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High Oracle Communications CVEs with a working exploit

3 CVEs, 2 protected by Waratek

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Oracle product: Oracle Communications✕
Overview 3 matches · 2 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV
3matches 2protected66.7% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0%
Protected by Waratek 2 66.7% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 1 33.3% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 3 100.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 2 66.7% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 1 33.3% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 3 100.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2024-38819 High 2024-12-19 Protected by Waratek Working exploit published Applications serving static resources through the functional web frameworks WebMvc.fn or WebFlux.fn are vulnerable to path traversal attacks. An attacker can craft malicious HTTP requests and obtain any file on the file system that is also accessible to the process in which the Spring application is running.
CVE-2022-29885 High 2022-05-12 Mitigation candidate Working exploit published The documentation of Apache Tomcat 10.1.0-M1 to 10.1.0-M14, 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.20, 9.0.13 to 9.0.62 and 8.5.38 to 8.5.78 for the EncryptInterceptor incorrectly stated it enabled Tomcat clustering to run over an untrusted network. This was not correct. While the EncryptInterceptor does provide confidentiality and integrity protection, it does not protect against all risks associated with running over any untrusted network, particularly DoS risks.
CVE-2020-9484 High 2020-05-20 Protected by Waratek Working exploit published When using Apache Tomcat versions 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34, 8.5.0 to 8.5.54 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.103 if a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on the server; and b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a FileStore; and c) the PersistenceManager is configured with sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the attacker provided object to be deserialized; and d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage location used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over; then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able to trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for the attack to succeed.