Overview 3 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
3
100.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
3
100.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 1 / quarter
Q1 09Q2 09Q3 09Q4 09Q1 10Q2 10Q3 10Q4 10Q1 11Q2 11
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2011-1772 | Low | 2011-05-13 | Mitigation candidate | Working exploit published | Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in XWork in Apache Struts 2.x before 2.2.3, and OpenSymphony XWork in OpenSymphony WebWork, allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via vectors involving (1) an action name, (2) the action attribute of an s:submit element, or (3) the method attribute of an s:submit element. |
| CVE-2010-1870 | Medium | 2010-08-17 | Mitigation candidate | Working exploit published | The OGNL extensive expression evaluation capability in XWork in Struts 2.0.0 through 2.1.8.1, as used in Atlassian Fisheye, Crucible, and possibly other products, uses a permissive whitelist, which allows remote attackers to modify server-side context objects and bypass the "#" protection mechanism in ParameterInterceptors via the (1) #context, (2) #_memberAccess, (3) #root, (4) #this, (5) #_typeResolver, (6) #_classResolver, (7) #_traceEvaluations, (8) #_lastEvaluation, (9) #_keepLastEvaluation, and possibly other OGNL context variables, a different vulnerability than CVE-2008-6504. |
| CVE-2008-6504 | Medium | 2009-03-23 | Mitigation candidate | Working exploit published | ParametersInterceptor in OpenSymphony XWork 2.0.x before 2.0.6 and 2.1.x before 2.1.2, as used in Apache Struts and other products, does not properly restrict # (pound sign) references to context objects, which allows remote attackers to execute Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) statements and modify server-side context objects, as demonstrated by use of a \u0023 representation for the # character. |