Overview 3 matches · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5
3matches
0exploited0.0%
0CISA KEV0.0%
0public PoC0.0%
0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%
Protected by Waratek
3
100.0%
Rule in development
0
0.0%
Mitigation candidate
0
0.0%
No exploit published
0
0.0%
blocked by ARMR today
3
100.0%
partly blocked
0
0.0%
not blocked
0
0.0%
not established
0
0.0%
unrecorded
0
0.0%
Exploited
0
0.0%
Working exploit published
0
0.0%
Proof of concept only
0
0.0%
Forecast only
0
0.0%
No public exploit
3
100.0%
split by
peak 2 / year
2018201920202021202220232024
| CVE | Severity | Published▾ | Status | Exploitation | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-38807 | Medium | 2024-08-23 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | Applications that use spring-boot-loader or spring-boot-loader-classic and contain custom code that performs signature verification of nested jar files may be vulnerable to signature forgery where content that appears to have been signed by one signer has, in fact, been signed by another. |
| CVE-2016-1000342 | High | 2018-06-04 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In the Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier ECDSA does not fully validate ASN.1 encoding of signature on verification. It is possible to inject extra elements in the sequence making up the signature and still have it validate, which in some cases may allow the introduction of 'invisible' data into a signed structure. |
| CVE-2016-1000338 | High | 2018-06-01 | Protected by Waratek | No public exploit | In Bouncy Castle JCE Provider version 1.55 and earlier the DSA does not fully validate ASN.1 encoding of signature on verification. It is possible to inject extra elements in the sequence making up the signature and still have it validate, which in some cases may allow the introduction of 'invisible' data into a signed structure. |