Overview 5 matches · 2 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
2
40.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
3
60.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
0
0.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
2
40.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
60.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
4
80.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
1
20.0%
split by
peak 3 / year
20192020202120222023202420252026
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-42584 | Critical | 2026-05-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpClientCodec pairs each inbound response with an outbound request by queue.poll() once per response, including for 1xx. If the client pipelines GET then HEAD and the server sends 103, then 200 with GET body, then 200 for HEAD, the queue pairs HEAD with the first 200. The HEAD rule then skips reading that message’s body, so the GET entity bytes stay on the stream and the following 200 is parsed from the wrong offset. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-42581 | Critical | 2026-05-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, HttpObjectDecoder strips a conflicting Content-Length header when a request carries both Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Content-Length, but only for HTTP/1.1 messages. The guard is absent for HTTP/1.0. An attacker that sends an HTTP/1.0 request with both headers causes Netty to decode the body as chunked while leaving Content-Length intact in the forwarded HttpMessage. Any downstream proxy or handler that trusts Content-Length over Transfer-Encoding will disagree on message boundaries, enabling request smuggling. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2026-42579 | Critical | 2026-05-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final, Netty's DNS codec does not enforce RFC 1035 domain name constraints during either encoding or decoding. This creates a bidirectional attack surface: malicious DNS responses can exploit the decoder, and user-influenced hostnames can exploit the encoder. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final. |
| CVE-2025-30065 | Critical | 2025-04-01 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | Schema parsing in the parquet-avro module of Apache Parquet 1.15.0 and previous versions allows bad actors to execute arbitrary code Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.15.1, which fixes the issue. |
| CVE-2018-14721 | Critical | 2019-01-02 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | FasterXML jackson-databind 2.x before 2.9.7 might allow remote attackers to conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks by leveraging failure to block the axis2-jaxws class from polymorphic deserialization. |