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Critical Netty-handler-ssl-ocsp CVEs

1 CVE

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Overview 1 match · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5

1match 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%

Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 1 100.0%

Critical 1 100.0% High 0 0.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%

blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 1 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%

Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 1 100.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 0 0.0%

split by StatusSeverityProtectionExploit maturity peak 1 / month

Jul 261 No exploit published1 Critical1 not blocked1 Proof of concept only1

Jul 26

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CVE	Severity	Published▾	Status	Exploitation	Description
CVE-2026-56820	Critical	2026-07-21	No exploit published	Proof of concept only	Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and prior to 4.1.135.Final, `OcspClient` does not validate that the `CertificateID` in an OCSP response matches the requested `CertificateID`, which can lead to replay attack. `OcspClient.validateResponse` accepts a legitimately signed `GOOD` status response for an unrelated certificate issued by the same CA, allowing bypass of revocation checks for another certificate. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.

CVE

Severity

Published▾

Status

Exploitation

Description

CVE-2026-56820

Critical

2026-07-21

No exploit published

Proof of concept only

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.15.Final and prior to 4.1.135.Final, `OcspClient` does not validate that the `CertificateID` in an OCSP response matches the requested `CertificateID`, which can lead to replay attack. `OcspClient.validateResponse` accepts a legitimately signed `GOOD` status response for an unrelated certificate issued by the same CA, allowing bypass of revocation checks for another certificate. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.