Overview 8 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
8matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
8
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
8
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
8
100.0%
split by
peak 3 / month
Oct 172
No exploit published2
High1
Medium1
not blocked2
No public exploit2
Nov 173
No exploit published3
High2
Medium1
not blocked3
No public exploit3
Dec 170
Jan 181
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Feb 181
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Mar 180
Apr 181
No exploit published1
Low1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Oct 17Nov 17Dec 17Jan 18Feb 18Mar 18Apr 18
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2018-1315 | Low | 2018-04-05 | No exploit published | No public exploit | In Apache Hive 2.1.0 to 2.3.2, when 'COPY FROM FTP' statement is run using HPL/SQL extension to Hive, a compromised/malicious FTP server can cause the file to be written to an arbitrary location on the cluster where the command is run from. This is because FTP client code in HPL/SQL does not verify the destination location of the downloaded file. This does not affect hive cli user and hiveserver2 user as hplsql is a separate command line script and needs to be invoked differently. |
| CVE-2018-1417 | High | 2018-02-22 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Under certain circumstances, a flaw in the J9 JVM (IBM SDK, Java Technology Edition 7.1 and 8.0) allows untrusted code running under a security manager to elevate its privileges. IBM X-Force ID: 138823. |
| CVE-2017-1000403 | High | 2018-01-26 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Jenkins Speaks! Plugin, all current versions, allows users with Job/Configure permission to run arbitrary Groovy code inside the Jenkins JVM, effectively elevating privileges to Overall/Run Scripts. |
| CVE-2017-1000221 | Medium | 2017-11-17 | No exploit published | No public exploit | In Opencast 2.2.3 and older if user names overlap, the Opencast search service used for publication to the media modules and players will handle the access control incorrectly so that users only need to match part of the user name used for the access restriction. For example, a user with the role ROLE_USER will have access to recordings published only for ROLE_USER_X. |
| CVE-2017-15288 | High | 2017-11-15 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The compilation daemon in Scala before 2.10.7, 2.11.x before 2.11.12, and 2.12.x before 2.12.4 uses weak permissions for private files in /tmp/scala-devel/${USER:shared}/scalac-compile-server-port, which allows local users to write to arbitrary class files and consequently gain privileges. |
| CVE-2017-3166 | High | 2017-11-13 | No exploit published | No public exploit | In Apache Hadoop versions 2.6.1 to 2.6.5, 2.7.0 to 2.7.3, and 3.0.0-alpha1, if a file in an encryption zone with access permissions that make it world readable is localized via YARN's localization mechanism, that file will be stored in a world-readable location and can be shared freely with any application that requests to localize that file. |
| CVE-2017-1000096 | High | 2017-10-05 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Arbitrary code execution due to incomplete sandbox protection: Constructors, instance variable initializers, and instance initializers in Pipeline scripts were not subject to sandbox protection, and could therefore execute arbitrary code. This could be exploited e.g. by regular Jenkins users with the permission to configure Pipelines in Jenkins, or by trusted committers to repositories containing Jenkinsfiles. |
| CVE-2017-1000095 | Medium | 2017-10-05 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The default whitelist included the following unsafe entries: DefaultGroovyMethods.putAt(Object, String, Object); DefaultGroovyMethods.getAt(Object, String). These allowed circumventing many of the access restrictions implemented in the script sandbox by using e.g. currentBuild['rawBuild'] rather than currentBuild.rawBuild. Additionally, the following entries allowed accessing private data that would not be accessible otherwise due to script security: groovy.json.JsonOutput.toJson(Closure); groovy.json.JsonOutput.toJson(Object). |