High Pac4j CVEs

CVE	Severity	Published▾	Status	Exploitation	Description
CVE-2026-40458	High	2026-04-17	No exploit published	No public exploit	PAC4J is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). A malicious attacker can craft a specially designed website which, when visited by a user, will automatically submit a forged cross-site request with a token whose hash collides with the victim's legitimate CSRF token. Importantly, the attacker does not need to know the victim’s CSRF token or its hash prior to the attack. Collisions in the deterministic String.hashCode() function can be computed directly, reducing the effective token's security space to 32 bits. This bypasses CSRF protection, allowing profile updates, password changes, account linking, and any other state-changing operations to be performed without the victim's consent. This issue was fixed in PAC4J versions 5.7.10 and 6.4.1
CVE-2025-31129	High	2025-03-31	Protected by Waratek	No public exploit	Jooby is a web framework for Java and Kotlin. The pac4j io.jooby.internal.pac4j.SessionStoreImpl#get module deserializes untrusted data. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.17.0 (2.x) and 3.7.0 (3.x).
CVE-2021-44878	High	2022-01-06	No exploit published	No public exploit	If an OpenID Connect provider supports the "none" algorithm (i.e., tokens with no signature), pac4j v5.3.0 (and prior) does not refuse it without an explicit configuration on its side or for the "idtoken" response type which is not secure and violates the OpenID Core Specification. The "none" algorithm does not require any signature verification when validating the ID tokens, which allows the attacker to bypass the token validation by injecting a malformed ID token using "none" as the value of "alg" key in the header with an empty signature value.

CVE

Severity

Published▾

Status

Exploitation

Description

CVE-2026-40458

High

2026-04-17

No exploit published

No public exploit

PAC4J is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). A malicious attacker can craft a specially designed website which, when visited by a user, will automatically submit a forged cross-site request with a token whose hash collides with the victim's legitimate CSRF token. Importantly, the attacker does not need to know the victim’s CSRF token or its hash prior to the attack. Collisions in the deterministic String.hashCode() function can be computed directly, reducing the effective token's security space to 32 bits. This bypasses CSRF protection, allowing profile updates, password changes, account linking, and any other state-changing operations to be performed without the victim's consent. This issue was fixed in PAC4J versions 5.7.10 and 6.4.1

CVE-2025-31129

High

2025-03-31

Protected by Waratek

No public exploit

Jooby is a web framework for Java and Kotlin. The pac4j io.jooby.internal.pac4j.SessionStoreImpl#get module deserializes untrusted data. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.17.0 (2.x) and 3.7.0 (3.x).

CVE-2021-44878

High

2022-01-06

No exploit published

No public exploit

If an OpenID Connect provider supports the "none" algorithm (i.e., tokens with no signature), pac4j v5.3.0 (and prior) does not refuse it without an explicit configuration on its side or for the "idtoken" response type which is not secure and violates the OpenID Core Specification. The "none" algorithm does not require any signature verification when validating the ID tokens, which allows the attacker to bypass the token validation by injecting a malformed ID token using "none" as the value of "alg" key in the header with an empty signature value.