CWE-345 CVEs · No exploit published · High

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Overview 11 matches · 0 protected · 0 exploited · 0 CISA KEV · 0 public PoC · 0 EPSS ≥ 0.5

11matches 0protected0.0% 0exploited0.0% 0CISA KEV0.0% 0public PoC0.0% 0EPSS ≥ 0.50.0%

Protected by Waratek 0 0.0% Rule in development 0 0.0% Mitigation candidate 0 0.0% No exploit published 11 100.0%

Critical 0 0.0% High 11 100.0% Medium 0 0.0% Low 0 0.0% None 0 0.0% Unknown 0 0.0%

blocked by ARMR today 0 0.0% partly blocked 0 0.0% not blocked 11 100.0% not established 0 0.0% unrecorded 0 0.0%

Exploited 0 0.0% Working exploit published 0 0.0% Proof of concept only 0 0.0% Forecast only 0 0.0% No public exploit 11 100.0%

split by StatusSeverityProtectionExploit maturity peak 6 / year

20161 No exploit published1 High1 not blocked1 No public exploit1 20171 No exploit published1 High1 not blocked1 No public exploit1 20181 No exploit published1 High1 not blocked1 No public exploit1 20190 20200 20210 20220 20230 20242 No exploit published2 High2 not blocked2 No public exploit2 20250 20266 No exploit published6 High6 not blocked6 No public exploit6

