Medium CWE-770 CVEs with a proof of concept
6 CVEs
Overview 6 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
6matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
6
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
6
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
6
100.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 2 / quarter
Q1 241
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q2 241
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q3 240
Q4 240
Q1 250
Q2 250
Q3 250
Q4 250
Q1 260
Q2 261
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q3 261
No exploit published1
Medium1
not blocked1
Proof of concept only1
Q4 262
No exploit published2
Medium2
not blocked2
Proof of concept only2
Q1 24Q2 24Q3 24Q4 24Q1 25Q2 25Q3 25Q4 25Q1 26Q2 26Q3 26Q4 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-59171 | Medium | 2026-11-06 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | JSON-java is a reference implementation of a JSON package in Java. From version 20150729 through 20260522, JSONTokener.nextSimpleValue can accumulate unbounded numeric tokens before JSONObject.stringToNumber passes them to BigInteger or BigDecimal conversion without a length limit. An application that parses attacker-controlled JSON or XML through JSONObject, JSONArray, or XML.toJSONObject can spend super-linear CPU time converting a sufficiently long numeric literal, blocking request-handling threads and causing denial of service. Strict mode and keep-strings settings in JSONParserConfiguration do not prevent the affected conversion path. Version 20260719 limits numeric conversion length. |
| CVE-2026-118488 | Medium | 2026-11-03 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | In Eclipse Vert.x versions [4.0.0, 4.5.35] or [5.0.0, 5.2.2], when a malicious server keeps sending bytes on an EOL-terminated line (not length-prefixed, for example a simple string [1]), we'll keep growing the buffer without bounds, eventually leading to an OOM. We need to have a configurable limit for EOL-terminated lines. If a malicious server sends a specially crafted RESP response (for example a bulk string [2] with missing CRLF trailer), the parser enters an infinite loop where it keeps parsing the same buffer and pushing the same response to the caller, which may lead e.g. to an OOM if the consumer just buffers the responses. We must fix the parser to avoid this infinite looping. |
| CVE-2026-18401 | Medium | 2026-08-04 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | The non-blocking (asynchronous) JSON parser in jackson-core does not enforce the maxNumberLength constraint defined in StreamReadConstraints (default: 1000 characters). An attacker able to submit JSON to an application that uses the async parser API can supply a number token of arbitrary length, leading to excessive memory allocation and potential CPU exhaustion, resulting in a denial of service. The synchronous parser enforces this limit correctly, so the constraint is applied inconsistently depending on which parsing API the application uses. Root cause: the async parsing path in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase and related classes never invokes the number length validation methods. Number parsing methods such as _finishNumberIntegralPart() accumulate digits into the TextBuffer without any length check, then call _valueComplete() to finalize the token. _valueComplete() does not call resetInt() or resetFloat(), which are the methods in ParserBase where validateIntegerLength() and validateFPLength() are performed. Because that validation step is skipped, maxNumberLength is never enforced on the async code path. Impact: an attacker sending a JSON document containing an arbitrarily long number to an application using the async parser (for example a Spring WebFlux or other reactive application) can cause unbounded allocation in the TextBuffer and an OutOfMemoryError. If the application subsequently calls getBigIntegerValue() or getDecimalValue(), the JVM may additionally be tied up in O(n^2) BigInteger parsing, causing CPU-based denial of service. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.5 and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.0, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.0.x. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq records the lower bound of the affected 2.x range as 2.0.0. |
| CVE-2026-6860 | Medium | 2026-05-06 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | A TCP client can perform a TLS handshake and present the server name extension with a server name that is accepted by a server wildcard name, e.g. if the server is configured with a certificate accepting *.example.com, any XYZ.example.com where xyz is a valid name can be used. |
| CVE-2024-37309 | Medium | 2024-06-13 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | CrateDB is a distributed SQL database. A high-risk vulnerability has been identified in versions prior to 5.7.2 where the TLS endpoint (port 4200) permits client-initiated renegotiation. In this scenario, an attacker can exploit this feature to repeatedly request renegotiation of security parameters during an ongoing TLS session. This flaw could lead to excessive consumption of CPU resources, resulting in potential server overload and service disruption. The vulnerability was confirmed using an openssl client where the command `R` initiates renegotiation, followed by the server confirming with `RENEGOTIATING`. This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform a denial of service attack by exhausting server CPU resources through repeated TLS renegotiations. This impacts the availability of services running on the affected server, posing a significant risk to operational stability and security. TLS 1.3 explicitly forbids renegotiation, since it closes a window of opportunity for an attack. Version 5.7.2 of CrateDB contains the fix for the issue. |
| CVE-2024-29025 | Medium | 2024-03-25 | No exploit published | Proof of concept only | Netty is an asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. The `HttpPostRequestDecoder` can be tricked to accumulate data. While the decoder can store items on the disk if configured so, there are no limits to the number of fields the form can have, an attacher can send a chunked post consisting of many small fields that will be accumulated in the `bodyListHttpData` list. The decoder cumulates bytes in the `undecodedChunk` buffer until it can decode a field, this field can cumulate data without limits. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.108.Final. |