Overview 7 matches · 0 in Waratek scope · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
7matches
0in Waratek scope0.0%
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
Outside Waratek scope
0
0.0%
Not applicable
7
100.0%
Withdrawn CVE
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
7
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
3
42.9%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
4
57.1%
split by
peak 3 / month
Nov 251
Not applicable1
Low1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Dec 250
Jan 260
Feb 260
Mar 260
Apr 260
May 260
Jun 260
Jul 261
Not applicable1
Low1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Aug 262
Not applicable2
Low2
not blocked2
Proof of concept only2
Sep 260
Oct 260
Nov 263
Not applicable3
Low3
not blocked3
No public exploit3
Nov 25Jan 26Mar 26May 26Jul 26Sep 26Nov 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-66295 | Low | 2026-11-06 | Not applicable | No public exploit | Saxy's XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between <? and ?>, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it. Because ?> terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching <? keeps the encoder's own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML Name production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction. The result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2 is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG. This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. |
| CVE-2026-66294 | Low | 2026-11-06 | Not applicable | No public exploit | XML injection in the Saxy XML encoder. Saxy.Encoder.cdata/1 serializes a {:cdata, characters} node by wrapping the supplied characters between <![CDATA[ and ]]> and passing the payload through byte for byte. The encoder's character-data and attribute-value paths escape the XML metacharacters <, >, &, ", and ', but the CDATA path applies no neutralization at all. XML provides no character escaping mechanism inside a CDATA section, so the only correct way to represent a ]]> substring is to split the section and rejoin it as ]]]]><![CDATA[>. Saxy neither performs that split nor rejects the substring. An application that renders untrusted text as CDATA, by building the node with Saxy.XML.cdata/1 and serializing it with Saxy.encode!/2 or Saxy.encode_to_iodata!/2, therefore lets an attacker terminate the section at a position of their choosing. Everything supplied after the ]]> is emitted outside any CDATA context and is parsed as markup, so a single attacker-controlled text field becomes attacker-controlled document structure: arbitrary sibling elements and attributes that the application never built. Downstream consumers of the serialized document accept the injected markup as genuine. Services that generate SOAP envelopes, RSS or Atom feeds, sitemaps, SVG, or XML exports from user-supplied content can have trusted fields forged or overridden. Applications that never place untrusted text in a CDATA node are not affected. This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. |
| CVE-2026-66293 | Low | 2026-11-06 | Not applicable | No public exploit | XML injection in the encoder of Saxy. Saxy.Encoder does not neutralize the -- sequence in XML comment content: escape_comment/2 returns the comment binary unchanged in every clause and only appends a space when the comment ends in a single -, so neither an interior -- nor a full --> is escaped or rejected before the encoder wraps the content in the <!-- and --> delimiters. When an application serializes attacker-controlled text as a comment, through Saxy.XML.comment/1 or a raw {:comment, text} simple form child, the attacker can close the comment early with --> and inject arbitrary sibling markup into the serialized document. A downstream parser then sees elements, attributes, and text that the application never built. Where the document is rendered as HTML or SVG, the injected markup executes as stored cross-site scripting; where it is consumed by another XML processor, the attacker can forge data that the producing application never emitted. Documents that Saxy only parses are not a vector. This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0. |
| CVE-2026-48590 | Low | 2026-08-21 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | XML Injection vulnerability in joshnuss xml_builder (XmlBuilder module) allows Content Spoofing, XML Injection. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/xml_builder.ex and program routines XmlBuilder.generate/1, XmlBuilder.generate/2, XmlBuilder.element/1, XmlBuilder.element/2, XmlBuilder.element/3. Element names, attribute names, and doctype identifiers are interpolated verbatim into the serialized XML output without validation or escaping of structural characters (<, >, ", ', &). An attacker who can influence a name argument (for example, an element name derived from a JSON object key or an HTTP form field name) can inject arbitrary XML markup including extra elements, comments, and event-handler attributes into the output document. This issue affects xml_builder: from 0.0.1 before 2.4.1. |
| CVE-2026-47080 | Low | 2026-08-21 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | XML Injection vulnerability in joshnuss xml_builder (XmlBuilder module) allows Content Spoofing, XML Injection. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/xml_builder.ex and program routines XmlBuilder.generate/1, XmlBuilder.generate/2, XmlBuilder.escape/1. The escape/1 clause for {:cdata, data} in lib/xml_builder.ex concatenates data verbatim between the CDATA opener <![CDATA[ and closer ]]> without rewriting or splitting on the embedded ]]> sequence. Because CDATA sections have no internal escape mechanism, the only safe way to embed arbitrary bytes is to split on ]]> and emit adjacent CDATA sections. An attacker who can supply input containing ]]> closes the CDATA section early; any bytes that follow are parsed as ordinary XML markup by downstream consumers, allowing injection of arbitrary elements, text, or entity references into the output document. This issue affects xml_builder: from 0.0.7 before 2.4.1. |
| CVE-2026-15037 | Low | 2026-07-23 | Not applicable | No public exploit | Improper output neutralization (XML injection) in QDom comment, CDATA, and processing-instruction serialization in Qt XML from 4.0.0 through 6.11 allows untrusted text serialized by an application into those nodes to inject arbitrary XML markup, because the node terminators are not escaped under the default InvalidDataPolicy (AcceptInvalidChars). Fixed in Qt 6.12. |
| CVE-2025-12921 | Low | 2025-11-10 | Not applicable | Proof of concept only | A vulnerability has been found in OpenClinica Community Edition up to 3.12.2/3.13. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /ImportCRFData?action=confirm of the component CRF Data Import. Such manipulation of the argument xml_file leads to xml injection. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |