Overview 2 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
2
100.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
2
100.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 1 / month
Apr 09Jun 09Aug 09Oct 09Dec 09Feb 10Apr 10Jun 10Aug 10
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2010-1870 | Medium | 2010-08-17 | Mitigation candidate | Working exploit published | The OGNL extensive expression evaluation capability in XWork in Struts 2.0.0 through 2.1.8.1, as used in Atlassian Fisheye, Crucible, and possibly other products, uses a permissive whitelist, which allows remote attackers to modify server-side context objects and bypass the "#" protection mechanism in ParameterInterceptors via the (1) #context, (2) #_memberAccess, (3) #root, (4) #this, (5) #_typeResolver, (6) #_classResolver, (7) #_traceEvaluations, (8) #_lastEvaluation, (9) #_keepLastEvaluation, and possibly other OGNL context variables, a different vulnerability than CVE-2008-6504. |
| CVE-2008-6504 | Medium | 2009-03-23 | Mitigation candidate | Working exploit published | ParametersInterceptor in OpenSymphony XWork 2.0.x before 2.0.6 and 2.1.x before 2.1.2, as used in Apache Struts and other products, does not properly restrict # (pound sign) references to context objects, which allows remote attackers to execute Object-Graph Navigation Language (OGNL) statements and modify server-side context objects, as demonstrated by use of a \u0023 representation for the # character. |