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Including CVEs outside Waratek scope✕Product http4k-format-xml✕
Overview 1 match · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
1match 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 1 100.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 0 0.0% Outside Waratek scope 0 0.0% Not applicable 0 0.0% Withdrawn CVE 0 0.0%
Critical 1 100.0% High 0 0.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 1 100.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 0 0.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 1 100.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%
split by peak 1 / month
Protected by Waratek: 1 Critical: 1 blocked by ARMR today: 1 Proof of concept only: 1
Dec 24
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2024-55875 Critical 2024-12-12 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only http4k is a functional toolkit for Kotlin HTTP applications. Prior to version 6.50.0.0, there is a potential XXE (XML External Entity Injection) vulnerability when http4k handling malicious XML contents within requests, which might allow attackers to read local sensitive information on server, trigger Server-side Request Forgery and even execute code under some circumstances. The original fix shipped in v5.41.0.0 / v4.50.0.0 closed the documented external-entity attack class (SSRF, local-file disclosure, code execution) by setting `ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD=""`, `ACCESS_EXTERNAL_SCHEMA=""`, and `isExpandEntityReferences=false` on the default `DocumentBuilderFactory`. A residual gap remained: the parser still accepted documents containing `<!DOCTYPE>` declarations even though external entity resolution was blocked. This left open billion-laughs-style internal entity expansion DoS attacks against any application using `Body.xml()` or `Document.asXmlDocument()` on untrusted XML. v6.50.0.0 closes this residual by adding `disallow-doctype-decl=true` and `FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING=true` to `defaultXmlParsingConfig`. Any document containing a `<!DOCTYPE>` is now rejected at parse time.