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High Migration Toolkit CVEs

4 CVEs, 1 exploited, 1 protected by Waratek

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Overview 4 matches · 1 protected · 1 exploited · 1 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 1 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Critical 0 0.0% High 4 100.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 1 25.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 3 75.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 1 25.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 1 25.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 2 50.0%
split by peak 1 / month
Feb 23Apr 23Jun 23Aug 23Oct 23Dec 23Feb 24Apr 24
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2024-1132 High 2024-04-17 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only A flaw was found in Keycloak, where it does not properly validate URLs included in a redirect. This issue could allow an attacker to construct a malicious request to bypass validation and access other URLs and sensitive information within the domain or conduct further attacks. This flaw affects any client that utilizes a wildcard in the Valid Redirect URIs field, and requires user interaction within the malicious URL.
CVE-2023-6291 High 2024-01-26 No exploit published No public exploit A flaw was found in the redirect_uri validation logic in Keycloak. This issue may allow a bypass of otherwise explicitly allowed hosts. A successful attack may lead to an access token being stolen, making it possible for the attacker to impersonate other users.
CVE-2023-44487 High 2023-10-10 Mitigation candidate Exploited The HTTP/2 protocol allows a denial of service (server resource consumption) because request cancellation can reset many streams quickly, as exploited in the wild in August through October 2023.
CVE-2022-4492 High 2023-02-23 No exploit published No public exploit The undertow client is not checking the server identity presented by the server certificate in https connections. This is a compulsory step (at least it should be performed by default) in https and in http/2. I would add it to any TLS client protocol.