20162017201820192020202120222023202420252026

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CVE	Severity	Published▾	Status	Exploitation	Description
CVE-2026-102695	High	2026-10-14	No exploit published	No public exploit	OmniFaces is a utility library for Faces. In OmniFaces versions before 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, and 5.4.2, CombinedResourceHandler accepts a structurally valid deflated and base64 encoded combined resource ID without verifying that the server issued it. A forged ID can cause unbounded decoded output, add unique reconstructed IDs to a process-lifetime cache, or combine resources other than stylesheets and scripts. Because jakarta.faces.RESOURCE_EXCLUDES is not applied by this custom resolution path, a forged ID can disclose Facelets source from the webapp resource tree or META-INF/resources. In a deployment configured with the wildcard CDN mapping, a forged ID that selects omnifaces.graphic can also cause a blind, deployment-dependent server-side fetch whose destination derives partly from the request Host header. The flaw does not provide arbitrary file read or establish arbitrary-scheme or arbitrary-destination SSRF. The shared authenticity failure permits memory exhaustion and limited resource disclosure. This issue is fixed in versions 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, and 5.4.2.
CVE-2026-85515	High	2026-10-03	No exploit published	No public exploit	In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, a truncated OpenPGP encrypted message was accepted with no error reported, and on the SEIPD version 1 path with no integrity check performed at all. RFC 9580 sec. 13.7 permits an implementation to release the cleartext of the fully authenticated chunks when streaming but requires it to indicate a clear error as soon as the truncation is detected, and to report suspect integrity when it discovers malleable ciphertext. The truncation was detected and then discarded: when a message is truncated but the length field of the enclosing packet is left unchanged, BCPGInputStream.PartialInputStream raises an EOFException for the missing ciphertext, and BCPGInputStream.nextPacketTag() reports an EOFException as a clean end of message, so the packet stream above it stopped as though no packets remained. On the AEAD path (SEIPD version 2 and the version 5 AEAD packet), when the literal data packet ended on an AEAD chunk boundary and the consumer read in increments smaller than one chunk, the look-ahead for the packet after the literal triggered the truncated chunk read, so BcAEADUtil and JceAEADUtil never reached the trailing message tag of sec. 5.13.2 that authenticates the total plaintext length; the caller received the plaintext of the fully authenticated chunks, every packet following the literal was silently dropped, and no exception was raised, so a signed and encrypted message read back as a well-formed unsigned one. Every byte released on that path remained individually authenticated, making this a missing truncation error rather than a forgery, and it is a residual of CVE-2026-12817, which closed the same outcome for an attacker who corrects the outer packet length. On the SEIPD version 1 path the consequence was more serious: IntegrityProtectedInputStream verifies the modification detection code from close(), and reached close() only by closing itself when a read of it returned -1, which a truncated message never produces, so PGPEncryptedData.verify() never ran and the recipient was handed CFB-decrypted plaintext on which no integrity check of any kind had been performed. Measured on a message truncated into that shape, 136 distinct single-byte modifications of the ciphertext produced accepted, altered plaintext with no exception raised. Reachability is a property of the message rather than of attacker-supplied input: the AEAD shape held for 3 of 131 consecutive payload lengths measured, and the SEIPD version 1 shape for one payload length in sixteen, at a truncation offset that did not move with the payload length. The low-level API is unaffected, a caller that invokes PGPEncryptedData.verify() directly getting the check regardless, as are consumers reading in increments of a whole AEAD chunk or more. The AEAD decryption streams now re-throw such an EOFException as a plain IOException, which nextPacketTag() does not launder; OpenPGPMessageInputStream.close() now closes its layer's integrity-protected stream itself rather than relying on that stream having seen the end of its data; and IntegrityProtectedInputStream.close() was made idempotent, as java.io.Closeable requires, which that depends on, since the stream is genuinely closed twice on the ordinary path and PGPEncryptedData.verify() consumes the digest state behind it and cannot be run a second time. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, on the AEAD route only, as that edition does not ship the high-level OpenPGP API the SEIPDv1 route runs through. It also affects Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcpg-fips 1.0.14 (1.0.X series), 2.0.14.1 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.14 (2.1.X series), on the AEAD route only, as those editions do not ship the high-level OpenPGP API.
CVE-2026-71887	High	2026-10-03	No exploit published	No public exploit	In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP API accepted a data signature made by a signing subkey whose Subkey Binding signature carried no embedded Primary Key Binding (cross-certification) signature, in the case where that binding omits a Key Flags subpacket. RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.1.8 and sec. 10.1.3 require the embedded Primary Key Binding signature on any subkey that can issue signatures; it is the subkey's own statement that it belongs to the primary key it is bound under. OpenPGPCertificate resolved the subkey's key flags two different ways. isSigningKey() goes through getKeyFlags() and getApplyingSubpacket(), which falls back to the primary key's direct-key or primary User ID self-signature when the binding signature omits the subpacket, so the subkey inherited the primary's SIGN_DATA and counted as signing-capable; verifyEmbeddedPrimaryKeyBinding(), which enforces the requirement, reads