Overview 2 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
2matches
0protected0.0%
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
0
0.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
2
100.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
0
0.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
2
100.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
1
50.0%
Proof of concept only
1
50.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
0
0.0%
split by
peak 1 / month
Oct 24Dec 24Feb 25Apr 25Jun 25Aug 25Oct 25Dec 25Feb 26
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-1529 | High | 2026-02-09 | Mitigation candidate | Proof of concept only | A flaw was found in Keycloak. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by modifying the organization ID and target email within a legitimate invitation token's JSON Web Token (JWT) payload. This lack of cryptographic signature verification allows the attacker to successfully self-register into an unauthorized organization, leading to unauthorized access. |
| CVE-2024-8698 | High | 2024-09-19 | Mitigation candidate | Working exploit published | A flaw exists in the SAML signature validation method within the Keycloak XMLSignatureUtil class. The method incorrectly determines whether a SAML signature is for the full document or only for specific assertions based on the position of the signature in the XML document, rather than the Reference element used to specify the signed element. This flaw allows attackers to create crafted responses that can bypass the validation, potentially leading to privilege escalation or impersonation attacks. |