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EPSS ≥ 0.5✕Product element✕
Overview 2 matches · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV
2matches 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0%
Protected by Waratek 2 100.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 1 50.0% Medium 1 50.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 2 100.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 0 0.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 2 100.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
split by peak 1 / month
Protected by Waratek: 2 Medium: 1High: 1 blocked by ARMR today: 2 Working exploit published: 2
May 201 Protected by Waratek1 High1 blocked by ARMR today1 Working exploit published1 Jun 200 Jul 200 Aug 200 Sep 200 Oct 200 Nov 200 Dec 200 Jan 210 Feb 210 Mar 210 Apr 211 Protected by Waratek1 Medium1 blocked by ARMR today1 Working exploit published1
May 20Jun 20Jul 20Aug 20Sep 20Oct 20Nov 20Dec 20Jan 21Feb 21Mar 21Apr 21
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2021-28164 Medium 2021-04-01 Protected by Waratek Working exploit published In Eclipse Jetty 9.4.37.v20210219 to 9.4.38.v20210224, the default compliance mode allows requests with URIs that contain %2e or %2e%2e segments to access protected resources within the WEB-INF directory. For example a request to /context/%2e/WEB-INF/web.xml can retrieve the web.xml file. This can reveal sensitive information regarding the implementation of a web application.
CVE-2020-9484 High 2020-05-20 Protected by Waratek Working exploit published When using Apache Tomcat versions 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34, 8.5.0 to 8.5.54 and 7.0.0 to 7.0.103 if a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on the server; and b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a FileStore; and c) the PersistenceManager is configured with sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the attacker provided object to be deserialized; and d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage location used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over; then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able to trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for the attack to succeed.