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Including CVEs outside Waratek scope✕Vendor io.qameta.allure✕
Overview 3 matches · 2 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches 2protected66.7% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 2 66.7% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 1 33.3% Outside Waratek scope 0 0.0% Not applicable 0 0.0% Withdrawn CVE 0 0.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 1 33.3% Medium 2 66.7% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 2 66.7% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 1 33.3% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 2 66.7% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 1 33.3%
split by peak 2 / month
Mar 26Apr 26May 26Jun 26Jul 26Aug 26Sep 26
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-55847 Medium 2026-09-14 No exploit published No public exploit Allure 2 is the version 2.x branch of Allure Report, a multi-language test reporting tool. Prior to 2.39.0, the ansi.js helper at allure-generator/src/main/javascript/helpers/ansi.js passes attacker-influenced statusMessage and statusTrace values through AnsiToHtml without HTML escaping and wraps the result in Handlebars SafeString, disabling template auto-escaping in allure-generator/src/main/javascript/blocks/status-details/status-details.hbs. JunitXmlPlugin.java can populate these fields directly from crafted JUnit XML failure messages and traces, and equivalent input flows exist in the TRX, xUnit XML, xctest, and Allure1 and Allure2 plugins. When a user views the affected status details, unescaped markup executes arbitrary JavaScript in the report origin, which can expose report data and compromise sessions associated with that origin. This is an incomplete-fix case because PR 3271 escaped link helpers but did not address the ANSI helper. This issue is fixed in version 2.39.0.
CVE-2026-55846 Medium 2026-09-14 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only Allure 2 is the version 2.x branch of Allure Report, a multi-language test reporting tool. Prior to 2.39.0, the HTTP server started by allure serve and allure open uses URI.getPath() in Commands.setUpServer() in allure-commandline/src/main/java/io/qameta/allure/Commands.java and passes the percent-decoded request path to reportDirectory.resolve() without normalizing the result or confirming that it remains inside that directory. An unauthenticated client that can reach the server can submit parent-directory segments, including percent-encoded segments, and cause serveFile() to return any regular file readable by the Allure process. The server binds to localhost by default, but the --host option can expose it to other systems, and local users, adjacent containers, or browser-origin attacks may reach a local listener. This can disclose credentials, configuration, source code, build secrets, and other CI/CD data. This issue is fixed in version 2.39.0.
CVE-2026-33166 High 2026-03-20 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only Allure 2 is the version 2.x branch of Allure Report, a multi-language test reporting tool. The Allure report generator prior to version 2.38.0 is vulnerable to an arbitrary file read via path traversal when processing test results. An attacker can craft a malicious result file (-result.json, -container.json, or .plist) that points an attachment source to a sensitive file on the host system. During report generation, Allure will resolve these paths and include the sensitive files in the final report. Version 2.38.0 fixes the issue.