Io.netty.incubator CVEs with no public exploit
12 CVEs
Overview 12 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
12matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
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Mitigation candidate
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0.0%
No exploit published
12
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
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partly blocked
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not blocked
12
100.0%
not established
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unrecorded
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Exploited
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Working exploit published
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Proof of concept only
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Forecast only
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0.0%
No public exploit
12
100.0%
split by
peak 5 / quarter
Q2 241
No exploit published1
Critical1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q3 241
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q4 240
Q1 251
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q2 250
Q3 250
Q4 250
Q1 260
Q2 263
No exploit published3
Medium3
not blocked3
No public exploit3
Q3 261
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q4 265
No exploit published5
High4
Medium1
not blocked5
No public exploit5
Q2 24Q3 24Q4 24Q1 25Q2 25Q3 25Q4 25Q1 26Q2 26Q3 26Q4 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-63202 | High | 2026-11-19 | No exploit published | No public exploit | netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BinaryHttpParser.readFieldSection in codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java loops while fieldSectionLength is nonzero and relies on disabled-by-default assertions to require BinaryHttpParser.readFieldLine to return a value and consume bytes. A corrupt field line can consume more bytes than its understated declared section length and drive the counter negative, or a truncated field line can return without consuming data and leave the parser in the same state. An unauthenticated OHTTP peer can encrypt such Binary HTTP content under the gateway public configuration, reach OHttpRequestResponseContext.ContentDecoder.decodeChunk, and permanently pin a Netty event-loop thread at full CPU before application business logic. Multiple requests can exhaust the event-loop group and deny service until restart. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final. |
| CVE-2026-63124 | High | 2026-11-19 | No exploit published | No public exploit | netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BinaryHttpParser.readFieldLine in codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java treats a complete field line that ends exactly at a known field-section boundary as incomplete and returns without consuming bytes. BinaryHttpParser.readFieldSection then leaves fieldSectionLength unchanged and repeats the loop because its forward-progress checks are Java assertions, which are normally disabled in production. A remote peer that sends a known-length Binary HTTP header or trailer section ending at that boundary can make the parser spin indefinitely and pin the Netty event-loop or worker thread responsible for the channel. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final. |
| CVE-2026-61827 | High | 2026-11-19 | No exploit published | No public exploit | netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BinaryHttpParser does not enforce limits on encoded variable-length fields controlled by a remote peer. A remote peer can cause the decoder to buffer data indefinitely until memory is exhausted, causing denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final. |
| CVE-2026-61799 | Medium | 2026-11-19 | No exploit published | No public exploit | netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BinaryHttpParser in codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java accumulates attacker-controlled Binary HTTP variable-length integers into the int offset sumBytes. BinaryHttpParser.readRequestHead, BinaryHttpParser.readFieldLine, and BinaryHttpParser.getIndeterminateLength can narrow long lengths into that offset, causing integer wraparound before buffer indices are calculated. A remote peer that supplies a valid large encoded length to BinaryHttpParser or BinaryHttpDecoder can trigger an unchecked bounds exception from a small malformed message, fail or close the channel, and repeatedly cause denial of service. Java and Netty bounds checks prevent memory corruption, and no information disclosure was observed. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final. |
| CVE-2026-61798 | High | 2026-11-19 | No exploit published | No public exploit | netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java includes its private parameter, BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java renders the complete private-key byte array when isPrivate is true, and BoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java includes rejected privateKeyBytes in an exception message. Applications that log affected key-pair objects or initialization exceptions can persist complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry. Anyone who can read those records can recover the key and may compromise OHTTP message confidentiality or authenticity expectations while the key remains usable. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final. |
