Overview 202 matches · 21 protected · 1 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 4 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
21
10.4%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
3
1.5%
No exploit published
178
88.1%
blocked by ARMR today
21
10.4%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
181
89.6%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
split by
peak 76 / month
Apr 251
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
May 253
No exploit published3
Critical1
High1
Low1
not blocked3
No public exploit3
Jun 251
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Jul 250
Aug 251
Protected by Waratek1
Medium1
blocked by ARMR today1
Working exploit published1
Sep 253
Mitigation candidate1
No exploit published2
Critical1
High2
not blocked3
Exploited1
No public exploit2
Oct 252
No exploit published2
High1
Medium1
not blocked2
No public exploit2
Nov 250
Dec 250
Jan 261
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Feb 260
Mar 2612
Protected by Waratek1
Mitigation candidate2
No exploit published9
Critical2
High8
Medium1
Low1
blocked by ARMR today1
not blocked11
Working exploit published1
Proof of concept only1
No public exploit10
Apr 2625
Protected by Waratek1
No exploit published24
Critical3
High10
Medium10
Low2
blocked by ARMR today1
not blocked24
No public exploit25
May 268
Protected by Waratek2
No exploit published6
Critical1
High5
Medium2
blocked by ARMR today2
not blocked6
No public exploit8
Jun 2669
Protected by Waratek8
No exploit published61
Critical2
High31
Medium35
Low1
blocked by ARMR today8
not blocked61
No public exploit69
Jul 260
Aug 2676
Protected by Waratek8
No exploit published68
Critical10
High22
Medium34
Low10
blocked by ARMR today8
not blocked68
No public exploit76
Apr 25Jun 25Aug 25Oct 25Dec 25Feb 26Apr 26Jun 26Aug 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-22233 | Low | 2025-05-16 | No exploit published | No public exploit | CVE-2024-38820 ensured Locale-independent, lowercase conversion for both the configured disallowedFields patterns and for request parameter names. However, there are still cases where it is possible to bypass the disallowedFields checks. Affected Spring Products and Versions Spring Framework: * 6.2.0 - 6.2.6 * 6.1.0 - 6.1.19 * 6.0.0 - 6.0.27 * 5.3.0 - 5.3.42 * Older, unsupported versions are also affected Mitigation Users of affected versions should upgrade to the corresponding fixed version. Affected version(s)Fix Version Availability 6.2.x 6.2.7 OSS6.1.x 6.1.20 OSS6.0.x 6.0.28 Commercial https://enterprise.spring.io/ 5.3.x 5.3.43 Commercial https://enterprise.spring.io/ No further mitigation steps are necessary. Generally, we recommend using a dedicated model object with properties only for data binding, or using constructor binding since constructor arguments explicitly declare what to bind together with turning off setter binding through the declarativeBinding flag. See the Model Design section in the reference documentation. For setting binding, prefer the use of allowedFields (an explicit list) over disallowedFields. Credit This issue was responsibly reported by the TERASOLUNA Framework Development Team from NTT DATA Group Corporation. |
| CVE-2025-22235 | High | 2025-04-28 | No exploit published | No public exploit | EndpointRequest.to() creates a matcher for null/** if the actuator endpoint, for which the EndpointRequest has been created, is disabled or not exposed. Your application may be affected by this if all the following conditions are met: * You use Spring Security * EndpointRequest.to() has been used in a Spring Security chain configuration * The endpoint which EndpointRequest references is disabled or not exposed via web * Your application handles requests to /null and this path needs protection You are not affected if any of the following is true: * You don't use Spring Security * You don't use EndpointRequest.to() * The endpoint which EndpointRequest.to() refers to is enabled and is exposed * Your application does not handle requests to /null or this path does not need protection |