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Published to 2013-12-31✕CWE CWE-502✕
Overview 3 matches · 2 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 1 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches 2protected66.7% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 1public PoC33.3% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek 2 66.7% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 1 33.3% No exploit published 0 0.0%
Critical 0 0.0% High 2 66.7% Medium 1 33.3% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%
blocked by ARMR today 2 66.7% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 1 33.3% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%
Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 1 33.3% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 2 66.7%
split by peak 1 / quarter
Q4 11Q1 12Q2 12Q3 12Q4 12Q1 13Q2 13Q3 13Q4 13
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CVE Severity Published▾ Status Exploitation Description
CVE-2013-4271 High 2013-10-10 Protected by Waratek No public exploit The default configuration of the ObjectRepresentation class in Restlet before 2.1.4 deserializes objects from untrusted sources, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary Java code via a serialized object, a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-4221.
CVE-2013-1768 High 2013-07-11 Mitigation candidate No public exploit The BrokerFactory functionality in Apache OpenJPA 1.x before 1.2.3 and 2.x before 2.2.2 creates local executable JSP files containing logging trace data produced during deserialization of certain crafted OpenJPA objects, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by creating a serialized object and leveraging improperly secured server programs.
CVE-2011-2894 Medium 2011-10-04 Protected by Waratek Proof of concept only Spring Framework 3.0.0 through 3.0.5, Spring Security 3.0.0 through 3.0.5 and 2.0.0 through 2.0.6, and possibly other versions deserialize objects from untrusted sources, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended security restrictions and execute untrusted code by (1) serializing a java.lang.Proxy instance and using InvocationHandler, or (2) accessing internal AOP interfaces, as demonstrated using deserialization of a DefaultListableBeanFactory instance to execute arbitrary commands via the java.lang.Runtime class.