| CVE-2026-54251 | High | 2026-09-15 | No exploit published | No public exploit | netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, the OHTTP gateway decryption path in codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpRequestResponseContext.java allocates a pooled direct ByteBuf for decrypted plaintext before the AEAD tag is verified. When an invalid tag causes decryptChunk() to throw CryptoException, OHttpRequestResponseContext.decodeChunk() does not release the ByteBuf because the allocation is not guarded by try/finally. Repeated invalid encrypted requests can therefore leak native off-heap memory until the gateway is unable to continue serving requests. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final. |
| CVE-2026-48480 | Medium | 2026-06-04 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. Prior to version 0.0.22.FInal, the codec-ohttp implementation of draft-ietf-ohai-chunked-ohttp does not verify that a cryptographically-signed final chunk was received before the outer HTTP body terminates. An on-path adversary (the OHTTP relay itself, or any MITM on the relay↔gateway or relay↔client transport) can forward a prefix of a legitimate chunked-OHTTP message—cut at a non-final chunk boundary—and close the outer body cleanly, producing no decryption error and no exception in the receiving application. Version 0.0.22.Final fixes the issue. |
| CVE-2026-48040 | Medium | 2026-06-04 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. The library implements Oblivious HTTP (RFC 9458) using BoringSSL's HPKE C library via JNI. When deriving native memory addresses for cryptographic operations versions prior to 0.0.22.Final provide a fallback path for direct ByteBufs that do not expose their memory address through `hasMemoryAddress()`. This fallback occurs when `sun.misc.Unsafe` is unavailable to Netty — for example, when the JVM is started with `-Dio.netty.noUnsafe=true`, when a SecurityManager restricts Unsafe access, or when running on non-HotSpot JVMs. In these configurations, Netty's default `PooledByteBufAllocator` returns `PooledDirectByteBuf` instances for which `hasMemoryAddress()` returns false. Under the enabling JVM configuration, an unauthenticated network attacker can cause the OHTTP gateway to corrupt memory belonging to other concurrent connections and disclose the contents of adjacent pooled direct buffers by triggering cryptographic operations with crafted OHTTP requests. The corruption occurs regardless of whether the AEAD tag verification succeeds, as BoringSSL zeroizes the output buffer on failure. The information disclosure path provides the attacker with the encryption key needed to extract the leaked data. This violates the confidentiality and integrity of all connections sharing the same Netty buffer arena. Version 0.0.22.Final fixes the issue. |
| CVE-2026-41207 | Medium | 2026-06-04 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. Prior to version 0.0.21.Final, HKDF_expand returns non-NULL on failure. The byte[] is filled with zeros and has no way to distinguish success from failure. Since this output is used as HKDF key material for the response AEAD, a failure silently produces an all-zero key. When EVP_HPKE_CTX_export fails it also returns an empty byte[] array filled with zeros. This byte[] feeds directly into OHttpCrypto.createResponseAEAD(...). A silent all-zero export secret would produce a deterministic, attacker-predictable AEAD key. Version 0.0.21.Final patches the issue. |
| CVE-2025-29908 | Medium | 2025-03-31 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Netty QUIC codec is a QUIC codec for netty which makes use of quiche. An issue was discovered in the codec. A hash collision vulnerability (in the hash map used to manage connections) allows remote attackers to cause a considerable CPU load on the server (a Hash DoS attack) by initiating connections with colliding Source Connection IDs (SCIDs). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.71.Final. |
| CVE-2024-40642 | High | 2024-07-18 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The netty incubator codec.bhttp is a java language binary http parser. In affected versions the `BinaryHttpParser` class does not properly validate input values thus giving attackers almost complete control over the HTTP requests constructed from the parsed output. Attackers can abuse several issues individually to perform various injection attacks including HTTP request smuggling, desync attacks, HTTP header injections, request queue poisoning, caching attacks and Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Attacker could also combine several issues to create well-formed messages for other text-based protocols which may result in attacks beyond the HTTP protocol. The BinaryHttpParser class implements the readRequestHead method which performs most of the relevant parsing of the received request. The data structure prefixes values with a variable length integer value. The parsing code below first gets the lengths of the values from the prefixed variable length integer. After it has all of the lengths and calculates all of the indices, the parser casts the applicable slices of the ByteBuf to String. Finally, it passes these values into a new `DefaultBinaryHttpRequest` object where no further parsing or validation occurs. Method is partially validated while other values are not validated at all. Software that relies on netty to apply input validation for binary HTTP data may be vulnerable to various injection and protocol based attacks. This issue has been addressed in version 0.0.13.Final. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability. |
| CVE-2024-36121 | Critical | 2024-06-04 | No exploit published | No public exploit | netty-incubator-codec-ohttp is the OHTTP implementation for netty. BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat. |