Overview 3 matches · 2 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
2
66.7%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
1
33.3%
blocked by ARMR today
2
66.7%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
1
33.3%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
3
100.0%
split by
peak 1 / quarter
Q3 201
No exploit published1
Critical1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Q4 200
Q1 211
Protected by Waratek1
Medium1
blocked by ARMR today1
No public exploit1
Q2 210
Q3 210
Q4 210
Q1 220
Q2 220
Q3 220
Q4 220
Q1 230
Q2 230
Q3 230
Q4 230
Q1 240
Q2 240
Q3 240
Q4 240
Q1 250
Q2 250
Q3 250
Q4 250
Q1 260
Q2 261
Protected by Waratek1
High1
blocked by ARMR today1
No public exploit1
Q4 20Q2 21Q4 21Q2 22Q4 22Q2 23Q4 23Q2 24Q4 24Q2 25Q4 25Q2 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-40987 | High | 2026-06-11 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | A malicious or compromised FTP/SFTP/SMB server can write arbitrary files anywhere on the client filesystem (outside the configured local-directory) with attacker-controlled content. Affected versions: Spring Integration 7.0.0 through 7.0.4; 6.5.0 through 6.5.8; 6.4.0 through 6.4.11; 6.3.0 through 6.3.14; 5.5.0 through 5.5.20. |
| CVE-2021-22114 | Medium | 2021-03-01 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Addresses partial fix in CVE-2018-1263. Spring-integration-zip, versions prior to 1.0.4, exposes an arbitrary file write vulnerability, that can be achieved using a specially crafted zip archive (affects other archives as well, bzip2, tar, xz, war, cpio, 7z), that holds path traversal filenames. So when the filename gets concatenated to the target extraction directory, the final path ends up outside of the target folder. |
| CVE-2020-5413 | Critical | 2020-07-31 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Spring Integration framework provides Kryo Codec implementations as an alternative for Java (de)serialization. When Kryo is configured with default options, all unregistered classes are resolved on demand. This leads to the "deserialization gadgets" exploit when provided data contains malicious code for execution during deserialization. In order to protect against this type of attack, Kryo can be configured to require a set of trusted classes for (de)serialization. Spring Integration should be proactive against blocking unknown "deserialization gadgets" when configuring Kryo in code. |