Overview 3 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
3
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
3
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
3
100.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 3 / month
Jul 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-56822 | High | 2026-07-29 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, the OcspServerCertificateValidator forwards the SslHandshakeCompletionEvent before the asynchronous OCSP validation completes. This allows the client's downstream handlers to send sensitive application data (e.g., HTTP requests) to a revoked server before the channel is closed by the OCSP check. n io.netty.handler.ssl.ocsp.OcspServerCertificateValidator#userEventTriggered, when an SslHandshakeCompletionEvent is received, the validator immediately calls ctx.fireUserEventTriggered(evt). It then initiates an asynchronous OCSP query using OcspClient.query. Because the handshake completion event is forwarded immediately, downstream handlers in the client's pipeline are notified that the TLS handshake is successful. They may then begin reading and processing incoming application data or sending outgoing data. If the OCSP response later indicates the server's certificate is REVOKED, the validator closes the channel, but by this time, the client may have already leaked sensitive data to a revoked server or processed malicious responses from it. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-56821 | High | 2026-07-29 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, the OcspServerCertificateValidator flags an out-of-date OCSP response but does not stop processing it, so an expired GOOD response is still reported as VALID, letting an on-path attacker replay a stale GOOD response to bypass revocation of a since-revoked certificate. Exploitation can lead to certificate revocation bypass via replay of an expired OCSP response. Any application using OcspServerCertificateValidator is affected; a revoked certificate can be accepted. This issue has been fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |
| CVE-2026-56820 | Critical | 2026-07-21 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and prior to 4.1.135.Final, `OcspClient` does not validate that the `CertificateID` in an OCSP response matches the requested `CertificateID`, which can lead to replay attack. `OcspClient.validateResponse` accepts a legitimately signed `GOOD` status response for an unrelated certificate issued by the same CA, allowing bypass of revocation checks for another certificate. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. |