Overview 5 matches · 1 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
1
20.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
4
80.0%
blocked by ARMR today
1
20.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
4
80.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
1
20.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
4
80.0%
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-34047 | Medium | 2023-09-20 | No exploit published | No public exploit | A batch loader function in Spring for GraphQL versions 1.1.0 - 1.1.5 and 1.2.0 - 1.2.2 may be exposed to GraphQL context with values, including security context values, from a different session. An application is vulnerable if it provides a DataLoaderOptions instance when registering batch loader functions through DefaultBatchLoaderRegistry. |
| CVE-2023-34040 | High | 2023-08-24 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | In Spring for Apache Kafka 3.0.9 and earlier and versions 2.9.10 and earlier, a possible deserialization attack vector existed, but only if unusual configuration was applied. An attacker would have to construct a malicious serialized object in one of the deserialization exception record headers. Specifically, an application is vulnerable when all of the following are true: * The user does not configure an ErrorHandlingDeserializer for the key and/or value of the record * The user explicitly sets container properties checkDeserExWhenKeyNull and/or checkDeserExWhenValueNull container properties to true. * The user allows untrusted sources to publish to a Kafka topic By default, these properties are false, and the container only attempts to deserialize the headers if an ErrorHandlingDeserializer is configured. The ErrorHandlingDeserializer prevents the vulnerability by removing any such malicious headers before processing the record. |
| CVE-2023-34034 | Critical | 2023-07-19 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Using "**" as a pattern in Spring Security configuration for WebFlux creates a mismatch in pattern matching between Spring Security and Spring WebFlux, and the potential for a security bypass. |
| CVE-2023-34035 | High | 2023-07-18 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Spring Security versions 5.8 prior to 5.8.5, 6.0 prior to 6.0.5, and 6.1 prior to 6.1.2 could be susceptible to authorization rule misconfiguration if the application uses requestMatchers(String) and multiple servlets, one of them being Spring MVC’s DispatcherServlet. (DispatcherServlet is a Spring MVC component that maps HTTP endpoints to methods on @Controller-annotated classes.) Specifically, an application is vulnerable when all of the following are true: * Spring MVC is on the classpath * Spring Security is securing more than one servlet in a single application (one of them being Spring MVC’s DispatcherServlet) * The application uses requestMatchers(String) to refer to endpoints that are not Spring MVC endpoints An application is not vulnerable if any of the following is true: * The application does not have Spring MVC on the classpath * The application secures no servlets other than Spring MVC’s DispatcherServlet * The application uses requestMatchers(String) only for Spring MVC endpoints |
| CVE-2023-34036 | Medium | 2023-07-17 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Reactive web applications that use Spring HATEOAS to produce hypermedia-based responses might be exposed to malicious forwarded headers if they are not behind a trusted proxy that ensures correctness of such headers, or if they don't have anything else in place to handle (and possibly discard) forwarded headers either in WebFlux or at the level of the underlying HTTP server. For the application to be affected, it needs to satisfy the following requirements: * It needs to use the reactive web stack (Spring WebFlux) and Spring HATEOAS to create links in hypermedia-based responses. * The application infrastructure does not guard against clients submitting (X-)Forwarded… headers. |