Overview 2 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
2
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
2
100.0%
split by
peak 1 / month
Aug 26Sep 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-73494 | High | 2026-09-14 | No exploit published | No public exploit | blaze is a Scala library for building asynchronous pipelines, with a focus on network IO. Prior to 0.23.18 and from 1.0.0-M1 until 1.0.0-M42, five HTTP/1.1 conformance laxities in the hand-written Java parser under http/src/main/java/org/http4s/blaze/http/parser/ can cause blaze to derive a different request boundary than a stricter fronting intermediary. A default BlazeServerBuilder accepts invalid or valueless header field names that violate tchar syntax, obsolete folded field lines (obs-fold), unsupported Transfer-Encoding values, duplicate Content-Length fields, and requests containing both Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length. If a lenient or legacy proxy forwards the malformed bytes but interprets them differently, the disagreement can permit front-end authorization bypass, response-queue poisoning on pooled backend connections, or cache poisoning. Exploitation requires a pair of disagreeing parsers; no non-default blaze configuration is required. The affected checks are enforced in BodyAndHeaderParser and Http1ServerParser. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42. |
| CVE-2026-73495 | High | 2026-08-12 | No exploit published | No public exploit | blaze is a Scala library for building asynchronous pipelines, with a focus on network IO. Prior to 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42, blaze-server can merge HTTP/1.1 chunked-body trailer fields into Request.headers. Because trailer fields are attacker-controlled, an unauthenticated remote client can inject arbitrary header names and values, including X-Forwarded-For and internal authorization headers, that a fronting proxy sanitized from the request-header section, bypassing header-based trust decisions in the application. Any http4s application using BlazeServerBuilder over HTTP/1.1 whose routes or middleware trust proxy-set headers, including X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP, and X-Forwarded-Host, is affected. If a fronting proxy strips or normalizes those headers but forwards chunked bodies with trailers intact, an attacker can spoof client IP for allow-lists, rate limits, or auditing, forge the https scheme, or inject internal authorization headers. A promoted Connection: close trailer is also honored, allowing attacker-controlled termination of pooled backend connections. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.18 and 1.0.0-M42. |