Medium File CVEs with a proof of concept
2 CVEs
Overview 2 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
1
50.0%
No exploit published
1
50.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
2
100.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 1 / year
201820192020202120222023202420252026
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-54050 | Medium | 2026-09-15 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Sakai is a Collaboration and Learning Environment (CLE). From 23.0 until 23.5 and 25.3, the DELETE /api/users/{userId}/profile/image endpoint allows an authenticated user to delete another user's profile image because ProfileController.removeProfileImage() passes the attacker-controlled userId to ProfileServiceImpl.removeProfileImage() without verifying ownership, and profileImageUploadedRepository.deleteById(userId) removes the selected row. The related DELETE /api/users/{userId}/profile/pronunciation endpoint also omits session validation and ownership checks before ProfileServiceImpl.removePronunciationRecording() deletes the target user's recording. The upload path is not affected because it already verifies ownership, and superusers remain intentionally authorized to modify other profiles. Successful exploitation can repeatedly remove profile identity artifacts, including administrator and instructor images, and disrupt workflows that rely on those artifacts. This issue is fixed in versions 23.5, 25.3, and 26.0. |
| CVE-2018-1305 | Medium | 2018-02-23 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | Security constraints defined by annotations of Servlets in Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.4, 8.5.0 to 8.5.27, 8.0.0.RC1 to 8.0.49 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.84 were only applied once a Servlet had been loaded. Because security constraints defined in this way apply to the URL pattern and any URLs below that point, it was possible - depending on the order Servlets were loaded - for some security constraints not to be applied. This could have exposed resources to users who were not authorised to access them. |