Overview 4 matches · 1 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 2 exploited · 2 CISA KEV · 2 public PoC
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
1
25.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
3
75.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
4
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
2
50.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
2
50.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 1 / quarter
Q1 181
Not applicable1
High1
not blocked1
Forecast only1
Q2 180
Q3 180
Q4 181
Not applicable1
High1
not blocked1
Forecast only1
Q1 190
Q2 190
Q3 190
Q4 190
Q1 201
Not applicable1
High1
not blocked1
Exploited1
Q2 200
Q3 200
Q4 200
Q1 210
Q2 210
Q3 210
Q4 210
Q1 220
Q2 220
Q3 220
Q4 220
Q1 230
Q2 230
Q3 230
Q4 231
Mitigation candidate1
High1
not blocked1
Exploited1
Q2 18Q4 18Q2 19Q4 19Q2 20Q4 20Q2 21Q4 21Q2 22Q4 22Q2 23Q4 23
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-44487 | High | 2023-10-10 | Mitigation candidate | Exploited | The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023. |
| CVE-2020-0601 | High | 2020-01-14 | Not applicable | Exploited | A spoofing vulnerability exists in the way Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) validates Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificates.An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by using a spoofed code-signing certificate to sign a malicious executable, making it appear the file was from a trusted, legitimate source, aka 'Windows CryptoAPI Spoofing Vulnerability'. |
| CVE-2018-16873 | High | 2018-12-14 | Not applicable | Forecast only | In Go before 1.10.6 and 1.11.x before 1.11.3, the "go get" command is vulnerable to remote code execution when executed with the -u flag and the import path of a malicious Go package, or a package that imports it directly or indirectly. Specifically, it is only vulnerable in GOPATH mode, but not in module mode (the distinction is documented at https://golang.org/cmd/go/#hdr-Module_aware_go_get). Using custom domains, it's possible to arrange things so that a Git repository is cloned to a folder named ".git" by using a vanity import path that ends with "/.git". If the Git repository root contains a "HEAD" file, a "config" file, an "objects" directory, a "refs" directory, with some work to ensure the proper ordering of operations, "go get -u" can be tricked into considering the parent directory as a repository root, and running Git commands on it. That will use the "config" file in the original Git repository root for its configuration, and if that config file contains malicious commands, they will execute on the system running "go get -u". |
| CVE-2018-7187 | High | 2018-02-16 | Not applicable | Forecast only | The "go get" implementation in Go 1.9.4, when the -insecure command-line option is used, does not validate the import path (get/vcs.go only checks for "://" anywhere in the string), which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted web site. |