Overview 5 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 3 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
1
20.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
2
40.0%
No exploit published
2
40.0%
blocked by ARMR today
1
20.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
4
80.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
5
100.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 3 / quarter
Q1 213
Protected by Waratek1
Mitigation candidate2
High3
blocked by ARMR today1
not blocked2
Proof of concept only3
Q2 210
Q3 210
Q4 210
Q1 220
Q2 220
Q3 221
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q4 220
Q1 230
Q2 230
Q3 230
Q4 230
Q1 240
Q2 240
Q3 240
Q4 240
Q1 250
Q2 250
Q3 250
Q4 250
Q1 260
Q2 261
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q2 21Q4 21Q2 22Q4 22Q2 23Q4 23Q2 24Q4 24Q2 25Q4 25Q2 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-54512 | High | 2026-06-23 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4. |
| CVE-2022-40152 | High | 2022-09-16 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Those using Woodstox to parse XML data may be vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks (DOS) if DTD support is enabled. If the parser is running on user supplied input, an attacker may supply content that causes the parser to crash by stackoverflow. This effect may support a denial of service attack. |
| CVE-2020-36179 | High | 2021-01-07 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.8 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to oadd.org.apache.commons.dbcp.cpdsadapter.DriverAdapterCPDS. |
| CVE-2020-36188 | High | 2021-01-06 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.8 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to com.newrelic.agent.deps.ch.qos.logback.core.db.JNDIConnectionSource. |
| CVE-2020-36184 | High | 2021-01-06 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.10.8 mishandles the interaction between serialization gadgets and typing, related to org.apache.tomcat.dbcp.dbcp2.datasources.PerUserPoolDataSource. |