Overview 5 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
5matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
5
100.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
5
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
5
100.0%
split by
peak 2 / month
Mar 172
No exploit published2
Critical2
not blocked2
No public exploit2
Apr 170
May 170
Jun 171
No exploit published1
Critical1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Jul 170
Aug 170
Sep 171
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Oct 170
Nov 171
No exploit published1
High1
not blocked1
No public exploit1
Mar 17Apr 17May 17Jun 17Jul 17Aug 17Sep 17Oct 17Nov 17
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2017-4995 | High | 2017-11-27 | No exploit published | No public exploit | An issue was discovered in Pivotal Spring Security 4.2.0.RELEASE through 4.2.2.RELEASE, and Spring Security 5.0.0.M1. When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known "deserialization gadgets." Spring Security configures Jackson with global default typing enabled, which means that (through the previous exploit) arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true: (1) Spring Security's Jackson support is being leveraged by invoking SecurityJackson2Modules.getModules(ClassLoader) or SecurityJackson2Modules.enableDefaultTyping(ObjectMapper); (2) Jackson is used to deserialize data that is not trusted (Spring Security does not perform deserialization using Jackson, so this is an explicit choice of the user); and (3) there is an unknown (Jackson is not blacklisting it already) "deserialization gadget" that allows code execution present on the classpath. Jackson provides a blacklisting approach to protecting against this type of attack, but Spring Security should be proactive against blocking unknown "deserialization gadgets" when Spring Security enables default typing. |
| CVE-2016-8744 | High | 2017-09-13 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Apache Brooklyn uses the SnakeYAML library for parsing YAML inputs. SnakeYAML allows the use of YAML tags to indicate that SnakeYAML should unmarshal data to a Java type. In the default configuration in Brooklyn before 0.10.0, SnakeYAML will allow unmarshalling to any Java type available on the classpath. This could provide an authenticated user with a means to cause the JVM running Brooklyn to load and run Java code without detection by Brooklyn. Such code would have the privileges of the Java process running Brooklyn, including the ability to open files and network connections, and execute system commands. There is known to be a proof-of-concept exploit using this vulnerability. |
| CVE-2016-3690 | Critical | 2017-06-08 | No exploit published | No public exploit | The PooledInvokerServlet in JBoss EAP 4.x and 5.x allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted serialized payload. |
| CVE-2016-8749 | Critical | 2017-03-28 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Apache Camel's Jackson and JacksonXML unmarshalling operation are vulnerable to Remote Code Execution attacks. |
| CVE-2017-3159 | Critical | 2017-03-07 | No exploit published | No public exploit | Apache Camel's camel-snakeyaml component is vulnerable to Java object de-serialization vulnerability. De-serializing untrusted data can lead to security flaws. |