in exception messages, avoiding leakage. |
| CVE-2020-36179 | High | 2021-01-07 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.8 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to oadd.org.apache.commons.dbcp.cpdsadapter.DriverAdapterCPDS. |
| CVE-2020-36188 | High | 2021-01-06 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.8 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to com.newrelic.agent.deps.ch.qos.logback.core.db.JNDIConnectionSource. |
| CVE-2020-36184 | High | 2021-01-06 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.8 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to org.apache.tomcat.dbcp.dbcp2.datasources.PerUserPoolDataSource. |
| CVE-2020-35728 | High | 2020-12-27 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.8 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to com.oracle.wls.shaded.org.apache.xalan.lib.sql.JNDIConnectionPool (aka embedded Xalan in org.glassfish.web/javax.servlet.jsp.jstl). |
| CVE-2020-10673 | High | 2020-03-18 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.4 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to com.caucho.config.types.ResourceRef (aka caucho-quercus). |
| CVE-2020-8840 | Critical | 2020-02-10 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | FasterXML jackson-databind 2.0.0 through 2.9.10.2 lacks certain xbean-reflect/JNDI blocking, as demonstrated by org.apache.xbean.propertyeditor.JndiConverter. |
| CVE-2019-14540 | Critical | 2019-09-15 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind before 2.9.10. It is related to com.zaxxer.hikari.HikariConfig. |
| CVE-2019-14439 | High | 2019-07-30 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.9.2. This occurs when Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has the logback jar in the classpath. |
| CVE-2019-12384 | Medium | 2019-06-24 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.9.1 might allow attackers to have a variety of impacts by leveraging failure to block the logback-core class from polymorphic deserialization. Depending on the classpath content, remote code execution may be possible. |
| CVE-2019-12814 | Medium | 2019-06-19 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | A Polymorphic Typing issue was discovered in FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x through 2.9.9. When Default Typing is enabled (either globally or for a specific property) for an externally exposed JSON endpoint and the service has JDOM 1.x or 2.x jar in the classpath, an attacker can send a specifically crafted JSON message that allows them to read arbitrary local files on the server. |
| CVE-2017-7525 | Critical | 2018-02-06 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | A deserialization flaw was discovered in the jackson-databind, versions before 2.6.7.1, 2.7.9.1 and 2.8.9, which could allow an unauthenticated user to perform code execution by sending the maliciously crafted input to the readValue method of the ObjectMapper. |