the binding signature's own hashed subpackets, found no SIGN_DATA there, and returned early as a non-signing key without ever demanding the back signature. The same subkey was therefore signing-capable - so its signatures were attributed to the certificate and OpenPGPSignature.OpenPGPDocumentSignature.isValid() returned true - while being exempt from cross-certification, where GnuPG refuses the identical certificate and message. An attacker needs only the victim's public signing subkey, which is public material: they bind it to their own primary key with a Subkey Binding signature they are able to make, carrying no Key Flags and no embedded Primary Key Binding signature, which they cannot make without the subkey's private key, and a relying party verifying one of the victim's genuinely signed messages against that certificate is told the signature is valid and given the attacker's certificate as its issuer. Because a certificate's User IDs are self-asserted, a verifier that pins on the subkey's fingerprint or key ID while taking the identity from the enclosing certificate reports a real signature under an attacker-chosen identity. This is misattribution of a genuine signature rather than forgery of a new one: no private key is recovered, and the signature must be one the grafted subkey actually made. The low-level PGPSignature / PGPPublicKeyRing API performs no binding checks by design and is unaffected. Key Flags are a statement about the key the carrying signature refers to (RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29), so a subkey no longer inherits them from the certificate-wide signatures of the primary key: a Subkey Binding signature that omits the subpacket now leaves the subkey with no capabilities rather than the primary's, which makes the flags the cross-certification check consults the same flags every other decision consults. Preferences and the other subpackets a direct-key signature carries are inherited as before, and the primary key itself, whose flags legitimately come from its own direct-key or User ID self-signature, is unaffected.
CVE-2026-103878	High	2026-10-02	No exploit published	No public exploit	Cleartext transmission of sensitive information vulnerability in Apache Directory LDAP API. A StartTLS extended operation started after a Search request has been sent can lead to receive data in plain text before the TLS Handshake has been completed. This issue affects Apache Directory LDAP API: from 2.1.0 before 2.1.9. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.9, which fixes the issue.
CVE-2026-53561	High	2026-08-25	No exploit published	No public exploit	An improper authentication vulnerability in HiveServer2 SAML bearer-token validation in Apache Hive 4.0.0 through 4.2.0 (and later unreleased branches) on deployments using HTTP transport with hive.server2.authentication=SAML allows an unauthenticated network attacker to authenticate as an arbitrary Hive user and obtain an authenticated HiveServer2 session via a forged Authorization: Bearer token sent to the /cliservice HTTP endpoint. Users are recommended to upgrade to 4.2.1 version that includes the fix for this issue. Access / authorization required: No Hive credentials, SAML IdP login, or knowledge of the server signing secret is required. The attacker only needs network reachability to the HiveServer2 HTTP port (typically /cliservice), directly or through a reverse proxy such as Apache Knox that forwards unauthenticated requests to HS2. The instance must have SAML authentication enabled in HTTP mode. Deployments where Knox handles SSO and HiveServer2 uses LDAP/Kerberos (not native SAML mode) are not affected by this specific issue.
CVE-2026-59641	High	2026-08-03	No exploit published	No public exploit	In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.85, S/MIME validator trusts signer-asserted signingTime for path validation. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.12, and Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcmail-fips and bcjmail-fips 1.0.7 (1.0.X series), 2.0.7 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.7 (2.1.X series).
CVE-2024-25638	High	2024-07-22	No exploit published	No public exploit	dnsjava is an implementation of DNS in Java. Records in DNS replies are not checked for their relevance to the query, allowing an attacker to respond with RRs from different zones. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.6.0.
CVE-2023-6236	High	2024-04-10	No exploit published	No public exploit	A flaw was found in Red Hat Enterprise Application Platform 8. When an OIDC app that serves multiple tenants attempts to access the second tenant, it should prompt the user to log in again since the second tenant is secured with a different OIDC configuration. The underlying issue is in OidcSessionTokenStore when determining if a cached token should be used or not. This logic needs to be updated to take into account the new "provider-url" option in addition to the "realm" option. EAP-7 does not provide the vulnerable provider-url configuration option in its OIDC implementation and is not affected by this flaw.
CVE-2018-15801	High	2018-12-19	No exploit published	No public exploit	Spring Security versions 5.1.x prior to 5.1.2 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability during JWT issuer validation. In order to be impacted, the same private key for an honest issuer and a malicious user must be used when signing JWTs. In that case, a malicious user could fashion signed JWTs with the malicious issuer URL that may be granted for the honest issuer.
CVE-2017-12972	High	2017-08-20	No exploit published	No public exploit	In Nimbus JOSE+JWT before 4.39, there is no integer-overflow check when converting length values from bytes to bits, which allows attackers to conduct HMAC bypass attacks by shifting Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) and ciphertext so that different plaintext is obtained for the same HMAC.
CVE-2015-7539	High	2016-02-03	No exploit published	No public exploit	The Plugins Manager in Jenkins before 1.640 and LTS before 1.625.2 does not verify checksums for plugin files referenced in update site data, which makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted plugin.

