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Critical Http4s-ember-core_3 CVEs

1 CVE

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Overview 1 match · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5

1match 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%

Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 1 100.0%

Critical 1 100.0% High 0 0.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%

blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 1 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%

Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 1 100.0%

split by StatusSeverityProtectionExploit maturity peak 1 / month

Sep 261 No exploit published1 Critical1 not blocked1 No public exploit1

Sep 26

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CVE	Severity	Published▾	Status	Exploitation	Description
CVE-2026-69204	Critical	2026-09-15	No exploit published	No public exploit	Http4s is a Scala interface for HTTP services. Prior to 0.23.35 and 1.0.0-M47, Ember HTTP/1.1 does not reject messages containing both Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length, so an intermediary and Ember can select different body framing rules. When ember-server is behind a keep-alive intermediary that forwards both headers and frames by Content-Length, an unauthenticated attacker can smuggle a second request, bypass intermediary access controls, poison caches, or cause a victim request to be joined to an attacker-controlled prefix. The shared response parser can also desynchronize an ember-client connection when a malicious or compromised upstream sends both headers. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.35 and 1.0.0-M47.

CVE

Severity

Published▾

Status

Exploitation

Description

CVE-2026-69204

Critical

2026-09-15

No exploit published

No public exploit

Http4s is a Scala interface for HTTP services. Prior to 0.23.35 and 1.0.0-M47, Ember HTTP/1.1 does not reject messages containing both Transfer-Encoding and Content-Length, so an intermediary and Ember can select different body framing rules. When ember-server is behind a keep-alive intermediary that forwards both headers and frames by Content-Length, an unauthenticated attacker can smuggle a second request, bypass intermediary access controls, poison caches, or cause a victim request to be joined to an attacker-controlled prefix. The shared response parser can also desynchronize an ember-client connection when a malicious or compromised upstream sends both headers. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.35 and 1.0.0-M47.