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Published from 2026-08-01✕Product ode✕
Overview 11 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
11matches 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 11 100.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 9 81.8% Medium 2 18.2% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 11 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 1 9.1% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 10 90.9%
split by peak 6 / month
Aug 26Sep 26Oct 26Nov 26
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2026-63202 High 2026-11-19 No exploit published No public exploit netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BinaryHttpParser.readFieldSection in codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java loops while fieldSectionLength is nonzero and relies on disabled-by-default assertions to require BinaryHttpParser.readFieldLine to return a value and consume bytes. A corrupt field line can consume more bytes than its understated declared section length and drive the counter negative, or a truncated field line can return without consuming data and leave the parser in the same state. An unauthenticated OHTTP peer can encrypt such Binary HTTP content under the gateway public configuration, reach OHttpRequestResponseContext.ContentDecoder.decodeChunk, and permanently pin a Netty event-loop thread at full CPU before application business logic. Multiple requests can exhaust the event-loop group and deny service until restart. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.
CVE-2026-63124 High 2026-11-19 No exploit published No public exploit netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BinaryHttpParser.readFieldLine in codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java treats a complete field line that ends exactly at a known field-section boundary as incomplete and returns without consuming bytes. BinaryHttpParser.readFieldSection then leaves fieldSectionLength unchanged and repeats the loop because its forward-progress checks are Java assertions, which are normally disabled in production. A remote peer that sends a known-length Binary HTTP header or trailer section ending at that boundary can make the parser spin indefinitely and pin the Netty event-loop or worker thread responsible for the channel. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.
CVE-2026-61827 High 2026-11-19 No exploit published No public exploit netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BinaryHttpParser does not enforce limits on encoded variable-length fields controlled by a remote peer. A remote peer can cause the decoder to buffer data indefinitely until memory is exhausted, causing denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.
CVE-2026-61799 Medium 2026-11-19 No exploit published No public exploit netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BinaryHttpParser in codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java accumulates attacker-controlled Binary HTTP variable-length integers into the int offset sumBytes. BinaryHttpParser.readRequestHead, BinaryHttpParser.readFieldLine, and BinaryHttpParser.getIndeterminateLength can narrow long lengths into that offset, causing integer wraparound before buffer indices are calculated. A remote peer that supplies a valid large encoded length to BinaryHttpParser or BinaryHttpDecoder can trigger an unchecked bounds exception from a small malformed message, fail or close the channel, and repeatedly cause denial of service. Java and Netty bounds checks prevent memory corruption, and no information disclosure was observed. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.
CVE-2026-61798 High 2026-11-19 No exploit published No public exploit netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java includes its private parameter, BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java renders the complete private-key byte array when isPrivate is true, and BoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java includes rejected privateKeyBytes in an exception message. Applications that log affected key-pair objects or initialization exceptions can persist complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry. Anyone who can read those records can recover the key and may compromise OHTTP message confidentiality or authenticity expectations while the key remains usable. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.
CVE-2026-76090 High 2026-11-18 No exploit published No public exploit Tapir is a Scala library for describing HTTP APIs and exposing, consuming, and documenting them using open standards. Prior to 1.13.27, tapir-openapi-codegen-core generates Scala source from untrusted OpenAPI documents by interpolating object property names, query, header, and path parameter names, and operation tags without context-appropriate validation or escaping. Crafted names or values can break out of generated identifier or string-literal contexts and inject arbitrary Scala that executes when generated code is compiled or endpoints are assembled. This is a code-generation and build-time issue and does not make a running tapir server directly exploitable. This issue is fixed in version 1.13.27.
CVE-2026-54251 High 2026-09-15 No exploit published No public exploit netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, the OHTTP gateway decryption path in codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpRequestResponseContext.java allocates a pooled direct ByteBuf for decrypted plaintext before the AEAD tag is verified. When an invalid tag causes decryptChunk() to throw CryptoException, OHttpRequestResponseContext.decodeChunk() does not release the ByteBuf because the allocation is not guarded by try/finally. Repeated invalid encrypted requests can therefore leak native off-heap memory until the gateway is unable to continue serving requests. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.
CVE-2026-59903 High 2026-08-17 No exploit published No public exploit Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.http.cors.CorsHandler setVaryHeader replaces application Vary headers such as Authorization or Cookie with Origin, allowing a caching proxy or CDN to reuse authenticated responses across users and disclose sensitive information. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.
CVE-2026-73508 High 2026-08-13 No exploit published No public exploit Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.dns.AbstractDnsRecord, io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DefaultDnsRecordDecoder.decodeRecord(), and io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil.decompressDomainName() failed to release retained or newly allocated ByteBuf objects when IDN.toASCII() or encodeDomainName() rejected a malformed domain name, allowing unauthenticated remote DNS packets to leak direct memory incrementally until denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.
CVE-2026-73507 High 2026-08-13 No exploit published No public exploit Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.xml.XmlFrameDecoder.decode() failed to preserve closing-tag parser state across invocations, so an unauthenticated remote attacker could trickle-feed repeated </ sequences that repeatedly rescanned the accumulated buffer and exhausted an EventLoop thread's CPU, causing denial of service with a maxFrameLength of 1 MB. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.
CVE-2026-56818 Medium 2026-08-07 No exploit published Proof of concept only Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, the RedisArrayAggregator Redis codec clears retained partial aggregate state when the maxNestedArrayDepth limit is exceeded, but it does not clear the same state when the sibling maxElements limit is exceeded. A peer can start a valid RESP array, send a bulk string child, then send a nested array header longer than the configured maxElements. Netty throws a decoder exception in decodeRedisArrayHeader, but the existing partial aggregate remains retained in the handler. If the application leaves the channel alive after the exception, later messages are still consumed into the pre-error aggregate, allowing an unauthenticated peer to keep attacker-controlled aggregate state alive across a security-limit exception and pin retained pooled buffers. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.