CVE

Severity

Published▾

Status

Exploitation

Description

CVE-2026-102695

High

2026-10-14

No exploit published

No public exploit

OmniFaces is a utility library for Faces. In OmniFaces versions before 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, and 5.4.2, CombinedResourceHandler accepts a structurally valid deflated and base64 encoded combined resource ID without verifying that the server issued it. A forged ID can cause unbounded decoded output, add unique reconstructed IDs to a process-lifetime cache, or combine resources other than stylesheets and scripts. Because jakarta.faces.RESOURCE_EXCLUDES is not applied by this custom resolution path, a forged ID can disclose Facelets source from the webapp resource tree or META-INF/resources. In a deployment configured with the wildcard CDN mapping, a forged ID that selects omnifaces.graphic can also cause a blind, deployment-dependent server-side fetch whose destination derives partly from the request Host header. The flaw does not provide arbitrary file read or establish arbitrary-scheme or arbitrary-destination SSRF. The shared authenticity failure permits memory exhaustion and limited resource disclosure. This issue is fixed in versions 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, and 5.4.2.

CVE-2026-85515

High

2026-10-03

No exploit published

No public exploit

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, a truncated OpenPGP encrypted message was accepted with no error reported, and on the SEIPD version 1 path with no integrity check performed at all. RFC 9580 sec. 13.7 permits an implementation to release the cleartext of the fully authenticated chunks when streaming but requires it to indicate a clear error as soon as the truncation is detected, and to report suspect integrity when it discovers malleable ciphertext. The truncation was detected and then discarded: when a message is truncated but the length field of the enclosing packet is left unchanged, BCPGInputStream.PartialInputStream raises an EOFException for the missing ciphertext, and BCPGInputStream.nextPacketTag() reports an EOFException as a clean end of message, so the packet stream above it stopped as though no packets remained. On the AEAD path (SEIPD version 2 and the version 5 AEAD packet), when the literal data packet ended on an AEAD chunk boundary and the consumer read in increments smaller than one chunk, the look-ahead for the packet after the literal triggered the truncated chunk read, so BcAEADUtil and JceAEADUtil never reached the trailing message tag of sec. 5.13.2 that authenticates the total plaintext length; the caller received the plaintext of the fully authenticated chunks, every packet following the literal was silently dropped, and no exception was raised, so a signed and encrypted message read back as a well-formed unsigned one. Every byte released on that path remained individually authenticated, making this a missing truncation error rather than a forgery, and it is a residual of CVE-2026-12817, which closed the same outcome for an attacker who corrects the outer packet length. On the SEIPD version 1 path the consequence was more serious: IntegrityProtectedInputStream verifies the modification detection code from close(), and reached close() only by closing itself when a read of it returned -1, which a truncated message never produces, so PGPEncryptedData.verify() never ran and the recipient was handed CFB-decrypted plaintext on which no integrity check of any kind had been performed. Measured on a message truncated into that shape, 136 distinct single-byte modifications of the ciphertext produced accepted, altered plaintext with no exception raised. Reachability is a property of the message rather than of attacker-supplied input: the AEAD shape held for 3 of 131 consecutive payload lengths measured, and the SEIPD version 1 shape for one payload length in sixteen, at a truncation offset that did not move with the payload length. The low-level API is unaffected, a caller that invokes PGPEncryptedData.verify() directly getting the check regardless, as are consumers reading in increments of a whole AEAD chunk or more. The AEAD decryption streams now re-throw such an EOFException as a plain IOException, which nextPacketTag() does not launder; OpenPGPMessageInputStream.close() now closes its layer's integrity-protected stream itself rather than relying on that stream having seen the end of its data; and IntegrityProtectedInputStream.close() was made idempotent, as java.io.Closeable requires, which that depends on, since the stream is genuinely closed twice on the ordinary path and PGPEncryptedData.verify() consumes the digest state behind it and cannot be run a second time. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.13, on the AEAD route only, as that edition does not ship the high-level OpenPGP API the SEIPDv1 route runs through. It also affects Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcpg-fips 1.0.14 (1.0.X series), 2.0.14.1 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.14 (2.1.X series), on the AEAD route only, as those editions do not ship the high-level OpenPGP API.

CVE-2026-71887

High

2026-10-03

No exploit published

No public exploit

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the high-level OpenPGP API accepted a data signature made by a signing subkey whose Subkey Binding signature carried no embedded Primary Key Binding (cross-certification) signature, in the case where that binding omits a Key Flags subpacket. RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.1.8 and sec. 10.1.3 require the embedded Primary Key Binding signature on any subkey that can issue signatures; it is the subkey's own statement that it belongs to the primary key it is bound under. OpenPGPCertificate resolved the subkey's key flags two different ways. isSigningKey() goes through getKeyFlags() and getApplyingSubpacket(), which falls back to the primary key's direct-key or primary User ID self-signature when the binding signature omits the subpacket, so the subkey inherited the primary's SIGN_DATA and counted as signing-capable; verifyEmbeddedPrimaryKeyBinding(), which enforces the requirement, reads the binding signature's own hashed subpackets, found no SIGN_DATA there, and returned early as a non-signing key without ever demanding the back signature. The same subkey was therefore signing-capable - so its signatures were attributed to the certificate and OpenPGPSignature.OpenPGPDocumentSignature.isValid() returned true - while being exempt from cross-certification, where GnuPG refuses the identical certificate and message. An attacker needs only the victim's public signing subkey, which is public material: they bind it to their own primary key with a Subkey Binding signature they are able to make, carrying no Key Flags and no embedded Primary Key Binding signature, which they cannot make without the subkey's private key, and a relying party verifying one of the victim's genuinely signed messages against that certificate is told the signature is valid and given the attacker's certificate as its issuer. Because a certificate's User IDs are self-asserted, a verifier that pins on the subkey's fingerprint or key ID while taking the identity from the enclosing certificate reports a real signature under an attacker-chosen identity. This is misattribution of a genuine signature rather than forgery of a new one: no private key is recovered, and the signature must be one the grafted subkey actually made. The low-level PGPSignature / PGPPublicKeyRing API performs no binding checks by design and is unaffected. Key Flags are a statement about the key the carrying signature refers to (RFC 9580 sec. 5.2.3.29), so a subkey no longer inherits them from the certificate-wide signatures of the primary key: a Subkey Binding signature that omits the subpacket now leaves the subkey with no capabilities rather than the primary's, which makes the flags the cross-certification check consults the same flags every other decision consults. Preferences and the other subpackets a direct-key signature carries are inherited as before, and the primary key itself, whose flags legitimately come from its own direct-key or User ID self-signature, is unaffected.

