Overview 3 matches · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
Protected by Waratek
3
100.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
3
100.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
0
0.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
1
33.3%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
2
66.7%
split by
peak 1 / quarter
Q4 11Q1 12Q2 12Q3 12Q4 12Q1 13Q2 13Q3 13Q4 13Q1 14
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2013-2185 | High | 2014-01-19 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | The readObject method in the DiskFileItem class in Apache Tomcat and JBoss Web, as used in Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 6.1.0 and Red Hat JBoss Portal 6.0.0, allows remote attackers to write to arbitrary files via a NULL byte in a file name in a serialized instance, a similar issue to CVE-2013-2186. NOTE: this issue is reportedly disputed by the Apache Tomcat team, although Red Hat considers it a vulnerability. The dispute appears to regard whether it is the responsibility of applications to avoid providing untrusted data to be deserialized, or whether this class should inherently protect against this issue |
| CVE-2013-4271 | High | 2013-10-10 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | The default configuration of the ObjectRepresentation class in Restlet before 2.1.4 deserializes objects from untrusted sources, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary Java code via a serialized object, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-4221. |
| CVE-2011-2894 | Medium | 2011-10-04 | Protected by Waratek | Proof of concept only | Spring Framework 3.0.0 through 3.0.5, Spring Security 3.0.0 through 3.0.5 and 2.0.0 through 2.0.6, and possibly other versions deserialize objects from untrusted sources, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended security restrictions and execute untrusted code by (1) serializing a java.lang.Proxy instance and using InvocationHandler, or (2) accessing internal AOP interfaces, as demonstrated using deserialization of a DefaultListableBeanFactory instance to execute arbitrary commands via the java.lang.Runtime class. |