Overview 2 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
2
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
2
100.0%
split by
peak 1 / month
Oct 17Nov 17
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2017-1000221 | Medium | 2017-11-17 | No exploit published | No public exploit | In Opencast 2.2.3 and older if user names overlap, the Opencast search service used for publication to the media modules and players will handle the access control incorrectly so that users only need to match part of the user name used for the access restriction. For example, a user with the role ROLE_USER will have access to recordings published only for ROLE_USER_X. |
| CVE-2017-1000095 | Medium | 2017-10-05 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The default whitelist included the following unsafe entries: DefaultGroovyMethods.putAt(Object, String, Object); DefaultGroovyMethods.getAt(Object, String). These allowed circumventing many of the access restrictions implemented in the script sandbox by using e.g. currentBuild['rawBuild'] rather than currentBuild.rawBuild. Additionally, the following entries allowed accessing private data that would not be accessible otherwise due to script security: groovy.json.JsonOutput.toJson(Closure); groovy.json.JsonOutput.toJson(Object). |