CVE-2026-103878

High

2026-10-02

No exploit published

No public exploit

Cleartext transmission of sensitive information vulnerability in Apache Directory LDAP API. A StartTLS extended operation started after a Search request has been sent can lead to receive data in plain text before the TLS Handshake has been completed. This issue affects Apache Directory LDAP API: from 2.1.0 before 2.1.9. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.9, which fixes the issue.

CVE-2026-53561

High

2026-08-25

No exploit published

No public exploit

An improper authentication vulnerability in HiveServer2 SAML bearer-token validation in Apache Hive 4.0.0 through 4.2.0 (and later unreleased branches) on deployments using HTTP transport with hive.server2.authentication=SAML allows an unauthenticated network attacker to authenticate as an arbitrary Hive user and obtain an authenticated HiveServer2 session via a forged Authorization: Bearer token sent to the /cliservice HTTP endpoint. Users are recommended to upgrade to 4.2.1 version that includes the fix for this issue. Access / authorization required: No Hive credentials, SAML IdP login, or knowledge of the server signing secret is required. The attacker only needs network reachability to the HiveServer2 HTTP port (typically /cliservice), directly or through a reverse proxy such as Apache Knox that forwards unauthenticated requests to HS2. The instance must have SAML authentication enabled in HTTP mode. Deployments where Knox handles SSO and HiveServer2 uses LDAP/Kerberos (not native SAML mode) are not affected by this specific issue.

CVE-2026-59641

High

2026-08-03

No exploit published

No public exploit

In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.85, S/MIME validator trusts signer-asserted signingTime for path validation. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java LTS before 2.73.12, and Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcmail-fips and bcjmail-fips 1.0.7 (1.0.X series), 2.0.7 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.7 (2.1.X series).

CVE-2024-25638

High

2024-07-22

No exploit published

No public exploit

dnsjava is an implementation of DNS in Java. Records in DNS replies are not checked for their relevance to the query, allowing an attacker to respond with RRs from different zones. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.6.0.

CVE-2023-6236

High

2024-04-10

No exploit published

No public exploit

A flaw was found in Red Hat Enterprise Application Platform 8. When an OIDC app that serves multiple tenants attempts to access the second tenant, it should prompt the user to log in again since the second tenant is secured with a different OIDC configuration. The underlying issue is in OidcSessionTokenStore when determining if a cached token should be used or not. This logic needs to be updated to take into account the new "provider-url" option in addition to the "realm" option. EAP-7 does not provide the vulnerable provider-url configuration option in its OIDC implementation and is not affected by this flaw.

CVE-2018-15801

High

2018-12-19

No exploit published

No public exploit

Spring Security versions 5.1.x prior to 5.1.2 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability during JWT issuer validation. In order to be impacted, the same private key for an honest issuer and a malicious user must be used when signing JWTs. In that case, a malicious user could fashion signed JWTs with the malicious issuer URL that may be granted for the honest issuer.

CVE-2017-12972

High

2017-08-20

No exploit published

No public exploit

In Nimbus JOSE+JWT before 4.39, there is no integer-overflow check when converting length values from bytes to bits, which allows attackers to conduct HMAC bypass attacks by shifting Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) and ciphertext so that different plaintext is obtained for the same HMAC.

CVE-2015-7539

High

2016-02-03

No exploit published

No public exploit

The Plugins Manager in Jenkins before 1.640 and LTS before 1.625.2 does not verify checksums for plugin files referenced in update site data, which makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted plugin.